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ABSTRACT
Since early experimentation in the late 1800’s, wireless communication has become in-
creasingly important and has been widely adopted by civilian and military markets world-
wide. The proliferation of wireless communication systems presents new challenges, threats
and opportunities for society and government institutions. Although the possibility of in-
fringing privacy laws exist, electronic surveillance has become an important capability
in military, counter-terrorism and law-enforcement operations. Through interception of
wireless communication signals, an advantage may be gained by extracting intelligence
from, or interfering with, communication signals of an adversary. Interception can only
be performed once the presence of the communication signal is detected. However, com-
munication signals are typically not intended for reception by third parties and security
mechanisms are often employed to protect communication transmissions from compro-
mise. Sophisticated techniques are therefore required to reliably detect the presence of,
and to extract information from, the communication signal of interest.
Due to the ubiquitous use of wireless communication devices, techniques to efficiently use
and manage system resources, such as the available radio frequency (RF) spectrum, have
been developed and are implemented in these devices to ensure co-existence and to limit
interference. Communication systems are also designed to minimise transmission power
dynamically, which brings about several advantages, such as enhanced battery life for
mobile users and lower detection probability in military applications. Techniques to share
resources among several users are also employed in order to increase system capacity and
availability. Detecting the presence of a certain communication signal within the resultant
dense signal environment is therefore challenging, especially if the intercept receiver does
not have accurate knowledge of the parameters being used by the target communication
system. The signal of interest will typically be weak, hidden in background noise and
among several other competing communication signals.
The detection of communication signals, and specifically weak signals, forms an integral
part of modern electronic warfare (EW) in applications of communication surveillance.
Signal detection is foundational in extracting parameter values and communications in-
telligence (COMINT) from radio transmissions, which are important components of com-
munications EW. Knowledge of the communication parameter values of the target radio
system must be obtained before further action can be taken to counter potentially hos-
tile communication transmissions. Efficient detection of weak communication signals will
therefore enhance the detection capability of communication intercept receivers, and will
provide an improved capability to perform interception, direction finding and jamming of
these hidden transmissions.
This thesis considers the non-cooperative or blind detection of a specific class of covert
communication signals, known as direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). DSSS is a low
probability of detection (LPD) communications technique, initially developed for military
application to hide transmitted messages below the noise floor in order to avoid detection
by potential enemy interceptors. DSSS has also become popular in non-military com-
munication systems and is widely implemented in existing wireless communication stan-
dards. The popularity of DSSS is due to its interference-rejection, multipath-resistance,
co-existence and transmission-security properties, which are desirable for communication
in mobile radio channels. As DSSS was designed as a covert communication technique,
detecting and demodulating DSSS transmissions present a significant challenge, especially
in the non-cooperative context.
The performance of detection algorithms can be expressed in terms of the probability of de-
tection over a range of signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs), although computational complexity
should also be taken into account. Sophisticated algorithms which provide high detection
probabilities usually also have high computational demands, which will limit their imple-
mentation in real-time detection systems. Existing detection techniques are investigated
and evaluated in this thesis through mathematical analysis and Monte-Carlo computer
simulation, in terms of both detection probability and computational complexity. Most
existing detection techniques rely on differentiating between the statistical properties of
the signal and the noise in which the signal is potentially hidden, using test statistics
based on either energy or correlation characteristics. New and improved detection and
estimation techniques, based on similar concepts and eigen analysis, are presented and
evaluated in this thesis.
The main body of this thesis consists of three published journal articles, which resulted
from the Ph.D. research work, embedded into the text. The first publication presents an
approximation to a statistical distribution which can be used to predict the performance
of the eigen detection techniques presented here. The second publication presents two
new semi-blind DSSS detection techniques, and the third publication considers the blind
estimation of the sequence length of DSSS spreading codes. Sequence length estimation
is important as several semi-blind DSSS detection and estimation techniques require the
sequence length as input parameter.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In certain scenarios where humans or electronic systems interact, it is desirable to hide the
fact that communication is taking place. Covert communication can provide an advantage
over an enemy in a battle scenario or strategic engagement, but can also be beneficial in a
communal setting where neutral entities attempt to communicate over a shared channel
without causing undue interference to neighbours. Conversely, knowing that information
is being transmitted between two or more enemy entities can also provide an advantage
in a military setting. Detecting signal activity is the first step towards intercepting and
exploiting potentially valuable information by tapping into enemy communication trans-
missions. Signal detection is also important in non-military settings, where the presence
of a communication signal can serve as an indicator that the channel is currently occupied
and cannot therefore be accessed by potential competitors.
1.1.1 Signal detection and transmission security
Covert communication techniques were originally developed to hide communication trans-
missions for military application in order to prevent detection by enemy receivers [1]. This
type of communication is therefore known as low probability of detection (LPD) commu-
nication [2]. Closely related to LPD is low probability of intercept (LPI), which refers
to communication signals which are difficult to intercept, although not necessarily dif-
ficult to detect. Although the terms “detection” and “interception” are sometimes used
interchangeably [3, 4], a distinction can be made as follows.
Signal detection can be viewed as the process of merely detecting the presence of a signal
without attempting to estimate the signal parameters for the purpose of extracting the
message content of the signal [5]. A certain amount of parameter estimation will however
be part of the detection process, as certain assumptions need to be made in order to detect
the presence of a signal. For example, a receiver needs to tune its centre frequency to a
certain band (or scan over the band) where the signal of interest is assumed to be present.
If the receiver finds that the signal is indeed present, information regarding the transmis-
sion band will therefore also be available, which inherently forms part of estimating the
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carrier frequency of the signal of interest. This may however not be sufficiently accurate,
and additional information, such as the signal constellation and symbol mapping, may be
required to perform demodulation. Furthermore, signal interception encompasses the pro-
cesses of detecting, receiving and demodulating the signal of interest after the parameters
have been estimated, such that the message contained in the signal can be extracted.
LPD and LPI communications are two approaches which can be used to enhance trans-
mission security, which refers to securing radio frequency (RF) or wireless transmissions
against compromise, adverse channel effects and jamming signals [2]. LPD schemes to
prevent detection include direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) signaling, where codes
are used to communicate secretly [6]. The code employed by the DSSS system is typically
unknown to third parties, especially when military systems are considered. The codes are
used to spread the transmitted signal over a wide bandwidth, enabling communication
at power levels below the noise floor [7]. Not knowing the spreading code, a third-party
receiver cannot take advantage of the processing gain available to the intended DSSS re-
ceiver, and must employ alternative strategies to differentiate between the signal hidden
in the noise, and the noise itself [5]. In order to prevent interception, LPI schemes such
as frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) signaling can be used. FHSS signaling is a
technique where the carrier frequency of the narrowband signal is constantly changed or
hopped over a much wider bandwidth in a seemingly random pattern. Only the intended
receiver that knows the hopping pattern can recover the signal. Although it is difficult
to intercept a FHSS signal, it may not be difficult to detect that it is present. A DSSS
signal however is difficult to detect, and therefore also difficult to intercept. This concept
is illustrated in Fig. 1.1 where LPD is on the top level hierarchy. It is however important
to note that LPD and LPI can be combined. For example, the carrier frequency of a DSSS
signal can be changed randomly to create a DSSS/FHSS system.
LPE
LPI
LPD
Figure 1.1: Hierarchy of low probability of detection, interception and exploitation.
To protect the actual message being transmitted over the RF channel, another layer of
protection can be added using low probability of exploitation (LPE) techniques. One
example of such a message security mechanism is encryption, which makes extracting the
message from a communication transmission difficult [2]. As illustrated in the hierarchy of
2
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Fig. 1.1, a signal which is difficult to detect or intercept will also be difficult to exploit. It
is however possible that a LPD/LPI transmission can be compromised, if the interceptor
gains access to the spreading code or hopping pattern. If a wireless communication system
employs a separate message protection mechanism in addition, the interceptor may not be
able to extract the actual message from the encrypted signal if the signal is successfully
detected and intercepted. Nevertheless, detecting the presence of a certain signal (without
extracting the message) may still be valuable, as the fact that communication is taking
place is information in its own right.
1.1.2 Electronic warfare in wireless communications
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to any action taken to control the electromagnetic (EM)
spectrum with the purpose of preserving friendly use and denying enemy use of the spec-
trum [8]. The focus of EW was initially on radar systems, although applying EW on
wireless communication systems gained importance as it became clear that similar needs
and opportunities in terms of protection and exploitation exist. The dawn of digital com-
munications and the implementation of techniques such as channel coding and encryption
complicated gaining unauthorised access to information-bearing RF signals, which fur-
ther contributed to the interest of applying EW in wireless communications [1]. As shown
in Fig. 1.2, EW consists of electronic attack, protection and support which respectively
replaced the older classifications of electronic counter measures (ECM), electronic counter-
counter measures (ECCM) and electronic support measures (ESM). Each of these three
concepts is subsequently explained with an emphasis on wireless communication trans-
missions.
Electronic warfare
(EW)
Electronic attack
(EA or ECM)
Electronic protection
(EP or ECCM)
Electronic support
(ES or ESM)
Figure 1.2: The three components of electronic warfare.
1.1.2.1 Electronic attack
ECM refers to methods (e.g. jamming, chaff and flares) to counter (or to interfere with)
the operation of radar, communication and threat systems (e.g. heat-seeking missiles).
Electronic attack encompasses the older ECM definition, but also includes weapon sys-
tems aligned with the purposes of ECM. These weapon systems include anti-radiation
3
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
weapons which aim to incapacitate sources of EM radiation using a physical projectile,
and directed-energy weapons which transmit energy in a focused direction without using
a projectile. An example anti-radiation weapon system is an anti-satellite missile that
may be used to destroy a communication or radar satellite, and an example directed-
energy weapon application is transmitting high-power RF signals to destroy or saturate
the electronics in a receiver system [8].
Electronic attack in communications EW therefore refers to attacking an enemy commu-
nication system by either physically destroying elements of the system or by injecting
interfering RF (jamming) signals into the enemy communication band with the aim of
denying, degrading or disrupting information flow. Jamming involves the injection of noise
waveforms, interfering signals or signals masquerading as communication signals (control
or information e.g. false messages) into the target receiver [1, 9].
1.1.2.2 Electronic protection
Electronic protection or ECCM refers to measures taken to counter the effects of electronic
attack such as jamming [8], and to protect radar or communication signals from compro-
mise, including interception and direction finding. Electronic protection approaches rele-
vant to wireless communications include spread spectrum (see the transmission security
mechanisms discussed in Section 1.1.1), channel coding or forward error correction, and
null-steering antennas [1]. Protecting communication signals from adverse channel effects
is similar to countering enemy jamming attempts and the same techniques (e.g. channel
coding) can be applied.
1.1.2.3 Electronic support
Electronic support or ESM refers to the reception of RF transmissions with the aim of
supporting electronic attack and also electronic protection. Although electronic support
is defined in terms of tactical or quick-response activities (such as providing the carrier
frequency of a transmitting enemy communication system to be jammed to the electronic
attack system), the electronic support receiver may also monitor wireless communication
activity over longer periods to determine the locations and types of enemy transmitters [8].
Closely related to electronic support is communications intelligence (COMINT), which
refers to the interception of communication signals with the purpose of extracting intelli-
gence from the information contained in the transmission [8]. The COMINT or intercept
receiver employs signal detection and estimation techniques to determine whether a cer-
tain type of signal is present from which intelligence may be extracted.
4
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Electronic support is the foundational component of communications EW, and with in-
sufficient electronic support capability, communication electronic attack and protection
attempts would be fruitless. Efficient detection of communication signals will enhance
communication interception, direction finding and jamming.
1.1.2.4 Tactical and strategic interception
Practical signal detection operations consist of tactical and strategic aspects [2]. Tactical
COMINT platforms are typically mobile, have limited processing capabilities, and are
usually required to perform real-time analysis in order to interact with and respond to
the environment quickly [10]. By contrast, strategic COMINT platforms are typically
stationary (for example housed in a building), have greater computational power, and
operate over longer time scales to collect and analyse signals [11].
Signals intercepted by tactical platforms can be stored and passed on to strategic platforms
for further off-line analysis. Usually the amount of data is large and high-performance
computing (HPC) platforms are required to perform analysis. Signal parameters obtained
from strategic analysis can then be passed back to tactical platforms to intercept and
analyse signals in real time.
Detection algorithms with lower processing requirements are therefore applied in tactical
operations, while more computationally complex algorithms are used in strategic analysis.
Details regarding which algorithm is used on which platform are proprietary information
and not available in the literature, except for declassified information on systems that are
no longer in use [12].
Fig. 1.3 illustrates the three elements of EW applied to a COMINT and jamming scenario.
The transmitted signal is protected using electronic protection techniques such as spread
spectrum signaling or channel coding. The electronic support receiver attempts to extract
signal parameters from the transmitted signal of the target communication system, and
the communication receiver is the target of the electronic attack system (the use of anti-
radiation weapons is not considered here).
In a tactical scenario, real-time analysis of the intercepted signal will be attempted, such
that the estimated signal parameter values will be fed to the jammer or electronic at-
tack system to attack the receiver of the target communication system (using jamming
waveforms) while the target communication system is still transmitting. The electronic
support receiver may also perform direction finding in order to estimate the location of
the target transmitter.
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Communication
transmitter
EP
ES EA
ES
receiver
Jammer
Signal
parameters
Communication
receiver
Figure 1.3: Electronic warfare applied in a wireless communication scenario.
In a strategic scenario, the electronic support system (or intercept receiver) will record
the intercepted signals for further off-line analysis. The processed signal or estimated
parameter values may then be used in future communications EW operations.
1.1.3 Military and non-military communication
Wireless communication has become an integral component of both military and non-
military life [13], where non-military refers to the use of communication systems in sup-
port of civilian, criminal and terrorist activities. The proliferation and ubiquitous use of
wireless communication systems, coupled with the decreasing availability of RF spectrum,
have lead communication engineers to develop and adopt strategies to efficiently manage
system resources in a dense user environment. These strategies include employing the
transmission security techniques discussed in Section 1.1.1, which were originally devel-
oped for military applications in order to communicate in unfavourable channel conditions
with LPD [2]. These techniques allow several users to communicate concurrently using
the same frequency band, while minimising the transmission power. Resultant advantages
to the users and operators of a communication system utilising such techniques include
enhanced battery life of the mobile device, increased system capacity, improved spectrum
utilisation, and lower detection probability for unintended receivers.
A growing trend in the military domain is the increasing reliance on commercial communi-
cation devices, and the more prevalent interaction and confrontation with non-military (or
unconventional) forces using commercial communication systems [9,13]. This has resulted
in a requirement for countermeasure technology to focus more on commercial wireless
communication systems. Furthermore, terms like “enemy”, “warfare” and “military” have
veered away from their original definitions as traditional conflicts are being replaced with
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unconventional and asymmetrical war, and the distinction between military and non-
military communication is becoming increasingly vague. Detecting potentially harmful
communication transmissions within commercial communication networks and the mon-
itoring and interception of signals from a wide variety of sources have therefore gained
importance.
1.1.4 Non-cooperative signal interception
In cooperative1 communication system design, optimal signal detection techniques such
as correlation or matched filtering can be used, as the receiver has perfect knowledge
of all the signal parameters (e.g. carrier frequency and modulation type) used by the
transmitter [7]. Many RF signals originating from commercial communication systems or
networks can also be detected optimally, as the majority of the specifications are openly
available. The signal parameters may however vary due to channel effects such as noise,
time dispersion and Doppler shift. Estimation techniques are therefore implemented to
find and track the parameters around their known values [15]. Detection and estimation
techniques are also used to identify the beginning of transmissions (as in asynchronous
communication systems) or to identify inactive channels or “white spaces” (as in cognitive
radio systems [14]).
However, in non-cooperative applications such as spectrum surveillance and electronic
interception, the receiver has little or no knowledge available of the communication pa-
rameters used by the transmitter. If no knowledge is available, the intercept receiver must
rely on blind detection and estimation techniques, which are typically more complex and
processor-intensive compared with non-blind detection. If some parameter information
is indeed available, semi-blind techniques may be used. Performing detection in a non-
cooperative context may also involve parameter estimation techniques. In order to detect a
specified signal, it may be required to estimate some of its parameters to confirm that the
detected signal is indeed the signal of interest. Estimation techniques can also be adapted
to function as detection algorithms by using the estimated parameters as detection test
statistics [16, 17].
Blind detection is further complicated by the fact that target communication signals are
typically weak, hidden in background noise, for the reasons given below.
• The intercept receiver is not necessarily located within the communication range or
1Cooperative in this sense means the transmitter and receiver are cooperating (they are part of the same
communication system or network) in order to achieve successful communication. In cognitive radio [14],
cooperative spectrum sensing has a different meaning and refers to several sensing nodes collaborating
to determine collectively whether a signal of interest is present or not.
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within the main lobe of the transmitting antenna as illustrated in Fig. 1.4. Modern
communication systems employ feedback power control mechanisms to conserve en-
ergy (and to limit interference) such that the intended receiver receives just enough
signal power to recover the transmitted message. The communication range is there-
fore continually adjusted and minimised, according to changes in the channel caused
by movement of the transmitter or receiver, and various other environmental ef-
fects [6, 18].
• Certain covert communication systems employ digital signalling techniques (such
as the LPD/LPI schemes discussed in Section 1.1.1) to further reduce transmitted
power, in order to communicate at power levels below the noise floor [7]. Only
the intended receiver, having knowledge of the signalling technique, can therefore
recover the transmitted message from the noisy signal with relative ease.
Communication
transmitter
r1
Communication
receiver
Intercept
receiver
r2
Figure 1.4: Signal interception scenario where r2 is much larger than r1.
Detection of a given communication transmission is also difficult in a dense and dynamic
wireless signal environment. Due to the multitude of concurrent communication users and
their mobility, a large number of simultaneous signals is typically present in the surveil-
lance band with fluctuating signal powers. A specific signal therefore not only competes
against background channel noise, but also against numerous other signals, effectively
weakening the signal further.
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The development and implementation of blind weak signal detection techniques is there-
fore of critical importance to non-cooperative signal interception, especially when LPD/LPI
signals are concerned. When the presence of the signal of interest can successfully be de-
tected, further actions can be taken such as locating or tracking the movement of the
associated transmitter, extracting the message content, or denying communication trans-
mission through jamming [2]. Intelligence gathering, direction finding, and communication
denial efforts therefore depend on the implementation of efficient signal detection tech-
niques.
1.2 Problem definition
The problem considered in this thesis is the detection of the presence of weak DSSS
communication signals with unknown parameter values. Closely related is the estimation
of the parameter values that are required to perform detection and to classify the detected
signal. As blind detection and estimation techniques are processor-intensive, real-time
detection is difficult to achieve [5, 15] and unknown DSSS signals therefore present a
significant challenge to the COMINT or intercept receiver.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, DSSS signaling was originally developed as a covert or LPD
modulation technique for use in wireless military networks [6]. The increasing demand
for wireless communication and the associated diminishing availability of radio spectrum
have however resulted in the widespread adoption of DSSS technology in commercial wire-
less communication standards [6, 19], including wireless local area networks [20], satellite
telephones [21], and almost all 3G mobile cellular standards [18].
The popularity of DSSS signaling in wireless communications is due to its interference-
rejection, multipath-resistance, co-existence2, and transmission-security properties [18].
This popularity and the fact that DSSS transmissions are difficult to detect have made
it a threat in terms of hiding potentially hostile transmissions below the noise floor and
within dense user environments [2, 9].
Furthermore, as military systems increasingly rely on commercial communication technol-
ogy [13] (and the difference between military and non-military communications becomes
less significant), techniques to counter both traditional military and modern commercial
DSSS transmissions are required. The development of sophisticated techniques to detect
weak DSSS signals is the first step towards achieving this goal.
2DSSS signaling can be used to allow multiple concurrent access to the same frequency band, by either
assigning orthogonal spreading codes (with strict time synchronisation) or non-orthogonal spreading
codes (with multi-user detection) to each participating user or device. These schemes are known as
direct-sequence code division multiple access (CDMA) methods as multiple access is achieved through
the code domain [22].
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1.3 Objectives of work
The objectives of the work presented in this thesis are given below.
• Evaluation of existing communication detection and estimation techniques.
• Development of new and improved DSSS detection techniques.
• Analysis and comparison of the detection performance of existing and new tech-
niques.
• Analysis and comparison of the computational complexities of these techniques in
order to determine the feasibility of hardware development and implementation.
1.4 Signal detection approach
The signal detection approach followed in this thesis is based on statistical decision theory
where the detector must decide whether the signal of interest is present or not, given a
set of noisy data [5]. The classical signal detection approach involves the following steps.
1. A test statistic value is calculated from the noisy data (or received signal).
2. The value is compared with a threshold, which is determined from the detection
performance specifications.
3. If the threshold is exceeded, a detection is declared or an alarm signal is activated.
The threshold differentiates between the two hypotheses of “signal present” and “signal
absent”. The possible outcomes are given in Table 1.1, where the aim is to maximise the
detection probability, while constraining the error probabilities.
Table 1.1: Possible outcomes of binary hypothesis testing.
Detector decision
Reality “Signal is absent” “Signal is present”
Signal is absent
Correct rejection
False alarm
(H0) (Type I error)
Signal is present Miss
Correct detection
(H1) (Type II error)
The threshold level is an indication of how stringently the hypothesis testing is performed.
If the threshold level is set high, only high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) signals will be cor-
rectly detected. Using a high threshold level in low-SNR scenarios will therefore result in
a low probability of correct detection PD and a high probability of miss PM . Likewise, the
false alarm probability PFA will be low and the probability of correct rejection high. Using
this threshold-detection approach, it is not possible to minimise both error probabilities
(PFA and PM) simultaneously. Furthermore, PD and PFA will increase and decrease to-
gether as the threshold level is adjusted. A popular approach is to fix one error probability
to a constant value, while minimising the other one, as the two error probabilities can be
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traded off. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) approach is to fix PFA and then to minimise PM ,
which is equivalent to maximising PD, since PD + PM = 1 [5].
The detection approach followed in this thesis is based on the NP theorem. The challenge
is to design detection algorithms to extract a feature from the received signal that can be
used to differentiate between the two hypotheses at low SNRs. Further details regarding
the signal detection approach are discussed in Chapter 2.
1.5 Techniques and methods used
The research design (types of studies undertaken) and the methodology followed in this
thesis are subsequently discussed.
1.5.1 Research design
1.5.1.1 Theoretical and empirical analyses
The design of new detection and estimation algorithms require both mathematical analysis
and empirical tests or numerical evaluation of components of these algorithms. The eval-
uation of the detection and estimation performances, and the computational complexities
also require mathematical and numerical analyses.
1.5.1.2 Statistical modelling
Development and evaluation of the algorithms to be implemented in the intercept re-
ceiver require statistical models of the transmitted data and noise. For simplicity of mod-
eling and algorithm development, it will be assumed that the data is uniformly and the
noise normally distributed [7,23]. Data and noise sequences can be generated experimen-
tally using established software implementations of pseudo-random sequences, such as the
Mersenne-Twister pseudo-noise (PN) generator implemented in the GNU scientific library
(GSL) [24].
1.5.1.3 Computer simulation
Closed-form mathematical analysis of digital communication techniques and algorithms
is often not possible due to the level of complexity involved [5,25]. Monte-Carlo computer
simulation provides a solution with a high measure of control, which can be used to
predict the performance of communication and receiver systems in the real world under
different scenarios. The approach followed in this thesis to determine the performance of
each detection algorithm and the effects of several parameters such as the SNR relies on
Monte-Carlo analysis of computer models (and mathematical analysis where applicable),
which include the receiver architecture, detection algorithms, and channel effects.
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Figure 1.5: Software simulation model of the communication system and intercept re-
ceiver.
1.5.2 Research methodology
The research design was executed mainly through computer simulation. The DSSS com-
munication platform and intercept receiver were implemented in C using the basic linear
algebra subprograms (BLAS) and GSL libraries [24]. Using this lower-level programming
approach provides an execution speed advantage, as performance evaluation of digital
communication systems typically requires a very large number of data samples in order
to obtain reliable statistics [25].
1.5.2.1 Software simulation model
The baseband simulation model of the DSSS communication system and single-channel
intercept receiver shown in Fig. 1.5 were used to evaluate existing and newly developed
detection and estimation algorithms. Several assumptions are made in the model to sim-
plify the design, including the fact that no carrier is used and only additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel effects are considered (see also Appendix A).
The data generator shown in Fig. 1.5 produces a binary phase shift keying (BPSK) data
signal d(t) with uniformly distributed samples with values ±1. The data is spread by
multiplying d(t) with the spreading code c(t), and the result is amplified by a factor ks
to produce the spread spectrum signal xs(t).
A noise generator produces zero-mean, unity-variance, normally-distributed samples which
12
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are amplified by a factor kn to produce the noise signal xn(t). AWGN is thus introduced
by adding xn(t) to xs(t) to produce the received signal y(t). The values of ks and kn are
chosen according to the desired SNR (at the input of the receiver) defined as
SNR =
k2s
k2n
. (1.1)
The intended DSSS receiver recovers an estimate dˆ(t) of the original data from the received
signal y(t) using a synchronised copy of c(t). To confirm that the DSSS transmitter and
receiver structures are implemented correctly, the error probability Pe is calculated by
comparing d(t) with dˆ(t) over a range of SNR values. The measured Pe vs. SNR is then
compared with the theoretical performance curve of BPSK DSSS in AWGN, which can
easily be derived mathematically [26].
The intercept receiver executes the detection or estimation algorithm under evaluation
using the received signal y(t) as main input. Other possible inputs include the transmitted
DSSS signal xs(t), the correct value of a parameter to be estimated θ, and the detection
threshold γ. The performance indicators provided as outputs are the probabilities of
detection PD, false alarm PFA, and correct estimation Pce.
1.5.2.2 Detection performance
Following the NP approach [5], PD can be measured (experimentally or in simulation)
over a range of SNR values using the threshold γ, calculated from a set PFA value. PFA
can also be measured and compared with the set value. The resultant PD vs. SNR curve
can then be compared with reference performance curves, such as energy detection (ED).
To calculate the optimal value for γ, perfect knowledge of the data and noise statistics
are assumed. Prior knowledge of whether xs(t) is transmitted or not, is also assumed to
calculate PD and PFA.
1.5.2.3 Estimation performance
Estimation accuracy is defined in terms of the difference or error between the actual
parameter value θ and the estimated parameter value θˆ [15]. A similar measure, the prob-
ability of correct estimation value Pce, was used in this thesis to evaluate the performance
of sequence-length-estimation algorithms over a range of SNR values.
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Table 1.2: Parameter summary to evaluate different scenarios.
Parameter Value/Type
Channel effect AWGN
Modulation BPSK
Spreading code Barker-11, m-sequence-63, Walsh-64
SNR range As required such that PD, Pce ∈ [0, 1]
PFA 0.1 to 10
−6
Receiver architecture Single channel
1.5.2.4 Computational cost analysis
Computational complexity can be derived mathematically in terms of the total number of
elementary arithmetic operations (+,−,×,÷), or the equivalent number of additions and
multiplications, required to execute an algorithm [27]. The execution time (or equivalently
the number of clock cycles) can also be determined in software.
1.5.2.5 Scenario selection
To evaluate different detection and estimation algorithms, a number of different scenarios
must be considered. Each scenario depends on environmental effects, the type of DSSS
transmission, and the configuration of the intercept receiver.
Table 1.2 contains a summary of the parameters and their values or types that are con-
sidered in this thesis. Representative spreading code types used in communication sys-
tems [26, 28] are considered, including a short code (Barker-11), and longer orthogonal
(Walsh) and non-orthogonal (m-sequence) codes. The PFA range is chosen to include large
values that can easily be verified experimentally, and smaller values in line with practical
detection system design [5].
1.6 Outline of thesis structure
The structure of this thesis follows the PhD by publication format, where the core of the
document consists of three published papers. The outline of the thesis is considered below.
1.6.1 Literature review
An extensive literature review is provided in Chapter 2, where the existing body of relevant
knowledge is summarised. The theory considered includes communication signal detection,
DSSS technology, and existing detection and estimation approaches relevant to DSSS.
Gaps identified in the literature are also discussed.
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1.6.2 Thesis core: publications
Chapters 3 to 5 contain the three papers embedded into the thesis text, such that section,
figure and table numbering are followed sequentially throughout the thesis. Each paper is
however a self-contained publication following from an introduction to conclusion in each
case. Some overlap between the three publication chapters and the rest of this thesis is
therefore present. The reference list of each paper was however removed and embedded
into the reference list of this thesis, provided after Chapter 6 and before the appendices.
The bibliographic details of the three published chapters are given below.
• Chapter 3: “Analytic approximation to the largest eigenvalue distribution of a white
Wishart matrix,” IET Communications, vol. 6, no. 12, pp. 1804–1811, Aug. 2012.
• Chapter 4: “Non-cooperative detection of weak spread-spectrum signals in additive
white Gaussian noise,” IET Communications, vol. 6, no. 16, pp. 2513–2524, Nov.
2012.
• Chapter 5: “Blind sequence-length estimation of low-SNR cyclostationary sequences,”
IET Communications, vol. 8, no. 9, pp. 1578–1588, Jun. 2014.
Following are short descriptions of the three publications.
1.6.2.1 Publication 1
The first publication (Chapter 3) presents an approximation to an eigenvalue distribution
that is used in the second publication to express the performance of the newly developed
DSSS detection algorithms. The distribution under consideration is that of the largest
eigenvalue of a white Wishart matrix, which is formed when performing principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) on the detection or data matrix in the noise-only case (H0).
1.6.2.2 Publication 2
The second publication (Chapter 4) presents new DSSS detection algorithms, based on
PCA and cyclic shifting of the data matrix. The algorithms are shown to perform better
than classical ED in AWGN, although at increased computational complexity.
1.6.2.3 Publication 3
The third publication (Chapter 5) presents blind methods to determine the spreading code
length of DSSS signals hidden within AWGN. Sequence-length estimation algorithms are
important to detect DSSS signals, as several detection algorithms assume prior knowledge
of the sequence length.
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1.6.3 Discussion
The thesis is concluded in Chapter 6 where major findings of the research work are high-
lighted. The challenge and importance of DSSS detection research, and possible ethical
issues surrounding the research topic are also discussed. Finally, possibilities of future
research are briefly considered.
1.6.4 Reference list and appendices
Finally, the reference list and a number of appendices are given after Chapter 6.
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2.1 Detection of communication signals
Communication signal detection and parameter estimation refer to statistical signal pro-
cessing performed on signals at the input of a communication receiver. The objectives
of such processing are to determine the presence or absence of signals within noise, to
classify the signals, and to extract information from the signals [29]. This section con-
siders detection theory applied to communication signals, as the focus of this thesis is
on communication signal detection. Parameter estimation theory is briefly considered in
Appendix B.
Detecting the presence of a signal is based on statistical decision theory where binary hy-
pothesis testing is applied to decide between the following two hypotheses when analysing
the received signal [5].
H0 : The communication signal of interest is absent (only noise is present).
H1 : The communication signal of interest is present within noise.
The possible outcomes of binary decision making are shown in Table 1.1 in Section 1.4.
Discriminating between H0 and H1 involves the calculation of a function value (the test
statistic) from the received signal samples and comparing this value with a threshold.
When the test statistic exceeds the threshold value, H1 is chosen (a detection is declared).
The central problem of detection theory is finding the correct function to calculate the
test statistic value and making a decision based on this value [5].
There are a number of signal-detection approaches that can be applied, which can be
categorised according to the following criteria [5].
• Number of hypotheses:
– Binary: A decision must be made between only two hypotheses, such as H0
and H1 given above.
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– Multiple: A decision must be made between more than two hypotheses. This
approach is used for example in classification problems, where a signal or pa-
rameter must be identified from multiple possibilities.
• Knowledge of parameters available to the receiver:
– Simple test: All the parameters are known, such that the probability density
function (PDF) describing the received signal under each hypothesis is com-
pletely known. This approach is used e.g. in a communication receiver where
the signal of interest and the noise statistics are known exactly.
– Composite test: Unknown parameters are present, such that the PDF describ-
ing the received signal is not completely known. This approach is applicable in
e.g. detecting RF signals where the carrier frequency and noise statistics are
not known completely.
• Use of prior probabilities:
– Classical detection: Prior probabilities are not used, e.g. in radar systems and
blind-detection of communication signals where prior knowledge regarding the
occurrence of the signal of interest is not available.
– Bayesian detection: Prior probabilities are known or assigned to the hypotheses,
e.g. in a communication system where the probability of occurrence of symbols
is known a priori.
In this thesis, only binary hypothesis testing using a simple classical approach will be con-
sidered to derive and evaluate the detection performance of various detection techniques.
Statistics of the signal will also be assumed known to the receiver under both hypotheses.
2.1.1 Simple classical approach
The simple classical approach forms the basis of non-cooperative signal detection from
which the other approaches can be understood. Using this approach, the two types of
decision errors given below can be made when deciding whether H0 or H1 is true (see also
Table 1.1).
• Type I error (false alarm): Choosing H1 when the signal is in fact absent.
• Type II error (miss): Choosing H0 when the signal is in fact present.
Although one would like to minimise both errors simultaneously, this is not possible
using threshold detection.1 When the probability of false alarm PFA is minimised, the
probability of miss PM is maximised and vice versa. The classical approach is to trade
the two errors off against one another.
1Both errors may possibly be constrained concurrently using a serial detection approach [30].
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An illustration of a sampled noisy signal y[n] where the signal of interest is present at
n = 50 is shown in Fig. 2.1. By choosing a low threshold as shown in Fig. 2.1(a), several
noise samples will exceed the threshold resulting in a large PFA. However, the low threshold
will also ensure a small PM since the signal of interest will usually exceed the threshold
and will therefore not be missed. Likewise, by choosing a high threshold value as shown
in Fig. 2.1(b), the PFA will be small and the PM large since the probability that any
received sample will exceed the threshold is small (for the case shown in Fig. 2.1(b)
no correct or false detections are made). Clearly, the error probabilities depend on the
threshold, and the optimal threshold level will result in a trade-off between PFA and PM .
The optimal decision rule can be defined in terms of the likelihood ratio test (LRT) and
the NP theorem [5].
0 50 100
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(a) Low threshold scenario.
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(b) High threshold scenario.
Figure 2.1: Different threshold scenarios to detect a signal (the spike at n = 50) in noise.
2.1.2 Likelihood ratio test
The likelihood ratio measures the likelihood that hypothesis H1 is true relative to the
likelihood that hypothesis H0 is true, given an observed data set y [23]. The likelihood
ratio is therefore given by
Λ(y) =
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) (2.1)
with p(y;H1) and p(y;H0) respectively the likelihood functions of H1 and H0 given the
data set y. (The difference between likelihood and probability is discussed in Appendix
C.) The LRT is a statistical test, based on the likelihood ratio, that can be used to
decide optimally between the two hypotheses, given that the PDFs of the data under
both hypotheses are known. The LRT is given by
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) > γ (2.2)
with γ a threshold value, that forms the decision region. The data set that satisfies the
inequality of (2.2) falls into the region where the signal is hypothesised to be present
(where H1 is assumed to be true).
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2.1.3 Neyman-Pearson theorem
The NP approach [5] is to maximise the detection probability PD for a fixed false alarm
rate PFA using the LRT. If (2.2) is satisfied, the NP theorem states that H1 should be
chosen, where the optimal value for the threshold γ is obtained from the PFA expression.
The LRT can also be used to obtain the test statistic function (i.e. how the data must be
processed to perform detection) and the expressions for the detection performance.
It is important to note that the decision region defined by the LRT in (2.2) is not affected
if the inequality expression is changed by any operation that does not affect the values
that satisfy the inequality [23]. The LRT can therefore be simplified, for example, by
taking the logarithm on both sides of (2.2).
2.1.4 Example to explain LRT and NP theorem
The example considered here is based on the detection of a direct current (DC) level in
AWGN with zero mean [5]. Assuming a single sample is used to perform detection and
the signal is the DC level x = A, the hypothesis problem can be stated as
H0 : y = w (2.3)
H1 : y = A+ w (2.4)
with w ∼ N (µ = 0, σ2). The likelihood functions are then given by
p(y;H0) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
[
− y
2
2σ2
]
(2.5)
p(y;H1) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
[
−(y − A)
2
2σ2
]
. (2.6)
The likelihood ratio can then be written using (2.1) as
Λ(y) =
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) (2.7)
= exp
[
2Ay − A2
2σ2
]
. (2.8)
Using the LRT of (2.2), a detection should therefore be declared if
exp
[
2Ay − A2
2σ2
]
> γ (2.9)
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according to the NP theorem. As the decision space is unaffected by modifying both sides
of the inequality with logarithms, (2.9) can be simplified as
ln exp
[
2Ay − A2
2σ2
]
> ln γ (2.10)
∴ 2Ay − A
2
2σ2
> ln γ (2.11)
∴ y > (2σ
2 ln γ) + A2
2A
(2.12)
by collecting all data-dependent terms on the left-hand side of the inequality. The in-
equality can further be simplified by replacing the threshold value with a single variable
as
y > γ′ (2.13)
where the new threshold level will be determined directly from the false alarm rate. The
inequality in (2.13) indicates that the test statistic is T (y) = y, such that the value of the
single sample will be used as is to decide between H0 and H1.
The false alarm probability PFA and detection probability PD are related to the likelihood
functions as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. PFA can be expressed using the likelihood function for
H0 as
PFA = p(H1;H0) (2.14)
= p(T (y) > γ′;H0) (2.15)
and since T (y) ∼ N (0, σ2) under H0 from (2.5), the false alarm probability can be given
as
PFA = Q
(
γ′
σ
)
(2.16)
as explained in Appendix D. The threshold level is therefore
γ′ = σ Q−1 (PFA) . (2.17)
The detection probability PD can similarly be derived as
PD = p(H1;H1) (2.18)
= p(T (y) > γ′;H1) (2.19)
= Q
(
γ′ − A
σ
)
. (2.20)
Equations (2.16) and (2.20) define the theoretical performance for the detection problem
given by (2.3) and (2.4), which can be attained by using the optimal threshold level
defined in (2.17).
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Figure 2.2: Detection performance related to the likelihood functions.
The performance of a detector also depends on the SNR, and two detectors can be com-
pared by evaluating their performances over a range of SNR values. The detector that
achieves a higher PD at the same SNR for a given PFA has better detection performance
(though the computational cost of achieving a higher PD should also be considered when
comparing two detectors).
To determine the performance of the example detector as a function of SNR, it should be
noted that the power of a DC signal of amplitude A is Ps = A
2, and the noise power is
simply the variance of the AWGN variable w, given by Pn = σ
2. The SNR can therefore
be expressed as
SNR =
Ps
Pn
=
A2
σ2
. (2.21)
The detection performance can then be obtained by substituting (2.17) and (2.21) into
(2.20) as
PD = Q
(
σ Q−1 (PFA)− A
σ
)
(2.22)
= Q
(
Q−1 (PFA)−
√
SNR
)
. (2.23)
Fig. 2.3 shows the theoretical performance obtained using (2.23) and the simulated per-
formance for different PFA values over a range of SNR values. The noise power was chosen
as Pn = 1 W and the simulated performance was calculated over 1000 iterations for each
SNR value. By increasing the number of iterations, the performance will converge to the
theoretical curve in each case.
The detection performance can also be displayed as a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC), which is a graph depicting PD against PFA for a fixed SNR value. A number of
ROCs using (2.23) is displayed in Fig. 2.4. Clearly, the further a curve is away from the
45◦ reference line, the better the performance. By allowing a small PFA, a good detector
should achieve a high PD value.
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Figure 2.3: Theoretical and simulated performance for DC level in AWGN.
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Figure 2.4: Theoretical ROC curves for different SNR values.
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2.2 DSSS Technology
DSSS signaling is a class of spread spectrum modulation techniques2 where the trans-
mitted waveform has a much wider bandwidth than the required Nyquist bandwidth [28]
to contain the information signal. The modulated RF bandwidth is determined by some
function unrelated to the information signal.
2.2.1 Transmitter and receiver architectures
The essence of spread spectrum communication is expanding the bandwidth of the in-
formation signal, transmitting the expanded signal, and recovering the desired signal
by collapsing the spread signal back into its original information bandwidth at the re-
ceiver [19]. DSSS is typically implemented in combination with phase shift keying (PSK)
modulation. In its simplest form, BPSK is used such that the transmitted DSSS signal
can be expressed as
s(t) = d(t)c(t)cos(wct) (2.24)
with d(t) a real input data signal, c(t) the real spreading code, and wc the sinusoidal
RF carrier. The data signal consists of a stream of antipodal bits (taking on values −1
and 1) each having duration Tb, and the spreading code consists of a sequence of antipo-
dal samples or chips each having duration Tc. Higher order modulation formats such as
quadrature PSK (QPSK) can also be used, especially when c(t) is complex.
The bandwidth of s(t) is determined by the chip period Tc, while the bandwidth expansion
factor is determined by the spreading code length, which is equal to the number of chips
in c(t) used to represent a single data bit. The bandwidth expansion factor (or processing
gain) can therefore be given as [19]
GP =
WRF
WBB
=
Tb
Tc
(2.25)
with WRF the spread RF bandwidth and WBB the narrow base-band information band-
width. Each data bit is thus represented by a sequence of chips (the spreading code) having
a bandwidth GP times that of the data stream. The power spectral density (PSD) of the
spread signal is also reduced GP times (assuming the amplitudes of the original data and
spread signals are equal). The bit energy is therefore spread over a wide frequency band,
potentially hiding the information signal within noise.
To recover the original data sequence, the DSSS receiver performs coherent demodulation
and performs despreading by matching segments of s(t) with a local copy of c(t) using
2Other spread spectrum techniques include FHSS, time hopping, pulsed techniques and hybrid forms [19].
Only DSSS will be considered in this thesis.
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a correlation-type architecture. Apart from carrier synchronisation (including frequency
and phase recovery), an important aspect of recovering the original data is code syn-
chronisation which is required to synchronise the local spreading code (originating from
a sequence generator or memory bank) with the spreading code within the received sig-
nal. Time synchronisation is obtained through an initial acquisition stage and maintained
through a tracking stage to align the incoming signal and the local spreading code, usually
via a delay-locked or code-locked loop [19].
2.2.2 Properties of spreading codes
Spreading codes are the signature sequences or keys, shared by the spread spectrum
transmitter and receiver, which contain the transmitted message signal after spreading.
The properties of spread spectrum transmissions are inherited from the type and quality of
spreading codes used. Desired properties of spreading codes are considered below [6,7,28].
2.2.2.1 Low detectability or randomness
Since DSSS is an LPD scheme, the spreading code should ideally be a random sequence
resembling white noise. The communication signal and background noise would then be
indistinguishable for an unintended receiver. The randomness of a digital sequence can be
evaluated in terms of its statistical distribution, predictability of patterns, and correlation
between its elements [28]. A spreading code should have a uniform distribution in which
the probabilities of occurrence of all symbols in the sequence alphabet are equal. Repeating
patterns within the spreading code are undesirable and should be limited to make the
sequence less predictable. Lastly, the occurrence of a given value in the sequence must
be independent from the others, such that a given symbol value may not be inferred by
observing the others.
2.2.2.2 Determinism or pseudo-randomness
Spreading codes are usually generated (or stored) at both the transmitter and receiver,
which require them to be deterministic. Pseudo-random or PN sequences provide the
possibility for DSSS codes to resemble noise while still being deterministic.
2.2.2.3 Correlation characteristics
An important aspect of spreading codes is their correlation characteristics. Autocorrela-
tion peaks are produced during despreading when the receiver’s copy of the spreading
code aligns with a spreading code within the received signal. To achieve reliable com-
munication in low SNR conditions, these autocorrelation peaks should clearly exceed the
sidelobe correlation values (when the spreading codes are not aligned) and noise [28].
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It is desirable that spreading codes exhibit low (ideally zero) cross-correlation sidelobes.
Correlation values (both aligned and misaligned) between different spreading codes within
a family should also be low. This property affords spread spectrum a co-existence capa-
bility, where multiple access to the same frequency band can be provided to several users
as in CDMA [28].
The two desired correlation characteristics are therefore: high autocorrelation and low
cross-correlation. Correlation can be subdivided into two types, including aperiodic and
periodic correlation. The aperiodic autocorrelation (AAC) function of a length-N spread-
ing code C = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] can be expressed as [31]
Rcc(k) =
N∑
n=1
cn cn+k (2.26)
with the shift parameter k ∈ [−N + 1;N − 1] since Rcc is zero outside these ranges. The
shifted index value n+ k ∈ (0;N ] since cn+k is zero outside these ranges. Equation (2.26)
means the complete spreading code C is shifted from left to right over itself and the dot
product (or partial dot product since a complete dot product is calculated only when
k = 0) is calculated for each shift. Note that the index value n+k could also be expressed
as n− k, as the autocorrelation can be performed in either direction (equivalently, (2.26)
can be manipulated by subtracting k from the index of cn and cn+k).
The AAC function only considers the correlation given over one period of a spreading
sequence. The periodic autocorrelation (PAC) function, on the other hand, provides the
autocorrelation where the sequence repeats itself and is given similarly to (2.26) by
Rcc(k) =
N∑
n=1
cn c{(n+k) mod N} with c0 = cN (2.27)
with k now unrestricted due to the modulus operator. When the shifted index value
{(n + k) mod N} = 0, such that c0 is required in (2.27), the chip c0 must be replaced
with cN . This is to ensure that the index value remains in the range [1, N ] as required
by the definition of the spreading code C = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ]. The PAC function therefore
provides the correlation between a spreading code and a long sequence consisting of several
repetitions of the same spreading code. If the sign of a given code within the long sequence
differs from the original code, the correlation peak will simply be −N (as opposed to +N).
The periodic and aperiodic correlation characteristics are closely related and both are
important. However, in a practical burst-communication scenario, several spreading codes
will be transmitted in sequence and the periodic correlation characteristics are therefore
more important. Good aperiodic correlation characteristics will however translate to good
periodic correlation characteristics.
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2.2.2.4 Anti-jamming and interference resistance
When a DSSS communication system is attacked with a narrowband interfering or jam-
ming signal, the DSSS receiver will act on the narrowband interferer much like the
DSSS transmitter acts on the narrowband information signal. The wideband, low-PSD
information-bearing received signal will be despread into a narrowband, high-PSD signal,
while the narrowband, high-PSD interferer will be despread into a wideband, low-PSD
signal. The resultant effect is that only a small portion of the interfering energy will affect
the DSSS signal [18,28].
2.2.2.5 Multipath resistance
DSSS systems require accurate synchronisation of spreading codes in order to function
correctly. Delayed versions of the transmitted signal caused by multipath effects in the
channel will therefore typically be rejected, since they are out of phase with the direct-path
transmitted signal [18, 28].
2.2.3 Classification of spreading codes
Several different types of spreading codes exist, which are subsequently considered.
2.2.3.1 Analogue and digital codes
Analogue spreading codes are finite-length sequences of which the samples (or chips)
are taken from a continuum of values rather than from a finite-size alphabet, as is the
case with digital spreading codes [1]. Examples of analogue sequences include Huffman
sequences [32] and analogue chaotic sequences [33].
2.2.3.2 Orthogonal and non-orthogonal codes
Orthogonal codes are sets of sequences (belonging to a code family) in which all pair-
wise cross correlations are zero. Using orthogonal codes allows concurrent transmission of
multiple data streams on the same frequency band if the codes can be synchronised or
aligned in time. Different data streams may originate from different devices sharing the
same communication medium (e.g. in a wireless communication system), or it may involve
a single device where more than one channel is used to transmit or receive data (or control
information). The cross-correlation properties between codes within a family determine
how many concurrent data streams can be accommodated, and how the performance will
degrade as the number of data channels is increased [18,28].
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Non-orthogonal spreading codes are sequences that are not designed as part of an orthog-
onal code family, and their main function is to spread the bandwidth. Non-orthogonal
codes can however also be used in multi-user systems, although other strategies (e.g.
multi-user detection and scrambling codes as in WCDMA) must then be used to separate
different channels or transmitters [22].
2.2.3.3 Real and complex codes
Real codes only contain real components and are typically used in conjunction with BPSK
modulation as explained in Section 2.2.1. A complex spreading code can be expressed as
c(t) = c1(t) + jc2(t) (2.28)
with c1 the real and c2 the imaginary component sequences. c1 and c2 can either be derived
from the primitive root of unity [34], or be chosen as two unique sequences of equal length.
Complex codes are typically transmitted on quadrature carriers to isolate the real and
imaginary components. Either one or two real (equivalent to one complex) data streams
can then be spread using c(t). Depending on the correlation characteristics between c1
and c2, a multi-dimensional quadrature modulation architecture [35] can alternatively be
used. Complex codes potentially have superior correlation characteristics compared with
real codes, depending on the implementation.
2.2.3.4 Linear and nonlinear codes
Spreading codes can be generated either using linear or nonlinear techniques. Nonlinear
codes [36] provide enhanced information security properties, since they are difficult to
decipher.
2.2.4 Example spreading codes
Following are several examples of popular spreading codes that fall within the classifica-
tions discussed in Section 2.2.3 above.
2.2.4.1 Barker codes
Barker codes are short binary antipodal codes (cn = ±1) with the property that the
sidelobe autocorrelation values are bounded by unity:
|Rcc(k)| ≤ 1; k 6= 0. (2.29)
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When k = 0 the autocorrelation reaches its peak Rcc(0) = N . There are only a few known
Barker codes of lengths N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11 and 13 (see for example [28]), which are given
in Table 2.1 in binary format. Variations on the codes given in Table 2.1 are also possible;
Barker codes remain Barker codes after some transformations such as negation [28]. Barker
codes are used in DSSS schemes (e.g. the N = 11 code is used in the Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 (Wi-Fi) standard) and pulse-compression radar.
Table 2.1: All known Barker codes in binary format where 0 represents −1.
N Binary code N Binary code
2 11 and 10 7 1110010
3 110 11 10110111000
4 1110 and 1101 13 1111100110101
5 11101
The AAC and PAC functions of three Barker codes (N = 7, 11 and 13) are shown in
Fig. 2.5. The characteristic of (2.29) is also illustrated. Each AAC function shows an
autocorrelation peak of amplitude N at k = 0, and sidelobe correlation values varying
between 0 and either −1 or +1. Each PAC function shows autocorrelation peak values
(also of amplitude N) at k = 0 and at integer multiples of N . The sidelobe values are
however constant at either −1 or +1. The peak-to-sidelobe difference is also an important
feature that can be used to predict the performance of the spreading code in noise. It is
desirable that longer codes have higher peak-to-sidelobe values, although from the PAC
graphs shown in Fig. 2.5, the peak-to-sidelobe differences are [8, 12, 12] respectively for
N = [7, 11, 13]. The Barker-11 code therefore has the same peak-to-sidelobe difference as
the Barker-13 code.
2.2.4.2 Maximum-length sequences
A maximum-length (or maximal-length) shift register sequence or simply m-sequence is
a PN or pseudo-random binary sequence which can be generated using a linear feedback
shift register (LFSR) from a given seed value. A PN sequence is a noise-like sequence, as
its autocorrelation properties are similar to those of white noise [26]. A LFSR containing
m registers can generate a periodic sequence of maximum length 2m−1 (the m-sequence)
consisting of 2m−1 ones and 2m−1 − 1 zeros, if the feedback taps are chosen correctly.
The feedback taps (or register positions that should be connected to be fed back to
the input through the modulo-2 adder) of the LFSR can be determined using finite or
Galois field mathematics. The structure of a LFSR can be expressed using a polynomial
of variable X. This polynomial is known as the generator polynomial as it defines the
sequence that will be generated with the LFSR.
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Figure 2.5: Autocorrelation characteristics of several Barker codes.
30
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Fig. 2.6 shows an illustration of a LFSR with generator polynomial terms associated with
each register position. The generator polynomial for the LFSR shown in Fig. 2.6 is given
in terms of the connected taps as
g(X) = Xm +Xm−1 +Xm−2 +X2 + 1. (2.30)
Figure 2.6: Linear feedback shift register with taps connected according to g(X).
If the generator polynomial is a primitive (minimal or irreducible) polynomial of degree
m, the LFSR will have maximum cycle length M = 2m−1 [1]. Such generator polynomials
can be obtained by factoring XM + 1 and choosing the irreducible factor polynomials of
degree m. Alternatively, the tap positions and generator polynomials can be obtained
from tables in literature (e.g. [26, 28]). Table 2.2 shows some examples of the connected
taps and generator polynomials for m = 4, 5, 6. Each generator polynomial will produce
a unique m-sequence. For example, the two m = 4 generator polynomials will produce
the following two sequences
g(X) = X4 +X3 + 1 → c = [0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1] (2.31)
g(X) = X4 +X + 1 → c = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1] (2.32)
These sequences can be determined using the LFSR structure or directly from the gener-
ator polynomial as the coefficients of the terms of 1/g(X) [28].
Table 2.2: Register tap connections and generator polynomial examples for m-sequences.
m N Connected taps Generator polynomial g(X)
4 15 1,4 X4 +X3 + 1
1,2 X4 +X + 1
5 31 1,4 X5 +X3 + 1
1,3 X5 +X2 + 1
6 63 1,6 X6 +X5 + 1
1,2 X6 +X + 1
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Fig. 2.7 shows the AAC and PAC functions of m-sequences of lengths N = 15, 31, 63
where the first generator polynomial listed in Table 2.2 was used in each case. The PAC
functions show constant sidelobe values of −1 in each case.
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Figure 2.7: Autocorrelation characteristics of several m-sequences.
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2.2.4.3 Sequences derived from m-sequences
M-sequences can be used in DSSS or FHSS systems, but generally not in multi-user
systems where every user requires a unique orthogonal spreading sequence within a code
family. The cross correlation between all unique codes used in such a system should be
low (ideally zero) in order to limit interference between concurrent users. M-sequences
typically do not exhibit such desirable cross-correlation properties. It is however possible
to construct code families with improved cross-correlation properties using m-sequences.
Two such code types are Gold and Kasami sequences [28].
Gold sequences
A set of Gold sequences is generated from two specific (“preferred pairs”) m-sequences.
The first two Gold codes in the set are these two specific m-sequences. For a length-N
Gold code (with N = 2m − 1), up to N additional codes can be generated by calculating
the modulo-2 sum of the first m-sequence and a cyclic shift of the second m-sequence. For
every cyclic shift, a new Gold code is formed. A given Gold code family therefore has a
total of N + 2 sequences.
Kasami sequences
Kasami sequences are generated similarly to Gold sequences. A Kasami code is produced
by the modulo-2 sum of an m-sequence and cyclic shifts of a sequence derived from the
original m-sequence. The derived sequence is formed through decimation and replication
of the original m-sequence. The cross correlation between unique codes in the Kasami set
is smaller than for Gold codes.
2.2.4.4 Walsh codes
Walsh codes are orthogonal codes taken from a N × N matrix (with N a power of 2)
where each row contains a spreading code which is orthogonal to all other rows in the
matrix [28]. The matrix is known as the Walsh matrix, which is recursively defined as
W2n =
[
Wn Wn
Wn W n
]
(2.33)
starting from W1 = [0]. W n is the logical complement matrix of Wn. To construct antipo-
dal codes, all 0s are simply replaced with -1s.
Walsh codes are orthogonal because the cross correlation between any pair of codes (or
any pair of rows in the Walsh matrix) is zero. The dot product between code words ci
and cj is therefore zero:
N∑
n=1
ci,n cj,n = 0; i 6= j. (2.34)
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Note that the codes need to be aligned perfectly in order for the cross correlation to be
zero. Furthermore, Walsh codes also exhibit large autocorrelation sidelobes, which are
not desirable. Fig. 2.8 shows the AAC and PAC functions of Walsh codes with lengths
N = 16, 32 and 64. For each code, the middle row of the Walsh matrix is chosen as the
spreading code (e.g. for the N = 32 code, row 16 is the chosen code). Due to the large
sidelobe values (in both the AAC and PAC functions), the multi-user system that uses
Walsh codes must ensure strict synchronisation between all concurrent users accessing the
shared transmission medium.
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Figure 2.8: Autocorrelation characteristics of several Walsh codes.
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2.2.4.5 Complex spreading codes
The example spreading codes considered above are all binary and real. Real codes can
be implemented as complex codes by using them on quadrature carriers as discussed in
Section 2.2.3.3. Alternatively, complex codes can be designed by choosing their sample
(or chip) values from the primitive root of unity. Example complex codes include gen-
eralised chirp-like polyphase [34], Frank-Zadoff-Chu [37], zero cross correlation [38], and
complementary code keying [20] sequences. Complex spreading codes exhibit improved
correlation characteristics in comparison with real codes (although the data throughput
rate may be lower) and can also be used to ensure constant envelope transmission [31].
2.2.5 Commercial applications of DSSS
Spread spectrum signaling was originally developed to counter detection, interception and
jamming in the military context. The inherent interference-resistance and co-existence ca-
pabilities of spread spectrum makes it a lucrative technique with robust performance in
mobile wireless channels, where effects such as multipath are prevalent. DSSS communi-
cation has therefore, since its military origin, found multiple applications in civilian or
commercial systems and also forms part of a number of wireless and mobile communica-
tion standards [6]. A number of these applications are discussed in this section.
2.2.5.1 Mobile cellular networks
DSSS is the basis of CDMA technology which was first implemented in the Interim Stan-
dard 95 (IS-95) 2G standard [39]. CDMA has also become the primary multiple access
technique in almost all 3G mobile cellular systems, such as CDMA2000 and Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications Service (UMTS), which includes wideband CDMA (W-CDMA)
and time division synchronous CDMA (TD-SCDMA). Table 2.3 contains the spreading
codes used in these systems [18]. Orthogonal variable spreading factor (OVSF) codes are
sets of orthogonal codes with different lengths (supporting different data rates) used to
separate physical channels.
Table 2.3: Spreading codes used in mobile cellular networks.
Mobile standard Spreading code
IS-95 (cdmaOne) Walsh (N = 64)
Long PN (N = 215)
CDMA2000 Variable length Walsh (maximum N = 256)
Long PN
W-CDMA OVSF, PN codes
Gold codes (N = 218)
TD-SCDMA OVSF codes
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2.2.5.2 Wireless local area networks
The IEEE 802.11b standard known as Wi-Fi [20] employs the DSSS Barker-11 and
complementary-code-keying codes. The standard defines a contention-based wireless pro-
tocol employing the carrier-sense-multiple-access-with-collision-avoidance (CSMA/CA)
media access protocol operating in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed industrial, scientific and med-
ical (ISM) band. As the spreading codes used in Wi-Fi do not form part of an orthogonal
family, multiple access is provided by combining frequency division with the CSMA/CA
protocol.
2.2.5.3 Global navigation satellite systems
Satellite navigation systems that use DSSS technology include the USA global positioning
system (GPS) [40] and the European Galileo system [41]. The GPS system consists of
a constellation of 24 to 32 medium-Earth-orbit satellites and a number of terrestrial
monitoring and control stations. The system uses CDMA technology by assigning a unique
length-1023 PN Gold code to each satellite for civilian use. The set of codes were carefully
selected to optimise CDMA performance; from the family of 1025 codes, only 32 are used.
Increased accuracy is available for USA military purposes, where encryption and much
longer spreading codes are used.
2.2.5.4 Wireless telephone systems
Wireless telephone systems other than cellular systems that employ DSSS (or CDMA)
technology include the following.
• Cordless home telephone systems, which typically operate in unlicensed ISM bands.
Spread spectrum technology is therefore used to mitigate interference from similar
devices [42].
• Satellite telephones such as Globalstar, which consists of a constellation of 48 satel-
lites offering telephone and low-rate (9600 bps) data communication services using
CDMA [21].
2.2.5.5 Radio telemetry systems
Telemetry refers to technology that allows remote measurement and reporting of infor-
mation. A few examples of such systems, which use a wireless physical layer employing
DSSS signaling, are considered below.
• Automatic meter reading systems are used to monitor (and to control) energy and
water consumption for the purposes of billing and analyses. Different technologies,
including DSSS, are used to transmit data from the measuring units to a central
processing station [43].
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• Radio-tracking techniques are widely used in research activities to monitor wildlife
movements. Such a tracking system utilising a light weight animal tracking device
employing CDMA (Gold codes) is considered in [44]. This specific system enables
simultaneous tracking of many animals, including small birds.
• Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are typically used in
industrial control systems to monitor and control processes e.g. on manufacturing
and mining plants. These systems are often connected via RF which uses spread
spectrum techniques [45].
2.3 Approaches to detect DSSS
Parameters that can possibly be used to perform detection of DSSS signals hidden in noise
include the spreading code length, modulation type, data and chip rates, signal bandwidth,
carrier frequency, and the statistical parameters of the signal and noise. These parameters
are typically unknown in the non-cooperative context, although some may be estimated.
Noise statistics can for example be obtained by monitoring the surveillance band over
long periods of time, assuming the signal of interest is not always present.
There are two features of the RF spectrum that change when a wireless communication
system transmits information. If the surveillance band is aligned with the portion of the
spectrum in which the communication system operates, these two features may be used
to perform detection.
The first feature is the energy or power present in the surveillance band which will increase
from a reference power level as soon as an information signal is transmitted. Determining
the reference power level is a challenge in itself, since it is dynamic and depends on
background noise and the behaviour of probably many other communication transmitters
that might not be of interest. There are however several techniques which may be used
to estimate the signal-free noise level [46].
The second feature is related to the first one and encompasses the statistics of the spec-
trum. Since information is typically conveyed using signals that exhibit periodicity, the
statistics of the received signal will change when a communication signal is present. Know-
ing what the statistics are when the signal of interest is not present is again a challenge.
It can usually be assumed that noise is a stationary process, while communication sig-
nals are cyclostationary. Stationarity means the statistics do not change over time, while
cyclostationarity means the statistics change with a certain periodic pattern [47]. The
cyclostationary nature of communication signals can therefore be exploited to perform
detection.
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A number of possible approaches that may be used to perform DSSS detection is sub-
sequently discussed. Exact details regarding which detection algorithms are being used
on which platforms are either sensitive military or proprietary information and are there-
fore not widely available in the open literature (see Section 1.1.2.4). However, academic
publications, classical textbooks [1,19,48] and information in company brochures [10,11]
provide a good indication of what is possible, and which types of techniques are probably
implemented.
2.3.1 Energy detection
It can be shown mathematically (using the NP approach) that ED is the optimal detection
technique of deterministic signals when no parameter knowledge is available to be used
in the detection process [5]. As illustration, the derivation of the detection performance
of an AWGN signal hidden within AWGN is given in Appendix E.
2.3.1.1 Ideal energy detection
The continuous-time energy content of a continuous-time voltage signal y(t), over the
interval T can be expressed as [48]
Es(t) =
∫ t
t−T
y2(τ) dτ. (2.35)
If y(t) is periodic with symbol period Tsym and the integration period T = Tsym, (2.35) will
provide the signal energy of a single symbol of y(t) at some time instant t. If T < Tsym,
only a part of the symbol energy will be calculated. The energy of a received signal y(t)
can be calculated by implementing (2.35) using a sliding-window integrator. Alternatively,
an integrate-and-dump approach can be followed [48], which calculates the energy in non-
overlapping segments of y(t) every T seconds, which may or may not coincide with Tsym.
2.3.1.2 Energy detection receivers
Devices that employ ideal ED to measure the energy of RF signals are known as ra-
diometers [48, 49]. Fig. 2.9 shows a single-channel ED receiver structure consisting of a
radiometer and an alarm circuit. The received signal r(t) is first passed through a band-
pass filter tuned to a certain spectral region in order to reduce the effect of noise, and to
focus on a specified portion of the RF spectrum. To cover a wider surveillance bandwidth,
a filter-bank system (consisting of a number of parallel single-channel receivers focussing
on separate narrow bands) or a frequency-scanning receiver (where the centre frequency
of the filter is swept over a frequency range) can be used [48]. The alarm circuit must
decide between the two hypotheses H0 and H1 as discussed in Section 2.1. The alarm
circuit here is a simple thresholding device that analyses the energy measurement Es(t)
and declares a detection if a predefined energy threshold is exceeded.
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Figure 2.9: Single-channel radiometer-based receiver structure.
2.3.1.3 Performance of energy detection
The detection result provided by the intercept receiver of Fig. 2.9 can be quantified in
terms of PFA and PD as explained in Section 2.1. The test statistic function of ED for a
single window of the received signal can be given by (2.35) in its discrete form as [5]
T (y) =
N∑
n=1
(y[n])2 (2.36)
with y[n] the nth;n = 1, 2, . . . , N sample of the discrete-time equivalent of y(t) where the
window size is N samples. If a deterministic signal x(t) is to be detected in noise w(t),
the binary hypothesis problem can be stated in terms of the sampled signals as [5]
H0 : y[n] = w[n]
H1 : y[n] = x[n] + w[n].
If the signal of interest x(t) is a base-band BPSK DSSS signal, with symbol amplitude A,
the ED test statistic can be expressed as
T (y) =

N∑
n=1
(w[n])2 under H0
N∑
n=1
(±A+ w[n])2 under H1
(2.37)
In order to calculate the detection performance, it is necessary to determine the statis-
tical distributions of the test statistic under each hypothesis. The sum of squares of N
independent standard normal random variables (RVs) N (0, 1) is distributed according to
the central Chi-squared distribution with N degrees of freedom X 2N [5]. By normalising
the received samples under H0, it can therefore be shown that (see Appendix E.4)
H0 : T (y)
σ2w
∼ X 2N (2.38)
under the assumption that w(t) is AWGN with variance σ2w.
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Likewise, the normalised sum of squares of N independent normal RVs (where the nth RV
has mean µn and variance σ
2
n) is distributed according to X ′2N (λ), which is the non-central
Chi-squared distribution with N degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter given
by [5]
λ =
N∑
n=1
(
µn
σn
)2
. (2.39)
It can therefore be shown that
H1 : T (y)
σ2w
∼ X ′2N (λ) (2.40)
with
λ =
N∑
n=1
(±A
σw
)2
=
A2
σ2w
N =
σ2x
σ2w
N = SNR×N. (2.41)
The false alarm rate can then be expressed as (see Section 2.1.4)
PFA = p(T (y) > γ
′;H0) (2.42)
= p
(
T (y)
σ2w
>
γ′
σ2w
;H0
)
(2.43)
= QX 2N
(
γ′
σ2w
)
(2.44)
from which the optimal threshold level can be calculated as
γ′ = σ2w Q
−1
X 2N
(PFA) . (2.45)
Similarly, the detection probability can be obtained as
PD = p(T (y) > γ
′;H1) (2.46)
= p
(
T (y)
σ2w
>
γ′
σ2w
;H1
)
(2.47)
= QX ′2N
(
γ′
σ2w
)
. (2.48)
To detect the signal of interest in a practical or simulation setup, the threshold level given
in (2.45) will be required. However, to draw theoretical detection performance curves,
(2.45) can be substituted into (2.48) to obtain
PD = QX ′2N
(
Q−1X 2N
(PFA)
)
(2.49)
which is plotted in Fig. 2.10, for different PFA values and N = 100.
40
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10
SNR [dB]
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
D
et
ec
ti
on
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
P D
PFA = 10−1
PFA = 10−3
PFA = 10−6
Figure 2.10: Theoretical energy detection performance bounds for N = 100.
The curves shown in Fig. 2.10 represent the theoretical ED performance bounds, as perfect
knowledge of the parameters and PDFs under both hypotheses were assumed to derive
(2.49). These performance curves are valid in general when ED is applied to signals in
zero-mean AWGN, such that each received sample is normally distributed under both
hypotheses.
It can however be expected that actual detection performance will be worse than depicted
in Fig. 2.10, as perfect noise estimates will typically not be available to the detector.
Uncertainty regarding the noise level will result in an inaccurate threshold level (see
(2.45)), which will negatively affect detection performance.
Assuming energy is calculated over N consecutive samples (as in Fig. 2.10) using a sliding
window, the value N does not have to equal the symbol period (or spreading sequence
length) of the signal of interest. The results in Fig. 2.10 are valid as long as the signal of
interest (or a section of the signal) is present over the entire energy window (irrespective
of whether N matches the symbol period or not), as the detector compares the calculated
energy (not necessarily equal to the symbol energy) over the window with a threshold level
determined from the noise-only energy level. In these conditions, the underlying (and un-
known) symbol period will not influence the energy calculated over the length-N window.
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The sliding-window energy detector therefore does not require accurate knowledge of the
symbol period of the signal to be detected.
However, if the detector calculates energy over non-overlapping and consecutive segments
of the received signal, the position and period of symbols within the received signal become
important. In such conditions, the results shown in Fig. 2.10 will only be valid if each
segment contains at least one complete signal symbol and no noise-only samples. The
sliding-window approach can therefore be expected to perform better, especially for blind
detection applications.
2.3.1.4 DSSS detection
For the intercept receiver, DSSS falls under the class of unknown deterministic signals
[5, 49]. The signal parameters are typically unknown or difficult to obtain due to the
low SNR of DSSS signals. ED is therefore an important detection technique when non-
cooperative detection of weak DSSS signals is considered [48–51].
2.3.1.5 Critical evaluation of energy detection
ED provides a very simple (low computational complexity) method to perform detection,
since only the sum of squares of intercepted samples is computed. Due to the simplicity
of the mathematics involved, theoretical ED performance curves can easily be derived by
assuming perfect knowledge of the signal and noise statistics (see Section 2.3.1.3).
However, the theoretical ED performance curves also indicate that relatively high SNRs
are required to successfully perform detection [52]. ED might therefore not be the optimal
detection technique in low-SNR scenarios, as are typical for DSSS transmissions. ED does
not capitalise on the cyclic features of communication signals [3] and might therefore
easily be outperformed by other detection techniques.
The theoretical ED performance curves may also be useful as reference curves for Monte-
Carlo simulation (or experimental results) of more advanced detection techniques and
scenarios that are mathematically intractable.
2.3.2 Autocorrelation detection
The cyclostationarity of DSSS signals and similar communication transmissions can be
exploited by correlating the received signal, or a portion thereof, with itself. Detection
is then performed by analysing the output of the correlation process for the presence of
correlation peaks. Correlation detection may also be used in combination with ED [48].
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2.3.2.1 Single-channel system
The simplest form of correlation detection is to isolate a segment y˜(t) from the intercepted
signal y(t) and to correlate the two as illustrated in Fig. 2.11. Assuming the SNR is
sufficiently high, the output of the correlator Ryy will contain correlation peaks if y˜(t)
contains a spreading code (or a large section thereof) that repeats within y(t). These
peaks can either be positive or negative which can all be made positive using a squaring
(or absolute value) device. The detection test statistic R2yy is then used as input to a
thresholding device to decide whether the DSSS signal is present or not. The threshold
value can be calculated using the required PFA and noise statistics, in a similar way as
for ED explained in Section 2.3.1.3.
Figure 2.11: Single-channel autocorrelation detection system.
2.3.2.2 Dual-channel system
Correlation detection can also be implemented using two spatially separated receiver
antennas [48, 53]. The two received signals are then correlated and the output analysed
for the presence of correlation peaks. Provided the antennas are sufficiently separated and
isolated, the two receivers will produce uncorrelated noise waveforms, which will have a
smaller effect during the correlation process compared with the correlated noise samples
produced using the single-channel system. The dual-channel system will therefore produce
stronger correlation peaks resulting in a performance advantage over the single-channel
system.
2.3.2.3 Compounded autocorrelation
A compounded autocorrelation approach uses the “fluctuations of autocorrelation estima-
tors” [54, 55] or mean-square correlation sequence to perform detection. The intercepted
signal y(t) is split into M segments of duration T each, and the correlation is then calcu-
lated for every segment using [54]
R(m)yy (τ) =
1
T
∫ T
0
y(t)y∗(t− τ) dt (2.50)
where m = 1, 2, . . . ,M is the segment number.
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The mean-square correlation sequence is then calculated using [54]
ρ(τ) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
[
R(m)yy (τ)
]2
(2.51)
which will produce large correlation spikes that will exceed a threshold value (calculated
from the noise-only statistics) if the DSSS signal is present with sufficiently high SNR.
2.3.2.4 Critical evaluation of autocorrelation detection
Although autocorrelation detection can outperform ED, a relatively high SNR or many
samples that contain several repetitions of the DSSS code are still required. The perfor-
mance of this technique is however limited because a noisy signal segment is correlated
with another noisy signal segment from the same intercepted signal. The noise samples
are therefore correlated (if the single-channel correlator is used), which will hamper the
performance, as the correlation peaks will be less distinguishable from the noise. Detection
performance can however be improved by ensuring that the noise samples are uncorrelated
by using two (or more) independent receiver channels feeding into the same correlator [53].
2.3.3 Higher-order statistical analysis
The autocorrelation function and power spectrum are important second order statistical
functions which also form part of the higher order class [56]. However, higher order statis-
tical (HOS)3 analysis usually refers to correlation and spectral analysis beyond the second
order, and is defined in terms of cumulants [57] and cumulant spectra [56]. HOS analy-
sis can be used in detection and estimation problems to suppress AWGN, to reconstruct
signals, to identify nonlinearities in stochastic processes, and to perform classification [58].
2.3.3.1 Cumulant sequences and spectra
The N th order spectrum of x(t) can be expressed in terms of the Fourier transform of its
N th order cumulant sequence cN as [56]
C(w1, w2, ..., wN−1) = F {cN(τ1, τ2, . . . , τN−1)}
=
∞∑
τ1=−∞
· · ·
∞∑
τN−1=−∞
cN(τ1, τ2, . . . , τN−1) exp {−j(w1τ1 + · · ·+ wN−1τN−1)} (2.52)
with w the frequency and τ the time-shift operators. The second-order cumulant sequence
(or autocorrelation function) of the zero-mean, stationary random process x(t) can be
written as [56]
c2(τ1) = Rx(τ1) = E [x(t) x(t+ τ1)] . (2.53)
3HOS can also refer to higher order spectrum/spectra/spectral.
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Similarly, the third-order cumulant sequence (or triple correlation function) can be written
as
c3(τ1, τ2) = E [x(t) x(t+ τ1) x(t+ τ2)] . (2.54)
By substituting (2.53) into (2.52), the power spectrum C(w1) is obtained by taking the
Fourier transform of the autocorrelation function (also known as the Wiener-Khinchin
theorem [26]). Similarly, when (2.54) is substituted into (2.52), the bispectrum C(w1, w2)
is obtained.
An advantage of the bispectrum (and trispectrum and even higher orders) over the power
spectrum is the fact that the bispectrum of a Gaussian signal has a mean of zero for all
combinations of frequency pairs (w1, w2) [59]. The bispectrum of a non-Gaussian signal
however exhibits a specific pattern with non-zero means. HOS can therefore be used to
identify deviations from Gaussianness [56] which may be applied to detect DSSS signals
within AWGN.
2.3.3.2 Detection based on higher order statistics
Higher order cumulant sequences of spreading codes show unique patterns in terms of the
location and magnitude of peak values, which may be used to identify and discriminate
such sequences [60]. Similarly, the bispectrum also exhibits well-defined features with a
peak at (w1, w2) = (0, 0). Statistical tests may therefore be conducted to detect DSSS
transmissions using averaging and thresholding techniques [59].
2.3.3.3 Spectral correlation and cyclic feature detection
The cyclic spectrum [3] is similar to the bispectrum where correlations between power
spectral elements are represented on a two-dimensional or bi-frequency plane. The cyclic
spectrum can exploit the cyclostationarity of DSSS signals by extracting their cyclic fea-
tures in order to perform detection [4].
2.3.3.4 Critical evaluation of higher-order statistical analysis
HOS analysis has higher computational requirements than second order techniques, such
as the autocorrelation detection technique of Section 2.3.2. Claims that HOS may provide
better detection performance have been made [52], although only limited results to support
these claims have been published. Potential performance gains achievable by using these
HOS detection algorithms should therefore be investigated further.
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2.3.4 Time-frequency analysis
Signal detection may also be performed using time-frequency analysis, which refers to
methods where the received signal is concurrently analysed in the time and frequency
domains. Frequency analysis techniques, such as the Fourier transform, provide a spectral
view of the signal without temporal localisation [61]. The amplitude (or energy) of each
spectral line is related to the strength and total duration of a given frequency component,
but the Fourier transform does not indicate the instance of occurrence and duration of
each spectral component.
2.3.4.1 Short-time Fourier transform
Temporal localisation can be obtained by performing the Fourier transform over shorter
temporal windows of the signal. The characteristics of the short-time Fourier transform
depend on the window function and its duration. Short windows provide good temporal
resolution (the time instance when a frequency change occurs is clear), but poor frequency
resolution (the exact frequency values present are unclear). Longer windows have the
opposite characteristics (the frequency values present are clear, but the time instances of
change are unclear) [62].
2.3.4.2 Wavelet transform
The wavelet transform addresses the resolution challenges of the short-time Fourier trans-
form using multi-resolution analysis [63] where different resolutions are used for different
spectral bands by changing the window duration according to frequency. Good temporal
(poor frequency) resolution is used for high frequencies, and good frequency (poor tem-
poral) resolution for low frequencies. This approach makes sense for most signals, since
high and low frequency components require short and long durations for analysis respec-
tively. The wavelet transform is performed by calculating a transform using a wavelet
basis function instead of a sine wave as used in the Fourier transform.
Continuous wavelet transform
The continuous wavelet transform of the signal x(t) can be expressed as [62]
Xw(τ, s) =
1√
s
∫ ∞
−∞
x(t)ψ∗
(
t− τ
s
)
dt (2.55)
with ψ(t) the mother wavelet, translated in time using τ , and scaled using s. Large values
of s (low frequencies) correspond to a global view (large segments of the signal) and small
values of s (high frequencies) correspond to a detailed view (small segments of the signal).
The continuous wavelet transform provides a measure of similarity between x(t) and
wavelets derived from the mother wavelet. Several mother wavelets with unique properties
are available, including the Haar, Mexican hat, Morlet and Daubechies wavelets [62]. The
choice of mother wavelet depends on the signal type and application [64].
46
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Discrete wavelet transform
An alternative method to obtain the wavelet representation of a signal is the discrete
wavelet transform. The signal x(t) is passed through a series of high and low pass filters
to analyse the signal at high and low frequencies respectively. The scale and frequency
resolution are changed by up or down sampling of the filtered signal, resulting in a sequence
of discrete wavelet coefficients [62].
2.3.4.3 Wavelet denoising
Denoising can be performed by computing the discrete wavelet transform of a signal and
setting all coefficient values less than a certain threshold to zero. The original denoised
signal can then be obtained by calculating the inverse discrete wavelet transform [65].
Instead of using a threshold to decide which values should be set to zero, the positions of
the coefficients can also be used.
2.3.4.4 DSSS detection
Examples of time-frequency techniques, suggested in the literature, to detect DSSS signals
are considered below.
• A PN sequence can be detected within AWGN by analysing the short-time Fourier
transform of the intercepted signal for periodic components [66].
• Similar to performing the compounded autocorrelation technique in the time domain
as described in Section 2.3.2.3, the mean-square correlation sequence can also be cal-
culated in the wavelet domain. By transforming a spreading code to the wavelet do-
main and then calculating the correlation between wavelet domain segments, DSSS
transmissions can be detected [52].
• The performance of a radiometric DSSS intercept receiver in the presence of nar-
row band interference can be improved by removing the interference using wavelet
denoising [67].
2.3.4.5 Critical evaluation of time-frequency analysis
The time-frequency techniques presented here are not very processor intensive, since they
can be implemented using fairly simple filtering and correlation processes. It is however
doubtful that time-frequency techniques will outperform the other techniques in low-SNR
conditions. Simply combining temporal and frequency representations (which inherently
carry the same signal information) will probably not provide significant gains in terms of
detection performance, especially when weak DSSS signals are considered.
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2.3.5 Principal component analysis
Blind detection techniques based on PCA can be used to detect communication signal
activity with improved performance compared with other techniques, such as cyclic feature
analysis and ED [68,69].
PCA is a technique where the essential or principal components of a correlated data
set are isolated to form a reduced and uncorrelated data set, with the aim of retaining
most of the information [70]. PCA has found application in several fields including pattern
recognition, image compression [71], and more recently in spectrum sensing used especially
in cognitive radio [72].
2.3.5.1 Isolating the principal components
The first step in finding the principal components of a real data set, consisting of N
variables (with M observations each) is to remove the mean from each variable [70]. The
M observations of each zero-mean variable are organised as column vectors to form the
M ×N data matrix X. The N ×N sample covariance matrix (SCM) of X is then [73]
C =
1
M
XTX (2.56)
with XT the transpose of X. The N eigenvalues and associated eigenvectors of C are then
calculated and sorted in decreasing order such that λ1 > λ2 > . . . > λN . The eigenvectors
associated with the largest eigenvalues of C are the principal components of X. The
number of eigenvectors used depends on the application and level of reduction required.
2.3.5.2 Spectrum sensing application
The eigenvalues of C in (2.56) can be used to perform detection if X contains the samples
of the received signal. A number of cognitive radio spectrum sensing algorithms, that use
these eigenvalues in their detection test statistics are listed below [68,72].
• The largest-eigenvalue (LE) method uses the largest eigenvalue directly with [74]
TLE = λ1(C). (2.57)
• The maximum-minimum-eigenvalue (MME) method uses the ratio between the
largest and smallest eigenvalue with [69]
TMME =
λ1(C)
λN(C)
. (2.58)
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• The energy-with-minimum-eigenvalue (EME) method uses the ratio between the
received signal power Ps and smallest eigenvalue with [69]
TEME =
Ps
λN(C)
. (2.59)
• The scaled-largest-eigenvalue (SLE) method normalises the largest eigenvalue with
the mean of all the eigenvalues with [68]
TSLE =
λ1(C)
1
N
N∑
n=1
λn(C)
=
Nλ1(C)
tr(C)
(2.60)
since the trace tr(·) of a matrix (sum of its diagonal elements) equals the sum of its
eigenvalues [75].
In addition to outperforming classical detection algorithms, the PCA algorithms asso-
ciated with (2.57) to (2.60) do not need prior information of the signal to be detected.
If accurate noise estimates are available, (2.57) will outperform ED and the other PCA
algorithms. If accurate noise estimates are however unavailable, (2.58)-(2.60) can be used
instead, as they are insensitive to noise estimation error [68].
2.3.5.3 DSSS detection
Similar to the detection of primary users in cognitive radio applications [74], detection of
DSSS signals can be performed using the largest eigenvalue of the SCM of the data matrix
X containing the intercepted signal [16]. The technique is semi-blind since it depends on
knowledge of the spreading code length. Knowledge of the noise statistics is also required
to determine the threshold [76]. More details of this technique are given in Chapter 3.
2.3.5.4 Critical evaluation of principal component analysis
The PCA techniques considered here are popular in especially cognitive radio spectrum
sensing applications [68]. Although these techniques are processor intensive (they require
the calculation of eigenvalues), they show promising performance for DSSS detection
purposes. A number of publications with mathematical proof and simulated performance
results indicate the superiority of PCA techniques to perform both DSSS detection and
sequence estimation (compared with ED and autocorrelation techniques) [14,16,68,77].
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2.3.6 Chaos theory
Chaos theory involves nonlinear dynamical systems that exhibit apparent disordered be-
haviour [78, 79]. An important characteristic of chaotic systems is their sensitive depen-
dence on initial conditions or system parameters [80]. This sensitivity is also referred to
as the “butterfly effect” which expresses the idea that a seemingly insignificant event (the
flap of a butterfly’s wings) may possibly have dramatic consequences (setting off a distant
tornado) [81].
Chaotic systems (e.g. Duffing oscillators [79, 82]) can potentially be made very sensitive
to the presence of sinusoidal signals of a given frequency [83, 84]. The presence of a very
weak signal (the butterfly’s flap) will then have a dramatic effect (the tornado) on the
behaviour of the chaotic oscillator, such that signal detection at low SNR is made possible.
2.3.6.1 DSSS detection
The Duffing oscillator may be used to detect the presence of a DSSS transmission, after
performing a nonlinear operation (such as squaring) on the intercepted signal [85]. The
nonlinear operation causes distinct spectral lines to reappear, that are not present in the
intercepted digital transmission. These spectral lines indicate the presence of sinusoidal
signals (which will be weak in the case of DSSS) which can be used to perform detection.
2.3.6.2 Critical evaluation of chaos theory
It was claimed that chaotic techniques can perform detection at much lower SNR levels
compared with classical approaches [83], although no simulation (or measured) results
to support this claim have yet been published. Also, several important details (e.g. the
number of samples used and the false alarm rate) were not considered in [83].
Furthermore, two important issues still need to be resolved to realise detection using
chaotic systems. Firstly, the sensitive-dependence principle not only implies the detector
will be sensitive to the signal of interest, but also to many other factors (including noise).
Methods to limit the false alarm rate should therefore be developed. Secondly, solving
nonlinear dynamical systems involves highly complex and computationally expensive nu-
merical methods, which may limit the practical application of these methods.
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2.4 Approaches to estimate DSSS sequences
An intercepted communication transmission affected by noise and other unwanted chan-
nel effects can only be identified if its signal parameters can be estimated accurately.
The parameters are also required to reconstruct the original signal, and to extract the
information from the intercepted transmission.
To classify a communication transmission as DSSS with the aim of extracting the in-
formation (or to at least identify the transmitter system), the spreading code should be
estimated. Important parameters mentioned in Section 2.3 that are needed to estimate the
code sequence include the chip and symbol periods and the code length.4 Many detection
techniques also require these parameters as inputs.
Spreading code parameters can be estimated by exploiting the cyclostationary nature of
DSSS transmissions. The chip and symbol periods (or rates) can be obtained using cyclic
feature detection [3], HOS analysis [59], or correlation estimators [86]. The code length
can be determined from the chip and symbol periods or directly from the spacing between
correlation estimator peaks [55], or using a technique based on PCA [87].
Subsequently, techniques to estimate the spreading code itself are considered. Most of
these techniques assume prior knowledge of the spreading code length.
2.4.1 Higher order statistical analysis
2.4.1.1 Triple correlation
The generator polynomials or LFSR structures of a number of overlapping m-sequences
can be determined from the peaks on the two dimensional triple correlation function of
the intercepted signal [59,60].
2.4.1.2 Bispectral averaging
Bispectral techniques can be used to extract cyclostationary waveforms hidden in noise [88,
89], and can therefore possibly be applied to estimate spreading codes. These techniques
calculate the average bispectrum from different segments of the noisy signal, and then
extract the Fourier coefficients from the bispectrum. The original waveform can then be
obtained using the inverse Fourier transform.
4The symbol period and code length are closely related, as the symbol period is equal to the period of a
single spreading code, and the code length is the number of chips in a single spreading code.
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2.4.2 Principal component concatenation
The spreading code of an intercepted DSSS transmission can be obtained from the data
matrix, constructed using non-overlapping signal segments of duration equal to the DSSS
symbol period. The first two principal components (i.e. the eigenvectors associated with
the two largest eigenvalues; see Section 2.3.5) of the data matrix contain separate frag-
ments of the spreading code [90]. The position and offset of the fragments within each
eigenvector can be determined from the eigenvalues, and the spreading code can then be
estimated by concatenating these eigenvectors [91].
2.4.3 Data matrix correlation
By constructing a data matrix as in the PCA technique discussed above, the spreading
codes will typically not be aligned in the matrix, such that each row will contain fragments
of two codes with each code having its own polarity. The matrix misalignment can be
determined by cyclically shifting the matrix and calculating a measurement function for
each cyclic shift [77]. The measurement function is a correlation between different matrix
elements, which is used to determine the starting position of the spreading code within
each row.
The data matrix can then be aligned such that each row will contain a complete spreading
code. The original spreading code can be estimated from the aligned data matrix by
calculating the correlation between the first and all other columns [77]. Assuming the
first chip in the code is +1, the sign of each subsequent correlation value will indicate the
value (±1) of each remaining chip. The spreading code (or its reversed polarity) is thus
obtained.
2.4.4 Artificial neural network approaches
Artificial neural networks (NNs) can be used to estimate spreading codes blindly if the
spreading code length is known. Two such examples are considered below.
2.4.4.1 Single-layer networks
The weights of a single-layer unsupervised NN controlled by Oja’s learning rule (or mod-
ified Hebbian rule) will converge to the principal component of the input data [92]. The
single-layer NN can be implemented as a simple tapped delay line filter structure as shown
in Fig. 2.12. The filter weight vector w = [w1, w2, . . . , wN ] is updated according to [93]
wn+1 = wn + ∆ y [xn − y wn] (2.61)
with ∆ the step size, y the filter output, and x the input data vector.
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Figure 2.12: Tapped delay line filter structure forming a single-layer neural network.
Since the principal component of the aligned data matrix (see Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3)
is the spreading code, sequence estimation can be performed using this tapped delay line
filter structure. It is required that the filter (or NN) output be sampled at the DSSS symbol
rate Tsym in order for the weights to be calculated according to synchronised spreading
codes. Equivalently, the aligned data matrix can be fed into the NN row-by-row such that
no weight updates are performed between complete DSSS symbols (or spreading codes).
2.4.4.2 Multi-layer networks
Using a three-layer NN with two neurons in the hidden layer, and feeding the network
with the data matrix (not necessarily aligned but with the number of columns equal to
the code length), the spreading code can be estimated as the converged weights of the
hidden layer [94].
2.5 Gaps identified in the literature
Several areas of possible future investigation were identified in the literature considered
in this chapter. For example, the HOS analysis and chaos theory techniques could be
developed further as suggested in Sections 2.3.3.4 and 2.3.6.2. The detection and estima-
tion performance of the techniques reviewed here could also be analysed and compared
further. These aspects are however not pursued in this thesis.
The gaps in the literature that are focussed on in this thesis, are considered subsequently
in this section. Although several aspects of the research problem were considered, which
resulted in three journal publications, research on this topic could be continued as dis-
cussed in Section 6.5.
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2.5.1 Simplifying mathematical performance expressions
The first publication (Chapter 3) considers the simplification of mathematical expressions
which require computationally complex numerical evaluation. These expressions can be
used in the analysis and application of detection receivers where decision thresholds in
noisy environments are concerned. The simplified expressions do not need numerical evalu-
ation and therefore provide a faster method of calculating threshold levels and performance
predictions, at the cost of reduced numerical accuracy.
2.5.2 Development of improved DSSS detection techniques
The second publication (Chapter 4) presents improved DSSS detection techniques in terms
of detection performance. A number of other aspects to improve current detection tech-
niques are also considered, including the following.
2.5.2.1 Blind detection
The parameters of the DSSS signal to be detected are typically unknown to the intercept
receiver. Blind (or semi-blind) detection techniques are therefore required. The methods
presented in Chapter 4 are semi-blind, although they can be made fully-blind using the
techniques presented in Chapter 5.
2.5.2.2 Computational complexity
Detection techniques that show promising detection performances in low-SNR conditions
typically have high computational complexities. The number and type of arithmetic op-
erations to perform detection, and possible techniques to reduce the computational com-
plexity, are also considered in Chapter 4.
2.5.3 Sequence length estimation algorithms
Many of the existing DSSS detection and sequence-estimation algorithms assume knowl-
edge of the sequence length. Very little is however published on sequence-length estima-
tion, and the development of such techniques is therefore critically important. The third
publication (Chapter 5) presents two possible sequence-length estimation techniques to
address this gap.
2.5.4 Variety of spreading codes
Different spreading codes have different applications and unique properties [18,28]. It can
therefore be expected that a given detection or estimation technique will perform differ-
ently on different spreading codes. Therefore a need exists to develop different algorithms
to cater for the variety of spreading codes. This fact is also highlighted in Chapter 5 by
evaluating two types of codes.
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Abstract: Eigenvalue distributions of Wishart matrices are given in the literature as
functions or distributions defined in terms of matrix arguments requiring numerical eval-
uation. As a result the relationship between parameter values and statistics is not available
analytically and the complexity of the numerical evaluation involved may limit the im-
plementation, evaluation and use of eigenvalue techniques using Wishart matrices. This
paper presents analytic expressions that approximate the distribution of the largest eigen-
value of white Wishart matrices and the corresponding sample covariance matrices. It is
shown that the desired expression follows from an approximation to the Tracy-Widom
distribution in terms of the Gamma distribution. The approximation offers largely sim-
plified computation and provides statistics such as the mean value and region of support
of the largest eigenvalue distribution. Numeric results from the literature are compared
with the approximation and Monte Carlo simulation results are presented to illustrate the
accuracy of the proposed analytic approximation.
3.1 Introduction
The eigenvalue spectrum of noise covariance matrices plays an important role in such
fields as PCA [73], singular value decomposition (SVD), multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) communication systems [95] and signal detection [96, 97]. The behaviour of the
largest eigenvalue can be used to predict the performance of MIMO systems in a fading
channel and the performance of eigenvalue-based signal detection techniques. The exact
distributions of individual eigenvalues can be obtained from the joint distribution, which
is defined in terms of hypergeometric functions if the covariance matrix has a Wishart
distribution [95,98]. The individual distributions are then expressed in terms of Laguerre
polynomials [99] which can be simplified as matrix arguments [95, 100]. These however
require numerical evaluation which can be performed using extensive tables or special pur-
pose software [101]. However, it was shown in [102] that the asymptotic distribution of the
scaled largest eigenvalue of a white Wishart matrix can be described by the Tracy-Widom
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(TW) law [103,104] which can be evaluated numerically [105–107] or approximated using
a logit transform [101]. The TW distribution was also shown to be reasonably accurate for
non-asymptotic cases [101, 102]. This paper presents a closed-form analytical expression
to approximate the TW distribution in order to derive simple expressions for the largest
eigenvalue distribution of the Wishart distributed covariance matrix and the associated
sample covariance matrix, similar to an approximation given in [68]. Simple expressions
describing the statistics and region of support of the largest eigenvalue distribution are
also given. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 a mathematical
background is given. Section 3.3 presents the approximation and Section 3.4 the expres-
sion for the largest eigenvalue distribution. Section 3.5 provides a simulation study where
numeric results from the literature are compared with Monte Carlo simulation results and
finally Section 3.6 summarises the main results and concludes the paper. The focus of this
paper is on the TW law of order 1 and 2, denoted respectively by TW1 and TW2. TW4
is briefly considered in the appendix.
3.2 Mathematical background
3.2.1 Noise matrix
Let X be an M × N matrix where each row of X is real and independently drawn from
NN(0, σ2xI), the N -variate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix σ2xI.
The N ×N matrix
Y = XHX (3.1)
will then have a white Wishart distributionWN(M,σ2xI) [102], where XH is the Hermitian
transpose of X. If X is complex and the complex components of each row are indepen-
dently drawn from NN(0, (σ2x/2)I), Y will have a complex white Wishart distribution.
The largest eigenvalue λ1 of Y in the edge scaling limit, that is when M →∞, N →∞
and M
N
→ γ ≥ 1, will obey [102]
(λ1/σ
2
x)− µMN,β
σMN,β
D→ Fβ (3.2)
where Fβ is the TW cumulative distribution function (CDF) CDF with β = 1 if X is real
and β = 2 if X is complex. The centre and scaling parameters for β = 1 are given by [102]
µMN,1 =
(√
M − 1 +
√
N
)2
(3.3)
σMN,1 =
√
µMN,1
(
1√
M − 1 +
1√
N
) 1
3
(3.4)
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and similarly for β = 2 are given by [102]
µMN,2 =
(√
M +
√
N
)2
(3.5)
σMN,2 =
√
µMN,2
(
1√
M
+
1√
N
) 1
3
. (3.6)
According to the limit M
N
→ γ ≥ 1, (3.2) to (3.6) hold only for M ≥ N . It is however
stated in [102] that (3.2) applies equally well if M < N when M →∞, N →∞, and the
roles of M and N are reversed in (3.3) and (3.4). Following the same argument, (3.5) and
(3.6) can also be used for M < N since reversing the roles of M and N has no effect in this
case. Although (3.2) is true in the limit, [102] showed that it can provide a satisfactory
approximation for matrix dimensions M and N as small as 10.
Note that (3.2) is usually stated for the unit variance case σ2x = 1 (as in [73, 102]). The
normalisation of λ1 is required to develop expressions for the largest eigenvalue distribu-
tion and the associated statistics for the general case of σ2x. To explain the normalisation
and show how a given eigenvalue λ of Y scale in comparison with the unit variance case,
suppose X(u) represents X when σ
2
x = 1 and Y(u) = X
H
(u)X(u) from (3.1). The correspond-
ing eigenvalue of Y(u) is λ(u). By substituting X = σxX(u) for the general case into (3.1),
it follows that Y = σ2xY(u). From the definition of eigenvalues and eigenvectors (Yv = λv
with v an eigenvector of Y) it can then be shown that
λ = σ2xλ(u). (3.7)
The eigenvalues of Y therefore scale with σ2x compared with the unit variance case Y(u).
The eigenvalue λ1 can therefore be normalised by dividing it with σ
2
x as is done in (3.2).
3.2.2 Sample covariance matrix and relation to noise matrix
The sample covariance matrix of X is given as [73]
R =
1
M
M∑
m=1
xHmxm (3.8)
with xm the m
th 1×N row of X. The ijth element of the N ×N matrix formed by xHmxm
in (3.8) can by definition be expressed in terms of the elements of X as
[
xHmxm
]
ij
= X∗miXmj. (3.9)
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From (3.8) and (3.9), each element of R can be expressed as
Rij =
1
M
M∑
m=1
X∗miXmj. (3.10)
Likewise, each element of Y can be expressed from (3.1) as
Yij =
M∑
m=1
X∗miXmj (3.11)
which is the scalar product of the ith row of XH and the jth column of X. From (3.10)
and (3.11) it is clear that
R =
1
M
Y. (3.12)
The largest eigenvalue of R denoted by l1 is therefore related to λ1 as
l1 =
1
M
λ1. (3.13)
Note that both λ1 and l1 are always real and non-negative since Y and R are always
Hermitian (or symmetric if β = 1) and positive semidefinite.
3.2.3 Tracy-Widom law
The Tracy-Widom law [104] or distribution TWβ refers to a family of CDFs Fβ and related
PDFs fβ describing the limiting distributions of the largest eigenvalues of symmetric
(β = 1), Hermitian (β = 2) or self-dual (β = 4) random matrices in the Gaussian
ensembles1.
The three TW CDFs are defined as [104,105]
F1(x) = exp
(
−1
2
∫ ∞
x
q(w) dw
)√
F2(x) (3.14)
F2(x) = exp
(
−
∫ ∞
x
(w − x) q2(w) dw
)
(3.15)
F4
(
x√
2
)
= cosh
(
−1
2
∫ ∞
x
q(w) dw
)√
F2(x) (3.16)
with q(w) the solution to the Painleve´ II differential equation
q′′(w) = wq(w) + 2q3(w) (3.17)
1The Gaussian ensembles include the Gaussian orthogonal ensemble (GOE), Gaussian unitary ensemble
(GUE) and Gaussian symplectic ensemble (GSE) corresponding respectively to real (β = 1), complex
(β = 2) and quaternion (β = 4) random matrices [98].
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with the boundary condition q(w) ∼ Ai(w) as w →∞ where Ai(w) is the Airy function.
Calculation of Fβ therefore requires evaluation of the Painleve´ II differential equation
which can be performed numerically and tabulated (see [107] for a review on the numer-
ical evaluation of distributions defined in terms of Painleve´ transcendents). A number
of authors [105–107] developed and made available software modules to calculate double
precision solutions of TWβ. Tables containing solutions of Painleve´ II, TW1 and TW2
over x ∈ [−40, 200] with step size ∆x = 0.0625 as described in [106] are available at [108].
The numeric solutions of fβ obtained from [108] for β = 1 and 2 are shown in Fig. 3.1
and are used in this paper to develop the approximation.
3.3 Tracy-Widom approximation
In this section an approximation to TWβ using the Gamma distribution is proposed and
the goodness-of-fit of the approximation is evaluated against the double precision numeric
values of [108], which are exact to sixteen significant decimal digits. The numeric values
of the PDF and CDF of TWβ obtained from [108] are denoted respectively by fβ and
Fβ. Likewise, the PDF and CDF of the Gamma approximation are denoted by gβ and
Gβ. Whereas only β = 1 and 2 are considered in this section, β = 4 is considered in the
appendix.
3.3.1 Proposed Gamma approximation
By observing the numeric solutions of fβ in Fig. 3.1, the functions appear to resemble
slightly asymmetric Gaussian density functions shifted on the x -axis. To incorporate the
asymmetry, fβ could therefore be approximated using the Gamma PDF given by
gβ(x) =
(x− x0)k−1
θkΓ(k)
exp
[−(x− x0)
θ
]
(3.18)
with x0 the location or shift parameter, k the shape, θ the scale and Γ(k) the Gamma
function. Values for these parameters (which are given in Table 3.1) were obtained by
fitting gβ to the numeric values of fβ and minimising the sum of squared difference (SSD)
2β =
L∑
i=1
[fβ(xi)− gβ(xi)]2 (3.19)
over the full range of x in [108] such that x1 = −40 and xL = 200 with sample step size
∆x = 0.0625. The statistics of the resultant Gamma approximation are given in Table
3.1, which resemble the TW statistics given in Table 1 of [104, 107]. In addition to the
numeric solutions, Fig. 3.1 also shows the Gamma approximations using (3.18) with the
parameter values from Table 3.1. The SSD values obtained using (3.19) are also given in
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Parameter values and related results for the Gamma approximation to TWβ.
Parameter Symbol β = 1 β = 2
Shape k 46.5651 79.3694
Scale θ 0.1850 0.1010
Location x0 -9.8209 -9.7874
Mean kθ + x0 -1.2064 -1.7711
Variance kθ2 1.5937 0.8096
Skewness 2/
√
k 0.2931 0.2245
SSD 2β 2.8270× 10−5 9.3883× 10−6
SCvM statistic W 2β 1.0547× 10−7 4.7651× 10−8
Kolmogorov statistic Kβ 8.0577× 10−4 4.0428× 10−4
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Figure 3.1: Numeric and approximated PDFs for β = 1 and β = 2. fβ is the numeric
solution of the TW PDF obtained from [108] and gβ is the Gamma PDF given in (3.18).
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3.3.2 Support region
Although the support of TWβ is not bounded, both left and right tails of fβ exhibit
exponential decay [102]. It is therefore possible to truncate the support region to certain
bounds [b−, b+] without losing much probability mass. This section proposes a truncated
support region for TWβ based on the Gamma approximation presented in Section 3.3.1.
The probability mass lost when using the truncated support region is also considered.
The Gamma PDF given in (3.18) has support [x0,∞) and the location parameter x0 can
therefore be used as the lower bound b−. The upper bound b+ is chosen such that the
mean value of the Gamma distribution is also the mean of the lower and upper bounds2.
The support of the truncated Gamma approximation is then
[b−, b+] = [x0, 2kθ + x0] (3.20)
which is also displayed in Fig. 3.1.
To illustrate the effect of the truncation, the PDFs and CDFs of TWβ and the associated
Gamma approximations are shown with logarithmic ordinate axes in Figs. 3.2 and 3.3. To
quantify the loss in probability mass due to the truncation, values from Fig. 3.3 for the
mass of each tail in terms of the cumulative distribution outside the bounded region of
(3.20) are given in Table 3.2. Interpolated values of [108] are used as reference solutions
for Fβ. The total probability mass lost in the truncation is the mass outside the support
region.
Table 3.2: Parameter values related to truncated support and loss in probability mass.
Parameter Expression β = 1 β = 2
Lower bound b− -9.8209 -9.7874
Upper bound b+ 7.4082 6.2452
Left tail mass (reference) Fβ(b−) 3.4799× 10−21 7.6093× 10−35
Right tail mass (reference) 1− Fβ(b+) 4.3875× 10−8 1.0734× 10−12
Total mass lost (reference) Fβ(b−) + 1− Fβ(b+) 4.3875× 10−8 1.0734× 10−12
Left tail mass (approximation) Gβ(b−) 0 0
Right tail mass (approximation) 1−Gβ(b+) 3.4942× 10−8 1.1563× 10−12
Total mass lost (approximation) Gβ(b−) + 1−Gβ(b+) 3.4942× 10−8 1.1563× 10−12
2For the purpose of choosing bounds the TW PDFs can be assumed to be approximately symmetric -
which can be seen clearly in Fig. 3.1.
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Figure 3.2: Numeric and approximated PDFs for β = 1 and β = 2 with logarithmic
ordinate axes. fβ is the numeric solution of the TW PDF obtained from [108] and gβ is
the Gamma PDF given in (3.18).
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Figure 3.3: Numeric and approximated CDFs for β = 1 and β = 2. Fβ is the numeric
solution of the TW CDF obtained from [108] and Gβ is the Gamma CDF derived from
(3.18).
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3.3.3 Goodness-of-fit
The approximation accuracy can also be measured using goodness-of-fit tests which in-
dicate how close an empirical CDF is to a theoretical CDF. The difference or distance
between the two CDFs is given for the purpose of this study as
Dβ(x) = Fβ(x)−Gβ(x). (3.21)
Two tests from [109] based on (3.21) are used in this paper to evaluate the approximation
accuracy. The first test is the Smirnov-Crame´r-Von-Mises (SCvM) test with test statistic
W 2β =
∫ b+
b−
D2β(x)gβ(x) dx. (3.22)
The second test is the Kolmogorov test with test statistic
Kβ = max |Dβ(x)| ; x ∈ [b−, b+]. (3.23)
Both the SCvM and Kolmogorov test statistics are indications of how well the numeric
values from [108] fit the analytic expression in (3.18). These statistics will approach zero as
the goodness-of-fit improves. The values of (3.22) obtained through numerical integration
with step size ∆x = 0.0625 and (3.23) are given in Table 3.1. The values of the test
statistics remain unchanged whether they are evaluated over [−40, 200] or [b−, b+] given
in (3.20), confirming that the truncation has a negligible effect on the accuracy of the
approximation. Graphs depicting the absolute value of (3.21) over x and the associated
Kolmogorov statistics are shown in Fig. 3.4.
3.4 Expression for largest eigenvalue distribution
This section provides expressions for the largest eigenvalue distributions of the noise
matrix Y and the sample covariance matrix R based on the TW approximation presented
in Section 3.3. Other approximation methods are also briefly considered.
3.4.1 Noise matrix Y
Using (3.2) and (3.18) and linear random variable transformations [110] the PDF of λ1
can be expressed as
pλ1(x) =
1
σ2x σMN,β
gβ
{
(x/σ2x)− µMN,β
σMN,β
}
(3.24)
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Figure 3.4: Absolute difference between the CDFs Fβ and Gβ as defined in (3.21) for
β = 1 and β = 2. The Kolmogorov statistic defined in (3.23) is also shown on each graph.
which can be written in the form of (3.18) as
pλ1(x) =
(x− x′0)k−1
θ′kΓ(k)
exp
[−(x− x′0)
θ′
]
(3.25)
with updated parameters
θ′ = σ2x σMN,β θ (3.26)
x′0 = σ
2
x (µMN,β + x0 σMN,β) . (3.27)
The support of pλ1(x) can then be written from (3.20) with the updated parameters given
in (3.26) and (3.27) as
[b−, b+] = [x′0, 2kθ
′ + x′0]. (3.28)
3.4.2 Sample covariance matrix R
Using (3.13) the PDF of l1 can be written from (3.24) as [110]
pl1(x) = Mpλ1(Mx) (3.29)
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which can also be written in the form of (3.18) or (3.25) as
pl1(x) =
(x− x′′0)k−1
θ′′kΓ(k)
exp
[−(x− x′′0)
θ′′
]
(3.30)
with parameters updated again, giving
θ′′ =
θ′
M
(3.31)
x′′0 =
x′0
M
. (3.32)
The support of pl1(x) can then be written as (3.28) by replacing the updated parameters
with the twice-updated parameters given in (3.31) and (3.32).
3.4.3 Other approximations
Other related approximations include the logit transform approximation to the TW law
presented in [101] and a Gamma approximation describing the largest eigenvalue distri-
bution in [68]. The logit transform approach considers only β = 1 and is computationally
more complex than the approximation proposed in this paper. The approximation of [68]
calculates the shape k and scale θ of the Gamma distribution by matching the first two
moments of the largest eigenvalue and Gamma distributions using an equivalent of (3.2)
and the TW law. The TW distribution is however not approximated directly and the shift
parameter x0 is not used. The focus of [68] is on spectrum sensing applicable to cognitive
radio and only β = 2 is considered for matrix Y. The approximation of [68] is however
evaluated in the simulation study in Section 3.5 against the approximation presented in
this paper for both β = 1 and 2 using the same scaling parameters given in Section 3.2.1
and the values of the first two TW moments given in [107].
3.5 Simulation study and results
A Monte Carlo computer simulation study was conducted with the aim of evaluating
how accurate the proposed Gamma approximations can predict actual largest eigenvalue
distributions. Empirical distributions of the largest eigenvalues of matrices Y and R for
both β = 1 and 2 were obtained through simulation using 106 replications of these matrices
for a given set of matrix dimensions (M,N) with σ2x = 1. Every simulation set was started
using identical random seed values. The empirical PDF for a given set was obtained
from the simulated data by calculating the histogram over the support region given in
(3.20) with the number of bins fixed to 100. To measure the approximation accuracy,
the SCvM criterion given by (3.21) and (3.22) was used with Fβ(x) corresponding to
the empirical CDF obtained through the Monte-Carlo simulations. Likewise, Gβ(x) and
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gβ(x) correspond to the Gamma approximations with densities defined by (3.25) or (3.30)
depending on whether λ1 or l1 is concerned. Subsequently the SCvM results are presented.
Section 3.5.1 considers an example set (M,N) = (20, 40) and Section 3.5.2 a range of
matrix dimensions. For the purpose of comparison, the SCvM statistics calculated for the
approximation method given in [68] (see Section 3.4.3) are also given in Section 3.5.2. The
results are discussed in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.1 Example set
Figs. 3.5 and 3.6 show the predicted and simulated distributions of the largest eigenvalues
for β = 1 and (M,N) = (20, 40). The predicted curves correspond to the Gamma approx-
imations based on (3.18) and the simulated curves to the empirical data. Fig. 3.5 shows
the results for λ1 using (3.25) as prediction and Fig. 3.6 shows the results for l1 using
(3.30) as prediction. Table 3.3 shows parameter values for β = 1 (corresponding to Figs.
3.5 and 3.6) and β = 2. The goodness-of-fit statistics are identical for λ1 and l1 for each
case of β since the random seed values used are identical and the number of histogram
bins used in determining the empirical CDF is constant.
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Figure 3.5: Predicted (from (3.25)) and simulated PDFs and CDFs of λ1 for
β = 1, (M,N) = (20, 40) and σ2x = 1.
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Figure 3.6: Predicted (from (3.30)) and simulated PDFs and CDFs of l1 for
β = 1, (M,N) = (20, 40) and σ2x = 1.
Table 3.3: Parameter values for the largest eigenvalue distributions for (M,N) = (20, 40).
β = 1 β = 2
Parameter λ1 l1 λ1 l1
Mean (Theory) kθ + x0 105.4619 5.2731 102.6974 5.1349
Mean (Measured) 105.4344 5.2717 103.1117 5.1556
Lower bound b− 38.3724 1.9186 39.9136 1.9957
Upper bound b+ 172.5515 8.6276 165.4811 8.2741
Bin size ∆x 1.3418 6.7090× 10−2 1.2557 6.2784× 10−2
SCvM statistic W 2β 9.9414× 10−5 9.9414× 10−5 4.2237× 10−4 4.2237× 10−4
Kolmogorov statistic Kβ 1.3901× 10−2 1.3901× 10−2 3.2812× 10−2 3.2812× 10−2
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3.5.2 Range of matrix dimensions
The range of matrix dimensions from (M,N) = (20, 20) to (200, 200) for both cases of
M ≥ N and M < N is considered. Results for the square matrix case M = N are given
in Table 3.4 and plotted in Fig. 3.7. As in Table 3.3, the SCvM statistics for λ1 and l1 are
identical in Table 3.4. Fig. 3.7 shows that as the matrix dimensions increase, the SCvM
statistics decrease indicating an improvement in the approximation accuracy. For β = 1,
the approximation given in (3.25) outperforms [68] up to a maximum SCvM difference
of 9.2809 × 10−5 at M = 200. For β = 2 the two approximation methods show similar
accuracies though for smaller values of M , [68] performs slightly better and for larger
values of M , (3.25) performs slightly better.
Table 3.4: SCvM statistics for the largest eigenvalues when M = N .
W 21 (β = 1) W
2
2 (β = 2)
M λ1 (3.25) and l1 (3.30) λ1 [68] λ1 (3.25) and l1 (3.30) λ1 [68]
20 2.8308× 10−4 2.8493× 10−4 7.4245× 10−4 6.9550× 10−4
40 9.5246× 10−5 1.0662× 10−4 2.7204× 10−4 2.0513× 10−4
60 5.2480× 10−5 8.7108× 10−5 1.6838× 10−4 1.1199× 10−4
80 3.1733× 10−5 7.8397× 10−5 1.0092× 10−4 6.7867× 10−5
100 2.5417× 10−5 8.2993× 10−5 7.9621× 10−5 5.4370× 10−5
120 1.8896× 10−5 7.9911× 10−5 5.9821× 10−5 4.4188× 10−5
140 1.1512× 10−5 9.0566× 10−5 3.7689× 10−5 4.2799× 10−5
160 1.2007× 10−5 9.3116× 10−5 3.6145× 10−5 4.3566× 10−5
180 8.3928× 10−6 9.2033× 10−5 2.7315× 10−5 4.1183× 10−5
200 6.8972× 10−6 9.9706× 10−5 2.7319× 10−5 4.0576× 10−5
SCvM results for fixed values of M = 20 and 200 (the extreme cases) over the range of
N ∈ [20, 200] when β = 2 are shown in Fig. 3.8. Again it is evident that larger matrix
dimensions result in improved approximation accuracy. Fig. 3.8 also shows that the two
methods (3.25) and [68] exhibit similar approximation accuracies, though [68] is slightly
better for M = 20 and (3.25) is slightly better for M = 200.
3.5.3 Discussion of results
The presented results indicate that the Gamma approximation can provide an accurate
prediction of the empiric distribution of the largest eigenvalue. It was also shown that
the approximation accuracy improves as the matrix dimensions increase. This can be
explained from (3.2) which is stated in terms of the edge scaling limits of the matrix di-
mensions. As the matrix dimensions increase, the TW law will provide a better prediction
of the largest eigenvalue distribution. The approximation to the TW law will therefore
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Figure 3.7: SCvM statistics for λ1 as given in Table 3.4. The Gamma approximation
and Wei’s method correspond respectively to (3.25) and [68].
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Matrix dimension N
10−5
10−4
10−3
SC
vM
st
at
is
ti
c
W
2 β
M = 20 (Gamma approx.)
M = 20 (Wei)
M = 200 (Gamma approx.)
M = 200 (Wei)
Figure 3.8: SCvM statistics for λ1 (β = 2) with M fixed over the range of N . The
Gamma approximation and Wei’s method correspond respectively to (3.25) and [68].
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also provide a more accurate prediction for larger matrix dimensions. Lastly, the approx-
imation given by (3.25) is generally more accurate than [68] (especially for larger matrix
dimensions). This can be ascribed to the different approximation methods. The method
of [68] relies on matching moments (see Section 3.4.3) to find k and θ of the Gamma dis-
tribution. The method presented in this paper fits the Gamma distribution (k, θ and x0)
to the TW law directly and then uses (3.2) to derive the largest eigenvalue distribution.
Using the shift parameter in the approximation provides a method to more accurately
describe the TW law in terms of the Gamma distribution, which results in improved
approximation accuracies.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper presented an approximation to the TW law based on the Gamma distribu-
tion which was shown, through Monte Carlo computer simulation and an analysis of the
distributions, to be able to accurately predict the largest eigenvalue distribution of white
Wishart matrices and their corresponding sample covariance matrices. The approxima-
tion provides a tractable and closed-form solution and does not require numerical eval-
uation. Furthermore, simple equations were derived to accurately predict the statistics
and support region of the principal component of a noise matrix directly from the matrix
dimensions. The results of this paper can be used to develop analytic expressions where
the TW law forms part of the argument. Such expressions will be useful in the analysis
and application of detection receivers where decision thresholds in noisy environments are
concerned, e.g. in MIMO, cognitive radio and signal detection systems.
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3.8 Appendix
This appendix considers two approximations to TW4. The first approximation (referred to
as the indirect Gamma approximation) is based on the Gamma approximations to TW1
and TW2 developed in this paper. The second approximation (direct Gamma approxima-
tion) is obtained using the method presented in Section 3.3.1.
71
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Communications and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
3.8.1 Indirect Gamma approximation
The CDF F4 given in (3.16) can be written in terms of F1 and F2 as
F4
(
x√
2
)
= cosh(α(x))
√
F2(x) (3.33)
with
α(x) = −1
2
∫ ∞
x
q(w) dw = ln
(
F1(x)√
F2(x)
)
(3.34)
from (3.14). The PDF f4 can then be obtained by differentiation from (3.33) as
f4
(
x√
2
)
=
sinh(α(x))
√
2F2(x)f1(x)
F1(x)
+
exp(−α(x))f2(x)√
2F2(x)
. (3.35)
It is required in (3.34) and (3.35) that F1(x) > 0 and F2(x) > 0. F4(x) = 0 and f4(x) = 0
wherever F1(x) = 0 or F2(x) = 0. By substituting the Gamma approximations gβ and Gβ
(β = 1 and 2) developed in Section 3.3 into fβ and Fβ in (3.33) to (3.35), the indirect
Gamma approximation Γ˜4 is obtained. Using the double precision values obtained from
[107] as reference (over x ∈ [−10, 10] and ∆x = 0.0625), the goodness-of-fit statistics (see
Section 3.3.3) are calculated as W 24 = 1.1455× 10−5 and K4 = 5.4584× 10−3.
3.8.2 Direct Gamma approximation
The direct Gamma approximation Γ4 was obtained using the method described in Section
3.3.1 and the numeric values from [107]. The resultant parameter values are given in Table
3.5.
The PDFs and CDFs of TW4 from [107], Γ4 and Γ˜4 are displayed in Fig. 3.9. It is evident
from Fig. 3.9 and the goodness-of-fit statistics given in the previous section and Table
3.5 that Γ˜4 is a less accurate approximation than Γ4. This can be expected since the
approximation Γ˜4 is based on approximations to TW1 and TW2.
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Table 3.5: Parameter values and related results for the direct Gamma approximation to
TW4.
Parameter Symbol β = 4
Shape k 105.7442
Scale θ 0.0700
Location x0 -9.7038
Mean kθ + x0 -2.3017
Variance kθ2 0.5181
Skewness 2/
√
k 0.1945
SSD 2β 1.0623× 10−4
SCvM statistic W 2β 1.9356× 10−6
Kolmogorov statistic Kβ 1.8025× 10−3
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Figure 3.9: Numeric and approximated PDFs and CDFs for β = 4. TW4 refers to
the numeric solution obtained from [107]. Γ4 and Γ˜4 refer respectively to the direct and
indirect Gamma approximations to TW4.
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Abstract: A semi-blind method based on PCA and sequence synchronisation is proposed
to detect DSSS signals in a non-cooperative setting under low SNR conditions. The inter-
cepted signal is segmented to form a detection matrix from which a feature is extracted
through cyclic shifting. Signal detection is then performed using a test statistic based on
this feature. The carrier frequency and sequence duration of the signal to be detected
are assumed known. Theoretical analysis and a computer simulation study show that the
performance of the new detection method is superior to classic ED in an AWGN channel.
4.1 Introduction
Cooperative detection techniques are used in communication systems where the receiver
has perfect knowledge of all the parameters used by the transmitter. The receiver then uses
detection and estimation of the parameters as necessary to identify the beginning of the
transmission (e.g. in asynchronous communication) or to identify inactive channels (e.g. in
cognitive radio). However, in non-cooperative applications such as spectrum surveillance
and electronic interception, the receiver has no knowledge of the parameters used by the
transmitter. Under these conditions blind detection and estimation techniques are used. If
the receiver has some information on the parameters available or is able to estimate some
of the parameters, semi-blind detection techniques may be used. This paper is concerned
with the performance of semi-blind detection techniques, specifically for the detection of
weak spread-spectrum signals.
In this paper new results and a new method for the detection of weak unknown deter-
ministic signals in an AWGN channel are presented. The class of signals investigated is
DSSS where a large transmission bandwidth is employed to hide the signal below the
noise level. Several techniques addressing DSSS detection are available in the literature.
ED of spread spectrum signals is presented in [48]. Techniques based on HOS analysis
are presented in [111], and cyclostationary analysis where the autocorrelation of segments
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of the intercepted signal is used as basis of detection is presented in [55]. Approaches to
estimate the spreading sequence from the intercepted signal include signal correlation of
synchronised sequences [77], PCA [91] and neural network techniques [94].
The new method presented in this paper is based on spreading sequence synchronisation
[77] and PCA [91] which are used to extract the largest eigenvalue sequence as detection
feature from the SCM of the intercepted signal. Two detection techniques are presented;
the first technique uses the eigenvalue sequence directly and the second technique uses
the frequency content of the eigenvalue sequence to perform detection. The techniques are
semi-blind since certain aspects of the signal to be detected and the noise are assumed
known. Signal knowledge assumed known include the carrier frequency and the sequence
duration. These two parameters can be estimated using correlation techniques [55, 77]
or the detection algorithm can sweep through a certain predefined range of these two
parameters in order to search for signal activity. The noise statistics (including the PDF
and power level) are assumed known in order to calculate the detection threshold. Noise
statistics can be estimated by observing the surveillance band over long periods of time
assuming that the signal of interest is not always present.
In this paper the performance of the detection techniques is evaluated and compared
using the binary hypothesis testing approach (see [5]) over a range of SNRs. Although
the detection algorithms do not assume knowledge of the SNR, the detection perfor-
mance is expressed in terms thereof. This paper compares the performance of the two
new techniques with classic ED, assuming the signal of interest is a baseband BPSK
DSSS communication signal. It is shown that the new detection techniques have superior
performance to classic ED under AWGN channel conditions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 considers the target communication system
and intercept receiver. Section 4.3 describes the new feature extraction technique and
Section 4.4 evaluates the performance thereof in an AWGN channel. Section 4.5 reviews
ED and presents the two new detection techniques. Section 4.6 investigates the compu-
tational complexity and Section 4.7 presents simulated detection performance results for
each detection technique. The paper is concluded in Section 4.8.
4.2 Communication and detection systems
This section considers the target communication system and the intercept receiver used
to detect communication activity originating from the target system in the surveillance
band.
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4.2.1 Target communication system
The target communication system considered in this paper is a BPSK DSSS system
employing a Walsh spreading code of length N = 64. In order to establish the required
SNR level at which non-cooperative detection must be performed, the error probability
achievable by the intended receiver (the receiver of the target communication system for
which the communication is intended) should be investigated. The error probability of
BPSK in AWGN is well known as [26]
Pe = Q
(√
2b
N0
)
(4.1)
with Q(·) the tail probability of the standard normal distribution, b the energy per bit and
N0 the single-sided noise power spectral density. The error probability can be expressed
from (4.1) as (see Appendix A.3)
Pe = Q
(√
Ns SNR
)
(4.2)
with Ns the number of samples used to represent a single transmitted bit. Although (4.1)
and (4.2) are equivalent, (4.2) is preferred in the non-cooperative context since the signal
and surveillance bandwidths are not necessarily equal and (4.2) is required to illustrate the
relation between the DSSS processing gain and the SNR advantage obtained by spreading.
If a single sample is used in the receiver to represent one chip of the spreading sequence
then Ns = N . The bit error probability curves for the non-spread BPSK case (N = 1) and
the spread case (N = 64) are shown in Fig. 4.1. The processing gain PG = 10 log10N ≈ 18
dB (for N = 64) is the SNR advantage obtained by spreading and corresponds to the SNR
difference between the two curves for any Pe value in Fig. 4.1. The intended receiver would
therefore be able to despread a DSSS signal with SNR = −10 dB (before despreading) to
SNR = 8 dB (after despreading) to achieve communications at Pe ≈ 6× 10−3. Assuming
the distances between the transmitter and intended receiver and the same transmitter and
the intercept receiver are equivalent, the intercept receiver (not knowing the spreading
code) is now faced with the challenge of detecting DSSS signal activity using a received
signal with SNR = −10 dB. If the intercept receiver is further off in distance, an even
lower SNR will result. Powerful detection algorithms are therefore required to enable the
intercept receiver to compete with the target communication system and detect DSSS
signals at very low SNR levels.
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Figure 4.1: Bit error probability for non-spread (N = 1) and spread (N = 64) BPSK
DSSS in AWGN.
4.2.2 Intercept receiver
The detection algorithms presented in this paper are envisaged to be implemented on a
system with a receiver architecture similar to the one presented in [112] (see also Appendix
A). The received RF signal is filtered using a wideband front-end filter, mixed down
and then sampled with a high-speed (greater than twice the surveillance bandwidth)
analogue-to-digital converter. The resultant baseband signal is then analysed without
further filtering stages. For this receiver architecture, the signal model presented in [77]
can be used to develop the detection algorithms. For simplicity of analysis, perfect timing
and carrier synchronisation are assumed such that one sample is used to represent a single
chip of the spreading sequence in the intercept receiver. The intercepted discrete DSSS
signal can then be expressed as
y(nTc) = σxd(nTc)c(nTc) + σww(nTc) (4.3)
with the chip number n = 1, 2, . . . , N and Tc the chip interval. c is the length-N (N >> 1)
pseudo-noise code sequence with period Tsym = NTc and d the data sequence assumed to
be invariant over Tsym. Since the target communication system is a BPSK DSSS system,
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both c and d are sequences with values ±1. The noise sequence is represented by w ∼
N (µ = 0, σ2 = 1). The code, data and noise sequences are also assumed independent of
each other. The constants σx and σw are included to scale the signal and noise sequences
respectively in order to obtain different SNR values, using
SNR =
σ2x
σ2w
(4.4)
which is the SNR before despreading.
Before the detection feature can be extracted from the intercepted signal, some signal
formatting is required. The intercepted signal is firstly divided into non-overlapping seg-
ments of length equal to N . Secondly, these segments are stacked to form the N × N
detection matrix given by
Y = σxX + σwW (4.5)
with X the data and W the noise matrices. The detection technique presented in this
paper then takes Y as input and decides whether a DSSS signal is present or not.
4.3 Feature extraction
The detection feature is the largest eigenvalue sequence of the SCM of the intercepted
signal stacked in the detection matrix Y. The feature is extracted by performing PCA
on Y while cyclically shifting the matrix. This section considers the noise-free scenario
with σx > 0 and σw = 0 such that Y = σxX (see also Appendix F). The scenario with
σw > 0 is considered in Section 4.4. Although this section considers real binary data and
spreading sequences, the result can easily be extended to the complex case.
4.3.1 Constructing the data matrix
The spreading sequence c = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] containing N chips is used to spread the data
sequence d = [d1, d2, . . . , dN ] containing N bits. If the receiver started intercepting at the
beginning of a new sequence, the data matrix can be denoted as
X0 =

d1c1 d1c2 . . . d1cN−1 d1cN
d2c1 d2c2 . . . d2cN−1 d2cN
...
...
. . .
...
...
dN−1c1 dN−1c2 . . . dN−1cN−1 dN−1cN
dNc1 dNc2 . . . dNcN−1 dNcN

(4.6)
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which will be referred to as the aligned data matrix since the code sequence elements are
aligned to the columns of X0; i.e. c1 is in column 1, c2 in column 2, and so on.
4.3.2 Principal component analysis
To perform PCA on the aligned data matrix, the covariance matrix of X0 is computed
and then eigen decomposition is performed. The N × N covariance matrix is defined as
(see [73, 76,102])
COV(X0) = E
[
XT0 X0
]
(4.7)
with [·]T the matrix transpose. The covariance matrix can be estimated using the SCM
R(X0) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xTnxn =
1
N
XT0 X0 (4.8)
with xn the n
th row of X0. The SCM of the aligned data matrix can therefore be expressed
as
R(X0) =
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
d2n
]
cTc = cTc (4.9)
which is a positive-semidefinite (and by definition symmetric) matrix [75]. The simplifica-
tion in (4.9) follows from the fact that d2n = 1 for all values of n. By performing elementary
row operations on R(X0) it can be shown that the row echelon form Rech(X0) is an N×N
matrix with only the first row being non-zero. R(X0) therefore has a rank of one and thus
only one non-zero eigenvalue [5]. This can be expected since X0 has N linearly dependent
rows. The non-zero eigenvalue of R(σxX0) can therefore be expressed as
λX,1 = tr(R(σxX0))
= σ2x
[
N∑
n=1
c2n
]
= σ2xN (4.10)
since the trace of a matrix equals the sum of its eigenvalues [75] and c2n = 1. Furthermore,
λX,1 is non-negative and real, since the eigenvalues of positive-semidefinite matrices are
non-negative and real [5].
4.3.3 Cyclic shifting
Shifting is performed by discarding the first received sample and appending a new sample
at the end of the sample sequence. The data matrix X0 after k ∈ [0, N) shifts can then
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be written as
Xk =

d1ck+1 . . . d1cN d2c1 . . . d2ck
d2ck+1 . . . d2cN d3c1 . . . d3ck
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
dN−1ck+1 . . . dN−1cN dNc1 . . . dNck
dNck+1 . . . dNcN dN+1c1 . . . dN+1ck

. (4.11)
Xk for k ≥ N can be obtained in a similar way by noting that Xk will be in aligned form
for any non-negative multiple of N shifts starting from X0. XN will therefore have the
same form as X0 though the contents of the entire matrix are shifted up one row with
the top row removed and the bottom row replaced by a new sequence. The effect of a
single sample shift on the data matrix is a cyclic left shift of all the columns followed by
a cyclic upwards shift of the last column and finally replacing the bottom right element
with the new sample. The resultant effect on the SCM is a shift diagonally upwards (in a
North West direction) such that the first row and column are removed and the last row
and column are replaced by new values due to the new data sample in the last row and
column position of the data matrix. The SCM of Xk, k ∈ [0, N) can be given as
R(Xk) = Ak ◦
[
cTk ck
]
(4.12)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product operator. ck is the spreading code c cyclically
left-shifted k times given as
ck = [ck+1, ck+2, . . . cN , c1, . . . ck] (4.13)
such that the first Nk = N − k elements in ck correspond to the last Nk elements in c.
Ak is an N ×N coefficient matrix
Ak =
[
α11JNk,Nk α12JNk,k
α12Jk,Nk α22Jk,k
]
(4.14)
consisting of four submatrices where Jm,n denotes the m×n matrix of ones. The coefficient
values are
α11 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
d2n = 1
α12 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
dndn+1
α22 =
1
N
N+1∑
n=2
d2n = 1
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since d2n = 1. The form of the coefficient matrix Ak arises from the fact that the first Nk
columns of each row of Xk have the same data bit value as the corresponding row of X0.
The last k columns of each row of Xk contain the data bit that overflowed from the row
beneath (e.g. the last k columns of the first row of Xk contain d2).
By performing elementary row operations on R(Xk) it can be shown that the row echelon
form Rech(Xk) is an N × N matrix with only the first two rows being non-zero (except
when the data matrix is aligned - only the first row is then non-zero). The second row
of Rech(Xk) contains Nk zeros followed by k non-zero elements and therefore Rech(Xk)
contains a maximum of only two non-zero rows for all values of k. R(Xk) therefore contains
a maximum of two non-zero (also non-negative real) eigenvalues and the data matrix Xk
consequently has a maximum of only two principal components.
4.3.4 Largest eigenvalues
Since R(σxXk) has a maximum of only two non-zero eigenvalues, its trace can be expressed
in terms of the eigenvalues as
tr(R(σxXk)) =
2∑
p=1
λX,p = λX,1 + λX,2 (4.15)
with the largest eigenvalue λX,1 ≥ λX,2. Note that λX,p depends on the shift parameter k
but this dependence is omitted for the sake of simplifying notation. Using (4.12)-(4.14)
the trace can be expressed in terms of the matrix elements as
tr (R(σxXk)) = σ
2
x
N∑
n=1
[R(Xk)]nn
= σ2x
(
α11
Nk∑
n=1
[
cTk ck
]
nn
+ α22
N∑
n=Nk+1
[
cTk ck
]
nn
)
= σ2xN (4.16)
with [·]nn denoting the diagonal entries of each matrix. The simplification in (4.16) follows
from the fact that α11 = α22 = 1 and c
2
n = 1. The sum of the eigenvalues therefore has
a constant value irrespective of the value of k, assuming the signal power σ2x remains
constant. (4.15) can thus be stated as
tr(R(σxXk)) = λX,1 + λX,2 = σ
2
xN ∀ k. (4.17)
Whenever Xk is aligned, λX,1 = σ
2
xN as in (4.10) and λX,2 = 0. λX,1 therefore exhibits a
pattern with period N as Xk is cyclically shifted, since λX,1 ≥ λX,2 for all values of k. λX,1
therefore reaches its maximum value σ2xN once during every complete cycle of shifting.
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4.3.4.1 Eigenvalue bounds
Though it is possible to develop analytic expressions for λX,p, such equations would not
be tractable since they are functions of all the elements of c and d. Instead, in order to
describe the behaviour of the largest eigenvalue, bounds on its variation are provided in
this section. Since R(Xk) has a maximum rank of two, its eigenvalues are the roots of
a quadratic polynomial. By evaluating the eigenvalues of R(σxXk) with d
2
n = c
2
n = 1, it
can be shown that the two non-zero eigenvalues can be expressed in the form (see also
Appendix G)
λX =
N2 ±√∆
2N
σ2x (4.18)
with the discriminant of the quadratic polynomial ∆ ∈ [0, N4]. From (4.18) the largest
eigenvalue of R(σxXk) is bounded according to
Nσ2x
2
≤ λX,1 ≤ Nσ2x. (4.19)
Fig. 4.2 shows an example of the temporal variation of λX,1 when BPSK data is spread
using the Walsh N = 64 code with σ2x = 1. The bounds in Fig. 4.2 are given in (4.19).
Note that the minimum bound for λX,1 is not necessarily reached during every cycle; the
actual minimum value depends on the input data bits. From (4.17) the maximum bound
for λX,1 is however reached during every cycle irrespective of the input data bit values.
4.4 Analysis in noise
This section considers the effect of noise on the feature extraction technique. The detection
matrix can be written as
Yk = σxXk + σwWk (4.20)
with the noise matrix in a similar form to Xk given by
Wk =

w1,k+1 . . . w1,N w2,1 . . . w2,k
w2,k+1 . . . w2,N w3,1 . . . w3,k
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
wN−1,k+1 . . . wN−1,N wN,1 . . . wN,k
wN,k+1 . . . wN,N wN+1,1 . . . wN+1,k

(4.21)
containing real independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean unity variance
Gaussian samples.
83
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Communications and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
0 640 1280 1920 2560
Sample nr
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
λ
X
,1
Figure 4.2: Example temporal representation of λX,1 for σ
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x = 1 and N = 64.
4.4.1 Noise-only scenario
If σx = 0, the intercepted signal will contain only noise. For any cyclic shift performed
on Wk, the SCM R(σwWk) is a Wishart matrix. The normalised largest eigenvalue of a
Wishart matrix is distributed according to the TW law [102], which can be approximated
using the Gamma distribution [68, 76]. The distribution of the largest eigenvalue λW,1 of
R(σwWk) can therefore be approximated using the Gamma PDF [76]
γ(x) =
(x− x0)α−1
θαΓ(α)
exp
[−(x− x0)
θ
]
(4.22)
with support region [x0, x0 + 2αθ]. The parameter values of (4.22) for Wk with real
elements are
α = 46.5651
θ = 0.1850 σ2w σN/N
x0 = σ
2
w (µN − 9.8209σN) /N
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with the centre and scaling parameters
µN =
(√
N − 1 +
√
N
)2
σN =
√
µN
(
1√
N − 1 +
1√
N
) 1
3
.
Although R(σwWk) is always a Wishart matrix, all SCMs of Wk for shifts from k to
k + N − 1 (starting from any value of k) will contain some identical elements, though
not in identical positions. This is due to the diagonal shift on the SCM as explained in
Section 4.3.3. It can therefore be expected that a pattern with period N will arise in the
eigenvalue sequence of the SCM as the noise matrix is cyclically shifted.
Fig. 4.3 shows an illustration of the temporal variation of λW,1 as Wk is cyclically shifted
for σ2w = 1 and N = 64. The bounds of λW,1 afforded by the support region
x0 ≤ λW,1 ≤ x0 + 2αθ (4.23)
and the measured mean value of λW,1 are also shown in Fig. 4.3. It can be shown that the
PDF of λW,1 illustrated in Fig. 4.3 is accurately predicted by the Gamma approximation
of (4.22) (see [76]).
4.4.2 Signal and noise scenario
The SCM of Yk can be expressed as
R(Yk) = R (σxXk + σwWk)
= σ2xR(Xk) + σ
2
wR(Wk) + Ek (4.24)
with the error matrix expressed as
Ek =
σxσw
N
[
XTkWk + W
T
k Xk
]
. (4.25)
This section considers bounds on the largest eigenvalue λY,1 of R(Yk) using the Weyl
inequalities [113–115]. Although it is often assumed that Ek = 0 (see for example [113]),
the effect of the error matrix is also considered here.
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4.4.2.1 Weyl inequalities
The eigenvalue spectrum of the sum of two N ×N Hermitian (or real symmetric) matri-
ces A and B can be described using the Weyl inequalities. Arranging all eigenvalues in
decreasing order (λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λN) the pth largest eigenvalue of the matrix sum A + B is
bounded according to
Lp ≤ λp(A + B) ≤ Up (4.26)
with the upper and lower bounds respectively given by [116]
Up = min{λi(A) + λj(B) : i+ j = p+ 1} (4.27)
Lp = max{λi(A) + λj(B) : i+ j = p+N} (4.28)
with the eigenvalue index values i, j ∈ [1, N ]. Note that any eigenvalue sum combination
in (4.27) and (4.28) is respectively a valid upper and lower bound. Taking the minimum in
(4.27) and the maximum in (4.28) will however result in the tightest bounds. The upper
bound for the largest eigenvalue (p = 1) can be obtained from (4.27) as
U1 = λ1(A) + λ1(B) (4.29)
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since there is only one solution (i = j = 1) to the index equation i + j = 2. The lower
bound for p = 1 can be obtained from (4.28) as
L1 = max{[λ1(A) + λN(B)], [λ2(A) + λN−1(B)], . . . , [λN(A) + λ1(B)]} (4.30)
since i + j = 1 + N . In order to use the Weyl inequalities, it can easily be verified
mathematically that the matrices σ2xR(Xk), σ
2
wR(Wk), σ
2
xR(Xk) +σ
2
wR(Wk) and Ek are
all symmetric.
4.4.2.2 Eigenvalue bounds of Ek
When N is small or correlation exists between the signal and noise sequences, the er-
ror matrix Ek given in (4.25) cannot be neglected in (4.24). This section considers the
upper and lower limits, respectively, of the largest eigenvalue λE,1 and the smallest eigen-
value λE,N of Ek in order to derive bounds for λY,1. Each element of Xk in (4.11) equals
±1 and each element of Wk given in (4.21) is independently drawn from N (0, 1). Each
element of XTkWk (and W
T
k Xk) is therefore the sum of N random variables drawn inde-
pendently from N (0, 1) such that each element is distributed according to N (0, N). The
sum XTkWk + W
T
k Xk will therefore result in a matrix with main diagonal elements dis-
tributed according to N (0, 4N) and all other elements distributed according to N (0, 2N).
Since Ek is a real symmetric matrix with all entries symmetrically distributed around 0,
the eigenvalue limits can be given as [117]
λ(Ek) ∈ [−Nb,Nb] (4.31)
with the entries of Ek in the range [−b, b]. Since the elements of Ek are normally dis-
tributed and [117] requires a fixed range, the support region of the matrix entries should
be truncated. The loss in tail probability mass of N (0, σ2) due to truncation can be
described in terms of the Q-function [26] as
Q
(
b
σ
)
= Q(β) (4.32)
with
b = βσ{(Ek)ij} (4.33)
where β is the factor of the standard deviation at which N (0, σ2) is truncated. The
standard deviation in (4.33) is denoted by σ{(Ek)ij} with i = j for the diagonal entries
and i 6= j for the off-diagonal entries. Although all entries of Ek are confined to the
interval of the diagonal entries ((Ek)jj has twice the variance of (Ek)ij), using i = j in
(4.33) will result in very conservative bounds. It can be shown that the lower and upper
bounds in (4.31) would only be attained if all entries of Ek were, respectively, −b and b
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(see [118]). The standard deviation of the majority of the matrix elements (i.e. the off-
diagonal entries) is often used to calculate eigenvalue bounds (see for example [119, 120]
for the case where all matrix elements are i.i.d.). Using (4.25) and the standard deviation
of the off-diagonal entries in (4.33), the eigenvalue bounds of Ek can therefore be expressed
using (4.31) with
Nb = βσxσw
√
2N. (4.34)
The tightness of the bounds further depends on the value of the factor β in (4.34). Em-
pirical results indicate that choosing β =
√
2 results in valid bounds such that
λ(Ek) ∈ [−2σxσw
√
N, 2σxσw
√
N ]. (4.35)
Simulated sequences of the largest and smallest eigenvalues of Ek for σ
2
x = σ
2
w = 1 and
N = 64 and the bounds of (4.35) are shown in Fig. 4.4. The PDF of each sequence is
also shown in the figure; λE,1 seems to have a Gamma PDF and the two PDFs are mirror
images.
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4.4.2.3 Bounds of λY,1 when Ek = 0
This section considers the bounds of the largest eigenvalue of R(Yk) for the scenario
where the data and noise are uncorrelated (when N is large) such that (4.24) can be
written as
R(Yk) = σ
2
xR(Xk) + σ
2
wR(Wk). (4.36)
The eigenvalue bounds of R(Yk) can be expressed using (4.26) to (4.28) with A =
σ2xR(Xk) and B = σ
2
wR(Wk). According to (4.29) the upper bound U1 of λY,1 is
U1 = λX,1 + λW,1
= Nσ2x + x0 + 2αθ (4.37)
obtained by summing the upper bounds of (4.19) and (4.23). According to (4.30) the
lower bound L1 can be expressed as
L1 = max{[λX,1 + λW,N ], [λX,2 + λW,N−1], [λW,N−2], . . . , [λW,1]}
= max{λX,1, λW,1} (4.38)
using the fact that λX,i = 0 for i > 2, since R(σxXk) has a maximum of only two non-zero
eigenvalues (see Section 4.3.4) and the fact that the smallest eigenvalue λW,N approaches
zero (even for small values of N [113,121]) since the detection matrix is square. (From [121]
the asymptotic lower bound of the eigenvalue spectrum of the SCM of an M × N noise
matrix is b− =
(
1−√N/M)2. In the case considered here N = M , such that b− = 0.)
By substituting the lower bounds of (4.19) and (4.23) into (4.38), the lower bound can
be expressed as
L1 = max
{
Nσ2x
2
, x0
}
(4.39)
with Nσ2x/2 > x0 if SNR > 2(µN−9.8209σN)/N2 using the value of x0 from Section 4.4.1.
4.4.2.4 Bounds of λY,1 when Ek 6= 0
In this section new bounds L1E and U1E for the largest eigenvalue of R(Yk) in (4.24) are
derived for the case when the error matrix is non-zero. The same method used in Section
4.4.2.3 is applied, though with A = σ2xR(Xk) + σ
2
wR(Wk) and B = Ek. Using (4.29) and
the upper bounds given in (4.35) and (4.37) the new upper bound can be written as
U1E = U1 + 2σxσw
√
N. (4.40)
Similarly, using (4.30) and the lower bounds given in (4.35) and (4.39) the new lower
bound can be shown to be
L1E = L1 − 2σxσw
√
N. (4.41)
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Fig. 4.5 shows an example of the temporal variation of λY,1 with the bounds from (4.37),
(4.39), (4.40) and (4.41) for σ2x = σ
2
w = 1 and N = 64. The bounds U1 and L1 are exceeded
in the figure since they neglect the error matrix.
4.5 Detection techniques
The detection of an unknown DSSS signal can be cast as a binary hypothesis testing
problem
H0 : y(nTc) = σww(nTc)
H1 : y(nTc) = σxx(nTc) + σww(nTc)
using the intercepted signal of (4.3) with the unknown deterministic signal x(nTc) =
d(nTc)c(nTc). H0 signifies the signal absent (noise-only) case and H1 the signal present
case. The task of the detection receiver is to decide whether the signal of interest is
present or not, based on a detection threshold derived from a test statistic under the H0
hypothesis.
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This section considers three techniques that can be used to detect DSSS signals. The tech-
niques are classic ED and two new detection techniques based on eigen analysis presented
in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. For ED the theoretical false alarm probability PFA and detection
probability PD are derived in terms of the threshold. For the other two techniques, PFA is
derived in terms of the threshold and PD is then determined using computer simulation
with the results presented in Section 4.7.
4.5.1 Energy detection
Using the generalised likelihood ratio test, it can be shown that hypothesis H1 should be
chosen if [5]
T (y) =
V∑
n=1
[y(nTc)]
2 > ζ (4.42)
with T (·) signifying the test statistic function calculated over V samples and ζ the de-
tection threshold which can be calculated from the required PFA according to the NP
criteria. Clearly, (4.42) signifies ED. Assuming perfect knowledge of the unknown signal,
a performance upper bound of the NP detector can be determined [5]. Assuming the signal
of interest is BPSK with x(nTc) = ±1, the hypothesis test can be stated as
H0 : T (y) =
N∑
n=1
[σww(nTc)]
2
H1 : T (y) =
N∑
n=1
[±σx + σww(nTc)]2 .
It can then be shown that
H0 : T (y)
σ2w
∼ X 2N
H1 : T (y)
σ2w
∼ X ′2N (pnc)
with X 2N the central and X ′2N the non-central Chi-square distributions with non-centrality
parameter
pnc =
Nσ2x
σ2w
= N × SNR.
The false alarm probability can then be expressed as
PFA = p {T (y) > ζ;H0}
= p
{
T (y)
σ2w
>
ζ
σ2w
;H0
}
= QX 2N (ζ
′) (4.43)
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with QX 2N (ζ
′) the right tail probability of X 2N and the scaled threshold ζ ′ = ζ/σ2w. Likewise,
the detection probability can be expressed as
PD = QX ′2N
(ζ ′) . (4.44)
4.5.2 Eigen detection technique 1
The first eigen detection algorithm is based on the feature extraction technique presented
in Section 4.3. The algorithm contains three phases. Firstly, the intercepted signal is
segmented and stacked to form the detection matrix. Secondly, the principal component
of the detection matrix is calculated and thirdly the detection matrix is cyclically shifted.
The principal component is calculated for every cycle, such that the largest eigenvalue
sequence λY,1 is generated. A detection is declared if λY,1 exceeds a given threshold ζ.
This threshold can be calculated from the right tail probability
PFA = Qg(ζ) =
∫ ∞
ζ
γ(x)dx (4.45)
with γ(x) the PDF of λW,1 given in (4.22). The threshold is therefore
ζ = Q−1g (PFA) . (4.46)
The SNR limit at which perfect detection (PFA = 0 and PD = 1) is achieved can be
calculated using the upper bound on λW,1 given in (4.23) and the lower bound on λY,1
given in (4.41). For SNR values above this limit, λW,1 will always be less than λY,1 such
that
x0 + 2αθ < L1 − 2σxσw
√
N (4.47)
with L1 = Nσ
2
x/2 from (4.39). The SNR limit can be calculated by solving the quadratic
inequality for σx/σw that results when the parameter values x0, α and θ from Section 4.4.1
are substituted into (4.47). For example, perfect detection for N = 64 using technique 1
can be shown to be possible if SNR > −2.828 dB. For non-zero values of PFA, PD = 1
will be achieved below this SNR limit.
4.5.3 Eigen detection technique 2
As illustrated in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, λY,1 exhibits a strong pattern with period N (or
Tsym) as the detection matrix is cyclically shifted (if a DSSS signal is present). Detection
could therefore be based on the frequency content I(f0) of λY,1 at f0 = 1/Tsym. Eigen
detection technique 2 uses sinusoidal detection to isolate I(f0) and declares a detection if
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a given threshold ζ is exceeded. The test statistic is therefore given by
T (λY,1) = I(f0) =
[
1√
V
V∑
n=1
λY,1(nTs)cos(2pif0nTs)
]2
+
[
1√
V
V∑
n=1
λY,1(nTs)sin(2pif0nTs)
]2
(4.48)
which is the periodogram equation [5] for sinusoidal detection of unknown amplitude and
phase over V samples. In order to calculate I(f0) for λY,1 formed by the content of a single
detection matrix, the number of samples should be V = N2. V can however be chosen
even longer, since the repetition pattern continues beyond N2. Under H0, the PDF of
I(f0) is related to the central Chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom [5],
since each term of the sum in (4.48) is normally distributed before squaring. The false
alarm probability can therefore be given as
PFA = QX 22 (ζ
′) = exp
(
−ζ
′
2
)
(4.49)
similar to (4.43), from which the threshold can determined using
ζ ′ = −2 ln (PFA) . (4.50)
4.6 Computational complexity
Computational complexity can be measured in terms of the total number of elementary
arithmetic operations (+, −, ×, ÷) required to execute an algorithm. The complexity
of other operations can also be expressed in terms of the elementary operations. It will
be assumed that the complexity of square rooting and division is the same as that of
multiplication [122]. Likewise, addition and subtraction will be assumed equivalent. The
complexity of an algorithm is typically dominated by the number of multiplications re-
quired, since multiplication is more complex than addition. This section considers the
computational complexity of the three algorithms presented in Section 4.5 in terms of the
number of arithmetic operations required to extract the test statistic from the intercepted
data. Additional processing, such as memory allocation and movement of data values, is
not taken into account. The equivalent number of multiplications and additions required
for each algorithm are summarised in Table 4.1 and measured execution times are given
Section 4.7.3.
4.6.1 Energy detection
ED is implemented in this paper using (4.42) with a fixed size window moving over the
intercepted data. The window size V is equal to the size of the detection matrix N2. The
energy in a single window can therefore be calculated using N2 multiplications and N2−1
additions.
93
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Communications and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
Table 4.1: Comparative computational complexities of the three detection algorithms.
Algorithm Multiplications Additions
ED N2 N2 − 1
Tech 1 N3 +M(N2 + 4N + 2) N3 −N2 +M(N2 + 3N − 3)
Tech 2 2V + 3 2V − 1
4.6.2 Eigen detection technique 1
The most computationally intensive step of the first eigen detection algorithm (described
in Section 4.5.2) is the calculation of the principal component, which involves calculat-
ing a SCM and its largest eigenvalue. The computational complexity of this step will
subsequently be considered for a single cyclic shift of the detection matrix.
4.6.2.1 Calculation of the SCM
Equation (4.8) indicates that the SCM is calculated by performing matrix multiplication
on two N×N matrices and scaling the resultant matrix by N . It might be more economical
to rather scale the detection threshold value (see [76]) than to scale each of theN2 elements
of the resultant matrix (if the hardware platform allows large numbers). For the analysis
presented here, it will be assumed that calculation of the SCM is equivalent to a single
matrix multiplication operation. The matrix multiplication operation F = GH can be
implemented through the conventional approach [75] using
fij =
N∑
k=1
gikhkj (4.51)
where [·]ij is the ijth matrix element. Calculation of each element of F therefore requires
N multiplications and N − 1 additions. Since there are N2 elements to be calculated,
the overall matrix multiplication operation requires N3 multiplications and N2(N − 1)
additions.
4.6.2.2 Calculation of the largest eigenvalue
Eigenvalues are usually approximated using iterative numerical methods, such as the
power method [75,123]. The power method is used to determine the dominant eigenvalue
(or simply the largest eigenvalue, if the eigenvalues are non-negative real) and associated
eigenvector of the N × N matrix F. The algorithm takes as input a non-zero column
vector v0 (with unit Euclidean norm) which could be an approximation to the associated
eigenvector or a random vector. If F is symmetric, the algorithm can be simplified and
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the largest eigenvalue λm and eigenvector vm can then approximated using [123]
um = Fvm (4.52)
λm = v
T
mum (4.53)
vm+1 =
um
||um||2 (4.54)
ε = ||vm+1 − vm||2 (4.55)
for each mth,m ≥ 0 iteration, with || · ||2 signifying the Euclidean norm. The convergence
of the algorithm depends on F and the choice of v0. Although bad choices of v0 may result
in slow convergence or division by zero errors (the algorithm will then not converge and
will need to be restarted with a new v0), the algorithm will converge for almost all initial
guesses of v0 if F has a single dominant eigenvalue (see [124]). The algorithm should
therefore check at each iteration whether ||um||2 = 0. The number of iterations can be
limited to a specified maximum or the algorithm can stop when the tolerance ε decreases
below a predefined value. The computational complexity of the symmetric power method
is considered below, assuming the algorithm will converge.
Equation (4.52) is a matrix-vector multiplication which is the same as (4.51) with j = 1.
Since only N elements are calculated, (4.52) requires N2 multiplications and N(N − 1)
additions. (4.53) is a dot-product operation and requires N multiplications and N − 1
additions. (4.54) requires N divisions and the calculation of the Euclidean norm, which
requires N multiplications, N−1 additions and one square root calculation. Lastly, (4.55)
requires N subtractions and again the calculation of an Euclidean norm. Assuming M
iterations are required to reach a certain ε, calculation of the largest eigenvalue therefore
requires the equivalent processing time of M(N2 + 4N + 2) multiplications and M(N2 +
3N − 3) additions.
4.6.2.3 Possible simplifications
A more efficient (though with reduced numerical stability) method to perform matrix mul-
tiplication is Strassen’s algorithm [75, 125]. The algorithm recursively splits the matrices
to be multiplied into smaller submatrices and performs matrix multiplication using less
multiplications, but more additions than the conventional approach. The multiplicative
cost of the Strassen algorithm is O(N log27) ≈ O(N2.807), instead of O(N log28) = O(N3) of
the conventional approach.
An alternative method to approximate the largest eigenvalue is the trace method [126]
using
tr (F r) =
N∑
i=1
λri . (4.56)
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If λ1 >> λ2 it follows from (4.56) that tr (F
r) ≈ λr1 such that
λ1 ≈ [tr (F r)]
1
r . (4.57)
The larger the difference between the largest and other eigenvalues, the better the ap-
proximation. Computation of (4.57) requires r−1 matrix multiplications, N−1 additions
to calculate the trace and the calculation of the rth root of a real number. If F could have
negative eigenvalues, r should be odd in order to retain the correct eigenvalue sign and the
minimum value is then r = 3. However, when F is positive-semidefinite (all eigenvalues
are non-negative real) the minimum value is r = 2. Although the trace method will not
produce accurate eigenvalues for the matrices considered in this paper, it can be used to
produce a periodic eigenvalue sequence.
4.6.3 Eigen detection technique 2
Technique 2 calculates the frequency content of λY,1 produced by technique 1. The com-
plexity can be calculated by writing (4.48) as
T (λY,1) =
1
V
( V∑
n=1
λY,1(nTs)fcos(nTs)
)2
+
(
V∑
n=1
λY,1(nTs)fsin(nTs)
)2 (4.58)
with fcos and fsin representing cosine and sine function values which can be calculated
once and stored in memory. Each term within the square brackets of (4.58) requires V +1
multiplications and V −1 additions. The total complexity of (4.58) is therefore equivalent
to 2V + 3 multiplications and 2V − 1 additions. To calculate the total processing time
to produce a single value of T (λY,1), the time required to produce the V samples of λY,1
used in (4.58) should also be included.
4.7 Simulation study and results
The performances of the three detection techniques were evaluated through Monte Carlo
computer simulation with the target communication system a baseband BPSK DSSS
system employing a length N = 64 binary Walsh spreading code (taking row 32 of the
Walsh matrix as code sequence). The intercept receiver used 1 sample per code chip such
that Ts = Tc to perform detection. The number of samples used to calculate a single
test statistic value (for a single cyclic shift) for each detection technique was Ns = N
2 =
642 = 4096 corresponding to the size of the detection matrix. Since eigen technique 2
calculates the frequency content of the eigenvalue sequence and is not confined to the size
of the detection matrix, the value 10N2 = 40960 was also considered for this technique.
This section presents the simulated false alarm and detection performance results where
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Table 4.2: Measured false alarm probability values.
Set PFA ED Tech 1 Tech 2
0.001 0.0010205 0.0012686 0.0009245
0.003 0.0030093 0.0034905 0.0027469
0.005 0.0050614 0.0056225 0.0046470
0.010 0.0101522 0.0107803 0.0099211
0.030 0.0302207 0.0307656 0.0309257
0.050 0.0504181 0.0505104 0.0514241
0.100 0.1007815 0.0997421 0.1010004
0.300 0.3005873 0.2995871 0.2995768
0.500 0.5012642 0.5045618 0.4978770
106 data bits were considered per simulation run. A single simulation run consisted of
calculating the probability of detection for a given SNR value. Measured average execution
times for each technique are also presented.
4.7.1 Calculation of false alarm rates
The false alarm performance of each technique was measured by calculating the theoretical
threshold ζ from set values of PFA using the equations in Section 4.5. The false alarm
or detection probability for the noise-only scenario was then obtained by setting σx = 0
and σw = 1 in (4.3). The results are given in Table 4.2. To obtain improved accuracies of
these values or to measure even lower probabilities, larger values of Ns would be required.
The measured values in Table 4.2 however correspond closely to the set values, confirming
that the threshold equations in Section 4.5 are correct.
4.7.2 Probability of detection performance
Using the theoretical threshold values calculated from the set values of PFA and setting
σw = 1 in (4.3) and σx according to (4.4) for a given SNR value, simulated values for PD
were obtained. The simulated detection performances for PFA = 0.1 and PFA = 10
−6 are
shown respectively in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7. At PFA = 10
−6 technique 1 exhibits a maximum
performance gain of approximately 3 dB over ED. Technique 2 exhibits additional gains
over technique 1 of 1.5 dB for V = N2 and 4 dB for V = 10N2.
Fig. 4.7 shows that for PFA = 10
−6, technique 1 achieves PD = 1 at SNR = −10 dB.
The SNR value at which PD = 1 is reached increases with decreasing PFA. Technique
1’s theoretic limit for perfect detection (see Section 4.5.2) however predicts the value at
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Figure 4.6: Simulated detection performance for PFA = 0.1.
which PD = 1 is reached will not increase beyond SNR = −2.828 dB.
The ROCs, displaying the PD vs. PFA performance, for SNR = −14 dB and the reference
45◦ line are shown in Fig. 4.8. For values of PFA approaching one, the three techniques have
the same detection performances, though for values of PFA approaching zero both eigen
detection techniques are superior to ED. At SNR = −14 dB, technique 2 (V = 40960)
exhibits perfect detection. As the SNR value decreases, the ROC curves moves closer to
the 45◦ reference line.
4.7.3 Evaluation of execution time
Although the number of arithmetic operations required to execute an algorithm (as derived
in Section 4.6) predicts execution time, several other factors should also be considered.
Two most important factors determining execution speed are hardware platform speci-
fications (processing speed, memory size, etc.) and the efficiency of the implementation
(how well the code is written to exploit the hardware).
The measured average execution times matching Table 4.1 are given in Table 4.3 for
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Figure 4.7: Simulated detection performance for PFA = 10
−6.
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Figure 4.8: Simulated receiver operating curves for SNR = -14 dB.
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Table 4.3: Average execution time in seconds of the detection algorithms for different
values of N .
Algorithm N = 32 N = 64 N = 96 N = 128
ED (C) 3.2928× 10−6 1.2870× 10−5 2.9118× 10−5 5.1695× 10−5
Tech 1 (C, -5 dB) 2.4120× 10−4 1.4825× 10−3 4.9252× 10−3 1.2397× 10−2
Tech 1 (GSL, -5 dB) 7.7575× 10−5 3.5204× 10−4 1.1936× 10−3 2.5524× 10−3
Tech 1 (C, -25 dB) 4.8001× 10−4 2.8274× 10−3 1.0530× 10−2 2.5837× 10−2
Tech 1 (GSL, -25 dB) 1.8533× 10−4 8.1181× 10−4 3.0881× 10−3 6.5832× 10−3
Tech 2 (C, V = N2) 5.7688× 10−6 2.3089× 10−5 5.2298× 10−5 9.2508× 10−5
Tech 2 (C, V = 10N2) 5.7705× 10−5 2.3179× 10−4 5.2073× 10−4 9.2447× 10−4
different code lengths N . The three techniques were implemented using ANSI C on a
computer platform with an Intel Core 2 Duo T9600 (2.80 GHz) processor. The average
execution time was measured by counting the number of processing cycles required by
the section of C code that calculates the test statistic. The implementation of technique
1 was also enhanced using BLAS [127] through the C GSL [128].
For ED, the complexity only depends on N and the values in Table 4.3 clearly indicates
that the execution time is related to N2 as predicted in Table 4.1. The complexity of
technique 1 depends both on N and the number of iterations M required by the symmetric
power method. M is a function of SNR and the tolerance value ε; the power method
converges slower for smaller values of both SNR and ε. The detection performance results
presented in this paper can be obtained using ε = 10−4 (smaller values do not improve
performance) which is reached on average after M = [11, 70, 111] iterations respectively
for SNR = [−5,−15,−25] dB.
Table 4.3 contains execution time results for technique 1 for SNR = −5 and −25 dB. The
results of both the C and C with GSL implementations are shown. All four technique 1
cases indicate a growth in execution time greater than N2. However, using GSL reduces
the execution times and growth rates. Lastly, the execution times of technique 2 are
strongly related to N2 in each case (as predicted in Table 4.1). By increasing the window
length N2 by a factor 10, the execution times increase by the same factor.
Comparing the different techniques using Tables 4.1 and 4.3, it is clear that ED is the
least complex. Although technique 2 is faster than technique 1, technique 2 needs the
output sequence produced by technique 1.
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4.8 Conclusion
This paper considered the detection of weak DSSS signals using PCA. Two new semi-
blind detection techniques with superior performance to classic ED were presented. If
the carrier frequency is known, the techniques only require the sequence length of the
spreading code to construct a detection matrix which forms the basis of detection. It was
shown that a DSSS signal can be detected using a function of the largest eigenvalue of
the shifted detection matrix as test statistic. The performance improvement is due to the
large difference between the largest eigenvalues of the detection matrix under the H0 and
H1 hypotheses even at low SNR values. The computational complexity of each algorithm
was also evaluated. Although this paper focussed on real signals, the techniques can also
be applied to complex signals since the eigenvalues of the SCM of a complex detection
matrix will also be real.
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Abstract: Several existing DSSS detection and estimation algorithms assume prior knowl-
edge of the symbol period or sequence length, although very few sequence-length estima-
tion techniques are available in the literature. This paper presents two techniques to
estimate the sequence length of a baseband DSSS signal affected by AWGN. The first
technique is based on a known autocorrelation technique which is used as reference, and
the second technique is based on PCA. Theoretical analysis and computer simulation
show that the second technique can correctly estimate the sequence length at a lower
SNR than the first technique. The techniques presented in this paper can estimate the
sequence length blindly which can then be fed to semi-blind detection and estimation
algorithms.
5.1 Introduction
In non-cooperative reception, blind detection and estimation techniques are required as
the parameters used by the communication transmitter are in general not known by
the receiver. The normal approach used in cooperative communication systems, such as
optimal correlation or matched filtering techniques [26], is therefore not applicable in
non-cooperative communication receiver systems. Typical applications of such systems
are to be found in spectrum surveillance and electronic interception, but blind estimation
techniques are important in their own right also [15], and hence this paper considers some
aspects of this problem in depth.
Signal detection and parameter estimation are usually performed separately and indepen-
dently in communication problems [129]. Detection is performed to determine whether
the signal of interest is present or absent given observed data that is corrupted by noise.
When it has been determined that the signal of interest is present, estimation is performed
to determine the signal parameter values. This paper is concerned with blind estimation
(assuming the signal is present) of the period of cyclostationary sequences used in DSSS
communication systems.
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The spreading codes used in DSSS are cyclostationary, since the mean and autocorrelation
of the transmitted signal are periodic with the same period [6]. This periodicity distin-
guishes the signal from noise and can be exploited to perform detection and estimation
especially when the signals are weak. This is in fact the case for received DSSS, especially
for a non-cooperative receiver which does not know the spreading code and cannot there-
fore take advantage of the processing gain. Furthermore, modern communication systems
use feedback to limit transmit power levels. The resultant effect is that intercepted DSSS
signals have very low SNR levels and sophisticated algorithms are required to perform
detection and estimation reliably.
We wish to emphasise that blind estimation of the sequence or code length (or symbol
period) of hidden DSSS transmissions is essential since semi-blind techniques often assume
knowledge of the sequence length which is generally not known a priory. Such semi-blind
techniques include sequence estimation techniques [77, 86, 93] and detection algorithms
[16].
A few techniques that may be used to estimate the sequence length (or related parameters
from which the sequence length can be determined) of DSSS transmissions have been
suggested in the literature. These include cyclic-feature analysis to determine the chip rate
through spectral-line regeneration [4], the related Fourier analysis of cyclic correlation to
estimate the bit rate [86], and higher-order statistical analysis where unique bispectrum
and triple correlation patterns reveal characteristics of m-sequences that may be used to
determine the sequence length and generator polynomials [111]. These techniques however
require relatively high SNRs to perform parameter estimation. Another technique based
on autocorrelation suggested in [54,55] has the potential to estimate the sequence length
at lower SNR values.
In this paper, we propose two new methods to estimate the sequence length of an inter-
cepted DSSS signal at low SNR, and we present some novel results based on these new
methods. The first method is based on the autocorrelation technique [54, 55] mentioned
above, and the second method on a PCA detection technique [16]. The two techniques
are compared in an AWGN environment in terms of the probability of correct estimation
of the sequence length.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the communication and intercept
systems, and defines the SNR regime to which the estimation is applied. The two new
methods are introduced in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Section 5.5 presents numerical results, and
Section 5.6 concludes the paper. Possible future research areas are identified in Section
5.7. A Barker code (length N = 11) and an m-sequence (N = 63) are considered as test
cases throughout the paper.
104
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Communications and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
5.2 Communication and intercept systems
The target communication system and intercept receiver platform used in this study are
identical to those used in our previous study [16] and are briefly reviewed here. The target
communication system is a BPSK DSSS system employing a length-N spreading code,
such that the intercepted signal can be written as
y(nTc) = σxd(nTc)c(nTc) + σww(nTc) (5.1)
with the chip number n = 1, 2, . . . , N and Tc the chip interval. One sample is used to
represent a single chip in the intercept receiver and therefore the sampling period Ts = Tc.
c is the length-N (N  1) pseudo-noise code sequence with period Tsym = NTc and d the
data sequence assumed to be invariant over Tsym. Since the target communication system
is a BPSK DSSS system, both c and d are sequences with values ±1. The noise sequence
is assumed to be a realisation of a standard normal RV represented by w ∼ N (0, 1) which
contains i.i.d. samples. The code, data and noise sequences are also assumed independent
of each other. The constants σx and σw are included to scale the signal and noise sequences
respectively in order to obtain different SNR values, using
SNR =
σ2x
σ2w
(5.2)
which is the SNR before despreading. The SNR at which the intercept receiver must
be able to operate is dictated by the SNR required by the intended or target DSSS
communication receiver system, which in turn is determined by the maximum tolerable
bit error rate (BER). The error probability or BER and the SNR are related by [16] (see
also Appendix A.3)
Pe = Q
(√
Ns SNR
)
(5.3)
with Ns the number of samples used to represent one transmitted bit. If one spreading
sequence chip is represented by one sample in the receiver, then Ns = N . Fig. 5.1 shows
the BER curves for the non-spread BPSK case (N = 1) and two spread cases (N = 11 and
N = 63) under AWGN conditions. Spreading affords a processing gain PG = 10 log10N or
SNR advantage to the intended DSSS receiver over the intercept receiver. For example,
the receiver of a DSSS communication system using N = 63 (PG ≈ 18 dB) can despread
a received signal at SNR = −3 dB to SNR = 15 dB to achieve Pe ≈ 10−8. An intercept
receiver that does not know the spreading code will have to deal with the SNR = −3
dB signal, assuming the intended and intercept receivers lie on a circle with the target
transmitter in the centre with an omnidirectional antenna. Identical channel conditions
between the transmitter and each receiver are also assumed. If the transmitter uses a
directional antenna and/or the intercept receiver is located at a further distance (which
is typical in electronic interception scenarios), an even lower SNR will result.
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Figure 5.1: Bit error probability for non-spread (N = 1) and spread (N = 11 and
N = 63) BPSK DSSS in AWGN.
To compete with the target DSSS communication system, the intercept receiver must be
equipped with powerful techniques to detect the signals and estimate their parameter
values at very low SNR levels. The BER that can be tolerated in a system depends on the
application; it has been reported that in wireless multimedia transmission, voice packets
can tolerate maximum BER levels of 10−3, while data packets require a BER less than 10−9
[130]. Using Fig. 5.1, these BER values translate to minimum SNR levels of approximately
−8.2 dB (−0.6 dB) for voice and −2.4 dB (5.1 dB) for data if N = 63 (N = 11) is used.
The lower the SNR value at which a detection or estimation technique can function, the
larger the detection range or intercept distance will be. In electronic intercept applications,
SNR values less than the values given above will typically be required.
5.3 Estimation technique 1: Autocorrelation
It has been suggested that the time interval between autocorrelation spikes of an inter-
cepted DSSS signal can be used to estimate the symbol period Tsym [54]. However, this
section proposes a new estimation technique with detailed mathematical analysis, which
is based on the concept that the correlation can be performed such that the index value
of the first peak corresponds to the sequence length.
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Figure 5.2: Segmented section of the intercepted signal consisting of ML samples.
5.3.1 Mean-square correlation
The intercepted signal of (5.1) can be expressed as
y = σxdc + σww (5.4)
with the data bit value d = ±1 constant over a single spreading code. The first ML
samples of y are split into M segments, such that each segment contains L samples as
shown in Fig. 5.2.
A sliding correlation is then calculated between the mth (m = 1, 2, . . . ,M) segment and
the neighbouring section to the right within y using
R(m)yy (k) =
1√
L
L∑
n=1
yn yn+k (5.5)
with the time-shift parameter k = 1, 2, . . . , K and the scale factor
√
L chosen to simplify
the mathematical analysis presented in Section 5.3.3. The samples of y in (5.5) are num-
bered such that yn is the n
th sample of the mth segment in each case. For example, when
calculating R
(1)
yy (k), sample yL+2 will refer to sample 2 of segment 2 in Fig. 5.2. However,
when calculating R
(2)
yy (k) this same sample will be referred to as y2. The scalar product of
a segment with itself is not needed and therefore k = 0 is excluded from (5.5). K is the
value of the maximum time shift and determines the number of samples required beyond
the segmented ML samples.
Using the M correlation sequences defined by (5.5), the mean-square correlation sequence
can be calculated as
ρ(k) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
[
R(m)yy (k)
]2
(5.6)
which is similar to the correlation estimators of [54]. An example mean-square correlation
sequence for the Barker N = 11 spreading code is shown in Fig. 5.3(a) with parameters
K = 39, L = 11, M = 100 and σ2x = σ
2
w = 1 such that the SNR is 0 dB.
The number of correlation spikes (or peaks) depends on the maximum time-shift param-
eter K, while the visibility of the peaks within the noise (or correlation sidelobe values)
depends on the segment length L, number of segments M , the position of spreading se-
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Figure 5.3: Simulated mean-square correlation sequences for L = N = 11 and M = 100
for the Barker-11 code.
quences within segments, and the SNR. Assuming the spikes are detectable, there will
be at least one in ρ(k) if K ≥ N , two if K ≥ 2N , three if K ≥ 3N , and so on. Fig.
5.3(a) shows three clear spikes since K ≥ 3N and the SNR of 0 dB is relatively high. For
increasing values of M and SNR, the peak values generally become more visible as long
as L is chosen correctly and a complete spreading code is located within a segment. Fig.
5.3(a) was obtained by choosing the actual spreading sequences as segments, which is the
ideal case for which the correlation peaks will be maximum.
Due to partial correlation, the sum in (5.5) will produce smaller correlation peaks if L < N .
Similarly, for L > N partial correlation caused by incomplete spreading codes within each
segment will add to or subtract from the correlation between complete spreading codes,
depending on the data bit values. Also, if L 6= N the spreading codes and segments are
misaligned, such that the starting positions of each spreading code will differ in neigh-
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(a) L < N , which will produce partial correlation results
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(b) L = N (ideal case) where segments and sequences are aligned
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(c) Case where N < L < 2N − 1
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(d) Case where L = 2N − 1
Figure 5.4: Example of a length N = 5 spreading sequence to illustrate the effect of the
segment length L on the correlation process.
bouring segments. Even if L > N , some segments might not contain a single complete
sequence and smaller correlation peaks than possible with L = N will be formed. To
ensure that a segment will always contain at least one complete spreading code, either
L = N (with sequences and segments aligned) or L ≥ 2N − 1.
To illustrate the effects of the value of L and the alignment between segments and spread-
ing sequences on the correlation process, an example is shown in Fig. 5.4. The sequence
length N = 5, and the first sample of the first segment is also the starting position of
a spreading code in each of the four cases shown. Each bit is represented by 5 samples
(chips) and has a unique value (±1) independent of the other bit values.
The case where L < N is shown in Fig. 5.4(a) where the segments and sequences are
misaligned. Using (5.5) will therefore result in partial correlation - and smaller peak val-
ues. The ideal case is shown in Fig. 5.4(b), where L = N and the alignment is retained
throughout the intercepted signal. When (5.5) is applied to this scenario, two complete
spreading sequences will be correlated, producing a large peak for each value of m. The
case where N < L < 2N − 1 is shown in Fig. 5.4(c). The first two segments each con-
tains a complete sequence, which will provide a peak value when (5.5) is calculated. The
incomplete sequences within these two segments will however affect this peak value de-
pending on the bit values. Segment 3 in Fig. 5.4(c) does not contain a complete sequence
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which will negatively affect the correlation process. When L ≥ 2N − 1 as illustrated in
Fig. 5.4(d), all segments will however contain at least one complete spreading sequence.
The incomplete sequences within each segment will also negatively affect the correlation
peaks for this scenario, and the result will be worse compared with L = N as in Fig.
5.4(b).
5.3.2 Method of estimation
Fig. 5.3(a) illustrates that if the parameters are chosen correctly and the SNR is sufficiently
high, all correlation peaks will be located at index values k, which are equal to multiples
of the code length N . For time shifts k = aN , with a a positive integer, the spreading
code(s) within the mth segment will align with spreading code(s) in y, irrespective of
the starting position of the spreading code(s) within the segment or y. The correlation
peak values will however depend on the alignment between segments and sequences as
discussed in Section 5.3.1 above. The code length may therefore be determined from the
index values of peaks within ρ(k). In this paper we propose to use the index of the first
peak (a = 1) to determine N .
5.3.3 Mathematical analysis
The intercepted signal of (5.4) can be written in discrete form as
yn = σxdicn + σwwn (5.7)
with di = ±1 the ith data bit value and cn the nth (n = 1, 2, . . . , N) chip of the spreading
code. The ideal case corresponding to Fig. 5.4(b) will be analysed here and compared
with simulation results of non-ideal cases in Section 5.5. The segment size will therefore
be chosen as L = N , such that each segment in Fig. 5.2 will contain one complete spreading
code. Furthermore, the maximum time shift is assumed to be bounded according to N ≤
K ≤ 2N−1, such that a single correlation peak is produced. Fig. 5.3(b) shows the resultant
mean-square correlation sequence ρ(k) for K = 2N − 1 and SNR = {−10,−5, 0} dB with
σ2w = 1. A clear peak value is shown at k = N if the SNR is sufficiently high.
5.3.3.1 Signal-only analysis
This section will consider the characteristics of R
(m)
yy (k) and ρ(k) defined respectively in
(5.5) and (5.6), using (5.7) with σw = 0.
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Peak value
When k = N , the spreading codes within each segment align, such that (5.5) can be
written using (5.7) as
R(m)yy (N) =
1√
L
L∑
n=1
yn yn+N
=
1√
L
L∑
n=1
(σxdmcn) (σxdm+1cn+N) (5.8)
where dm = ±1 represents the data bit value associated with the mth segment. Since
cn = cn+N = ±1, (5.8) can be simplified as
R(m)yy (N) = ±σ2x
√
L. (5.9)
The mean-square correlation peak value can then be expressed using (5.6) as
ρ(N) = σ4xL. (5.10)
Sidelobe values
When k 6= N , the correlation between misaligned spreading codes can be expressed using
(5.5) and (5.7) as
R(m)yy (k) =
σ2x√
L
L∑
n=1
(dpcn) (dqcn+k) (5.11)
with dp and dq antipodal bit values depending on the segment in which cn and cn+k are
respectively located. The correlation values produced by (5.11) depend on the specific
spreading code c and the data bit values. If dp = dq, (5.11) resembles the periodic auto-
correlation function, for which a number of bounds have been derived [131], which can be
used to evaluate the sidelobe levels.
Barker codes and maximum-length or m-sequences are of particular interest, since the
unscaled periodic autocorrelation for each time shift (k 6= N) is ±1. Even when dp 6= dq,
the sum in (5.11) equals ±1 if c is a Barker code of length N = [5, 7, 11, 13]. In these
conditions, (5.11) can be simplified to
R(m)yy (k) = ±
σ2x√
L
(5.12)
such that the mean-square value can be written by substituting (5.12) into (5.6) as
ρ(k) =
σ4x
L
. (5.13)
Equation (5.12) will subsequently be used to derive the theoretical performance bound of
technique 1.
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5.3.3.2 Noise-only analysis
When σx = 0, the correlation sequence can be written by combining (5.5) and (5.7) as
R(m)ww (k) =
σ2w√
L
L∑
n=1
wnwn+k. (5.14)
Since wn ∼ N (0, 1) is a sample within a sequence of i.i.d. samples, wn and wn+k will
be independent when k 6= 0. The product wnwn+k will therefore have a normal product
distribution [132] with zero mean and unity variance (see Appendix H). According to the
central limit theorem [110], the sum in (5.14) will approach the normal distribution with
zero mean and variance approaching L, as L increases. R
(m)
ww (k) will therefore approach
the normal distribution with zero mean and variance
var (Rww) =
(
σ2w√
L
)2
L
= σ4w. (5.15)
The distribution of the mean-square correlation ρ(k) can then be obtained by combining
(5.6), (5.14) and (5.15) as
ρ(k) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
[
R(m)ww (k)
]2
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
[
σ2wR˜
(m)
ww (k)
]2
=
σ4w
M
M∑
m=1
[
R˜(m)ww (k)
]2
(5.16)
with R˜
(m)
ww (k) normalised such that it has unity variance. The mean-square correlation can
then be written from (5.16) as
M
σ4w
ρ(k) =
M∑
m=1
[
R˜(m)ww (k)
]2
(5.17)
which has a central Chi-squared distribution [5] with M degrees of freedom. Note that,
although R˜
(m)
ww (k) contains correlated samples over k for any given value of m, the sum in
(5.17) is calculated over m (and not over k) such that the summands are independent.
It can be confirmed in simulation that (5.14) and (5.17) approach, respectively, a normal
distribution (with variance given by (5.15)) and a central Chi-squared distribution (with
M degrees of freedom) as L increases.
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5.3.3.3 Signal-and-noise analysis
When a signal is present within the noise, the correlation can be expressed by combining
(5.5) and (5.7) as
R(m)yy (k) =
1√
L
L∑
n=1
{(σxdpcn + σwwn)× (σxdqcn+k + σwwn+k)} (5.18)
with dp and dq bit values depending on the value of k as in (5.11). Equation (5.18) can
further be developed as
R(m)yy (k) =
σ2x√
L
L∑
n=1
dpdqcncn+k+
σxσw√
L
L∑
n=1
dpcnwn+k+
σxσw√
L
L∑
n=1
dqcn+kwn+
σ2w√
L
L∑
n=1
wnwn+k.
(5.19)
The first term of (5.19) is non-random while the remaining terms are random since they
contain the noise sample w ∼ N (0, 1). The second and third terms of (5.19) are both
normally distributed with zero mean and variance
σ2 = σ2xσ
2
w (5.20)
since cd = ±1 has no effect on the statistics of each term separately, and the sum of
L i.i.d. standard normal samples has a variance equal to L. The last term of (5.19) is
the same as the noise-only scenario described in (5.14), and is therefore also normally
distributed with zero mean and variance σ4w as in (5.15). By assuming that the terms of
(5.19) are independent, R
(m)
yy (k) can be described as a normally distributed RV with mean
µ
(m)
R equal to the first term of (5.19), and variance given by
σ2R = 2 σ
2
xσ
2
w + σ
4
w (5.21)
which is the sum of the variances of the three random terms in (5.19). The independence
assumption is based on the fact that k 6= 0, the noise samples are i.i.d., and the spreading
chips and data bits are independent. (Independence can further be ensured using a dual-
channel receiver structure as in [53].)
By substituting (5.19) into (5.6), ρ(k) becomes the sum of squares of M non-zero mean
Gaussian RVs. The distribution of ρ(k) can therefore be determined using the non-central
Chi-squared distribution X ′2M [5]. By normalising the variance of ρ(k) it can then be shown
that
M
σ2R
ρ(k) ∼ X ′2M (5.22)
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with non-centrality parameter
pnc =
1
σ2R
M∑
m=1
[
µ
(m)
R
]2
(5.23)
since R
(m)
yy (k) must be divided by σR to normalise the variance.
Peak value
When the spreading sequences align, the first term of (5.19) equals (5.8), and the mean
value µ
(m)
R therefore equals (5.9). Using (5.9) as the mean value in (5.23), the non-centrality
parameter can then be determined as
pnc =
σ4xLM
σ2R
. (5.24)
It can be confirmed in simulation that the peak value ρ(k = N) scaled according to (5.22)
will have a non-central Chi-squared distribution with non-centrality parameter given in
(5.24).
Sidelobe values
When the spreading sequences are misaligned, the first term of (5.19) equals (5.11), and
the mean value µ
(m)
R therefore equals (5.12). Using (5.12) and (5.23), the non-centrality
parameter can therefore be calculated as
pnc =
σ4xM
σ2RL
. (5.25)
It can also be confirmed in simulation that the sidelobe values ρ(k 6= N) scaled according
to (5.22) will have a non-central Chi-squared distribution with non-centrality parameter
given in (5.25).
5.3.4 Estimation performance bound
Estimation algorithm 1 takes the index k of the maximum value of the mean-square
correlation sequence ρ(k) as the estimated sequence length Nest. The sequence length will
therefore be estimated correctly if the peak of ρ(k) is located at k = N . The estimation
performance bound will be expressed in terms of the probability of correct estimation Pce,
which is the probability that the value ρ(k) located at k = N exceeds all other values
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located at k 6= N , defined as
Pce = p {ρ(k = N) > ρ(k 6= N)} (5.26)
with k = 1, 2, . . . , K chosen such that a single distinct peak will be present within ρ(k), as-
suming the SNR is sufficiently high as in Fig. 5.3(b). By defining the RVs ρpeak = ρ(k = N)
and the largest sidelobe contender ρmax = max[ρ(k 6= N)], the performance bound can fur-
ther be developed from (5.26) as
Pce = p (ρpeak − ρmax > 0)
=
∫ ∞
0
fdiff(z) dz (5.27)
with fdiff(z) the PDF of the RV difference ρpeak−ρmax, which can be calculated using [110]
fdiff(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fpeak(z + v) fmax(v) dv (5.28)
which is simply the convolution between fpeak(z) and fmax(z), respectively the PDFs of
ρpeak and ρmax. fpeak(z) is the non-central Chi-squared PDF with non-centrality parameter
given in (5.24), and fmax(z) is the PDF of the maximum of the K − 1 sidelobe values,
where each one has a non-central Chi-squared PDF with non-centrality parameter given
in (5.25). fmax(z) can therefore be expressed as [110]
fmax(z) = (K − 1)fside(z) [Fside(z)]K−2 (5.29)
with fside(z) and Fside(z) respectively the PDF and CDF of each of the i.i.d. sidelobe
values. By evaluating (5.27) to (5.29) numerically, the performance bound in terms of Pce
over a range of SNR values (with L and M fixed) can be obtained as is done in Section
5.5.
5.3.5 Choice of parameter values
It is important to note that the bound derived in Section 5.3.4 is the optimal estimation
performance for technique 1. The bound is a function of the parameter values K (or range
of k), L, M and the SNR, under the assumptions that the segments and sequences align
as in Fig. 5.4(b), and that a single correlation peak is present as in Fig. 5.3(b).
The actual estimation performance depends on the choice or assumptions made regarding
these parameter values. The range of k constrains the estimated sequence length Nest, and
technique 1 can therefore only provide the correct answer as long as k = N is considered
within the range of k. The positions of segments within the intercepted signal and the
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value of L will also influence the performance as described in Section 5.3.1 (see Fig. 5.4).
The number of segments M required to estimate N depends on the SNR, although the
number of segments available may be less than required, depending on the number of
samples (containing the DSSS signal) intercepted. It can be shown that a lower SNR
value will require more segments to maintain a given Pce value, as more segments will be
required to reduce or average out the noise.
Although the estimation technique presented here is blind, parameter values for K, L
and M must be chosen correctly in order to determine N . The ranges of k and L may be
set up according to known or expected DSSS sequence lengths or an exhaustive search
may be required to find an autocorrelation peak. Although real-time application of the
algorithm is possible in high-SNR scenarios, the typical low-SNR scenario considered in
this paper will necessitate off-line analysis on a HPC platform as large values of M (and
large ranges of k and L) would be required to perform estimation.
5.4 Estimation technique 2: Eigen analysis
Eigenvalues are used in several signal analysis techniques, including signal detection and
parameter estimation. PCA [73] and SVD [75] are two such related approaches where the
principal components (dominant eigenvectors) or singular values (square roots of eigen-
values) are extracted from a matrix constructed from the intercepted signal. An example
PCA technique to estimate spreading sequences by concatenating the first two eigenvec-
tors of the covariance matrix of the intercepted signal is presented in [91]. Several SVD
methods used to estimate the parameters of sinusoids in noise are available in the liter-
ature. Examples include estimation of signal parameters via rotational invariance tech-
niques (ESPRIT) [133] and matrix pencil algorithms [134], where generalised eigenvalues
of matrix pencils are extracted to estimate the parameters of interest [135].
More recently, eigenvalue techniques have been suggested to perform spectrum sensing in
cognitive radio applications [69]. The presence of a primary user can be detected by using
test statistics based on eigenvalues of a fusion matrix constructed from signal samples
collected cooperatively from distributed sensors [68]. A similar DSSS detection technique
that uses the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of the intercepted signal as test
statistic is presented in [16].
In this section we wish to show that the detection technique described in [16] can be
adapted to determine the sequence length of a hidden DSSS transmission. Subsequently,
the portion of the technique presented in [16] which is required to develop the sequence
estimation algorithm is reviewed, and the estimation technique itself is then presented.
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5.4.1 Largest eigenvalue sequence
The detection technique of [16] consists of two stages. During the first stage, the baseband
intercepted signal of (5.1) is divided into non-overlapping segments containing D samples
each, and the segments are then stacked to form the D ×D detection matrix given by
Y = σxX + σwW (5.30)
with X the data matrix (containing the spread data) and W the AWGN matrix with
i.i.d. elements.
During the second stage, the largest eigenvalue λY,1 of the SCM of Y, denoted as [73]
R(Y) =
YTY
D
(5.31)
is calculated. A sequence of largest eigenvalues of R(Y) is then formed by cyclically
shifting the elements of Y to the left and upwards, such that the first element in each
row moves to the last element of the row above it. The top left element of Y is removed,
and the lower right element takes on a new sample value. For each cyclic or time shift τ
of Y, the largest eigenvalue is calculated, to form a sequence λY,1(τ).
Fig. 5.5 shows the largest eigenvalue sequences formed when the Barker-11 code is consid-
ered for different values of D, for the signal-only scenario (σx = 1 and σw = 0 in (5.30)).
Clearly, when D = N = 11, the eigenvalue sequence exhibits a more regular pattern and
has a larger mean (and variance) compared with the other values.
5.4.2 Method of estimation
The sequence length can be determined by analysing the mean of the largest eigenvalue
sequence λY,1(τ) over a range of values of D as shown in Fig. 5.6(a). Similar to Fig. 5.3(a),
the mean of λY,1(τ) exhibits peak values at integer multiples of the spreading sequence
length N .
The sequence length can therefore be determined by identifying the index of the peak in
the graph shown in Fig. 5.6(a). Since the mean value increases along with D, the peak
will be located at N only if the SNR is sufficiently high. The peak value can therefore be
determined more reliably by identifying a decrease (or negative slope) within the mean
value graph across the range of D. The technique presented here is therefore to estimate
the sequence length using the minimum value of the derivative of the mean, shown in Fig.
5.6(b).
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Figure 5.5: Simulated largest eigenvalue sequences for the Barker-11 code for the signal-
only scenario.
5.4.3 Mathematical analysis
Though it is possible to develop an analytic expression for the largest eigenvalue sequence,
such an expression will be intractable since λX,1 depends on all the elements of c and d
in (5.1). Instead, bounds on the variation of λY,1(τ) will be developed in this section in
order to describe its behaviour. The performance of the estimation technique will then be
obtained through simulation which is presented in Section 5.5.
5.4.3.1 Signal-only analysis
If the square matrix dimension D matches the spreading code length N , and σw = 0 in
(5.30), the SCM
R(Y) = σ2xR(X) (5.32)
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Figure 5.6: Simulated functions of the largest eigenvalue sequence over square matrix
dimension D for SNR = {−10,−5, 0} dB.
from (5.31) has a maximum rank of two, such that its eigenvalues are the roots of a
quadratic polynomial, which can be expressed in the form [16] (see also Appendix G)
λX =
N2 ±√∆
2N
σ2x (5.33)
since the spreading code and data bits have values ±1. Also note that both eigenvalues
will be non-negative, as the SCM R(·) is positive semidefinite [5]. As illustrated in Fig.
5.5 for D = N , λX,1(τ) exhibits a pattern with period N as X is cyclically shifted. By
considering all possible combinations of code and data values for any cyclic shift of X, it
can be shown that the discriminant in (5.33) has ranges
∆ ∈

[0, N4] (N even)
[2N2 − 1, N4] (N odd)
(5.34)
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and the largest eigenvalue sequence is therefore bounded according to
λX,1 ∈

[
N
2
, N
]
σ2x (N even)[
N2+
√
2N2−1
2N
, N
]
σ2x (N odd)
(5.35)
which are the bounds shown (for N odd) in Fig. 5.5.
5.4.3.2 Noise-only analysis
If σx = 0 in (5.30) such that Y = σwW, the SCM
R(Y) = σ2wR(W) (5.36)
from (5.31) is a Wishart matrix [102]. The distribution of the largest eigenvalue of a
Wishart matrix can be described using the TW law [104], which can be approximated
using the Gamma distribution [76]. Using functions of distributions [110], the distribution
of the largest eigenvalue λW,1 of (5.36) can be expressed using the Gamma PDF, given
by [76]
γ(z) =
(z − z0)α−1
θαΓ(α)
exp
[−(z − z0)
θ
]
(5.37)
with Γ(·) the Gamma function, z0 the location parameter, α the shape, and θ the scale,
respectively given by
z0 =
σ2w (µc − 9.8209 σc)
D
α = 46.5651
θ =
0.1850 σ2w σc
D
with centre and scaling parameters [102]
µc =
(√
D − 1 +
√
D
)2
σc =
√
µc
(
1√
D − 1 +
1√
D
) 1
3
.
Furthermore, the support region of (5.37) can be expressed as [76]
z ∈ [z0, z0 + 2αθ]. (5.38)
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5.4.3.3 Signal-and-noise analysis
When both σx > 0 and σw > 0 in (5.30), the SCM of (5.31) can be written as
R(Y) = σ2xR(X) + σ
2
wR(W) + E (5.39)
with the cross-term or error matrix
E =
σxσw
D
[
XTW + WTX
]
(5.40)
which is zero under the assumption that the signal and noise are uncorrelated. Under
this assumption, R(Y) is a linear function of R(X) and R(W) as indicated by (5.39),
although the eigenvalues of R(Y) are nonlinear functions of the eigenvalues of R(X) and
R(W) [113]. According to the Weyl inequalities [113–115], the largest eigenvalue of R(Y)
is however bounded according to
λmin ≤ λY,1 ≤ λmax (5.41)
with the upper and lower bounds given by [16]
λmax = [λX,1]max + [λW,1]max (5.42)
λmin = max
{
[λX,1]min , [λW,1]min
}
. (5.43)
Note that both [λX,1]min and [λW,1]min are less than or equal to λY,1, though the tightest
lower bound is obtained by taking the maximum of the two. The upper bound can be
written from (5.42) as [76]
λmax = Nσ
2
x + z0 + 2αθ (5.44)
using the upper bounds given in (5.35) and (5.38). The lower bound can similarly be
obtained from (5.43) using the lower bounds of (5.35) and (5.38). For N odd, the lower
bound can therefore be expressed as
λmin = max
{
N2 +
√
2N2 − 1
2N
σ2x, z0
}
(5.45)
from which it can easily be shown that λmin = z0 for small SNR values.
A simulated example of the largest eigenvalue sequence for σx = σw = 1 (SNR of 0 dB) is
shown in Fig. 5.7 for the Barker-11 code for different values of D similar to Fig. 5.5. The
eigenvalue bounds given in (5.44) and (5.45), and the measured mean value λµ of λY,1(τ)
are also shown. When D = N , the mean λµ clearly exceeds the means of the eigenvalue
sequences associated with D 6= N , which is also illustrated in Fig. 5.6(a).
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Figure 5.7: Simulated largest eigenvalue sequences for the Barker-11 code for the signal-
and-noise scenario.
5.4.4 Choice of parameter values
The discussion of Section 5.3.5 is also relevant to technique 2. The range over which the
matrix dimension D should be evaluated and the number of matrices (maximum time
shift τ) to be considered to calculate the average eigenvalue must be chosen, similar to
the suggestions made for the parameters of technique 1. As the calculation of eigenvalues
are computationally expensive [16], technique 2 will also typically require off-line analysis.
5.5 Simulation results
This section provides Monte Carlo simulation results obtained by implementing the com-
munication and intercept models of Section 5.2 in software. The performance of the two
estimation techniques presented in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 were evaluated against a Barker
code (N = 11) and m-sequence (N = 63) with generator polynomial g(X) = X6 +X + 1.
The output of each estimation technique is the estimated sequence length Nest, which is
compared with the actual sequence length N in order to evaluate the performance of each
estimation technique.
122
This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Communications and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
5.5.1 Probability of estimation
Fig. 5.8 shows the probability of estimation Pest obtained over a range of values for
Nest when the Barker-11 code is considered. Fig. 5.8(a) shows the results obtained using
technique 1 for segment lengths L = {5, 11} and SNR = {−15,−12} dB. The sidelobe
values (for Nest 6= N) are shown to be uniformly distributed, while a peak is observable
(depending on L and the SNR) at Nest = N . The peak value increases while the sidelobe
values decrease, as the SNR increases. Furthermore, the value at Nest = N is the highest
for L = N , provided that the SNR is sufficiently high.
Similarly, Fig. 5.8(b) shows the results obtained using technique 2 for different SNR values.
The distribution of the sidelobe values can be explained from Fig. 5.6; the derivative of
the mean of λY,1(τ) is positive for small values of the square matrix dimension D, and
decreases as D increases. The minimum value of the derivative will therefore typically
(depending on the SNR) be located at Nest ≥ N . As the SNR increases, the probability
that Nest = N will also increase.
5.5.2 Probability of correct estimation
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, the performance of the estimation techniques can be eval-
uated in terms of the probability of correct estimation Pce, which is the probability that
Nest will equal N . Fig. 5.9 shows the simulated Pce over a range of SNR values for the two
estimation techniques against the Barker-11 code.
For technique 1, 105 runs of M = 1000 segments (of length L each) were simulated for
each SNR point shown, with the maximum time shift K = 2L − 1. Different segment
sizes L were considered, and when L matches N = 11, the best performance is obtained.
When L < N , the performance degrades due to partial correlation of incomplete spreading
sequences as explained in Section 5.3.1. When L > N , the performance improves since
some segments contain complete spreading codes, though the performance is still worse
compared with L = N , since fragments of spreading codes within segments reduce the
correlation peaks (also due to partial correlation). The theoretical bound for technique 1
given by (5.27) is also shown, which is nearly attained by the L = 11 curve. (The L = 11
curve does not match the theoretical curve exactly since L or N is not sufficiently long.)
For technique 2, the mean of the largest eigenvalue sequence λµ was calculated by shifting
1000 bits through the detection matrix Y as explained in Section 5.4. The same data
sequence was used to calculate λµ for a single simulation run, during which the range
of matrix dimensions D = 1, . . . , 2N − 1 were evaluated for each SNR point. A total
of 104 simulation runs was completed per SNR value. Fig. 5.9 indicates that technique
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Figure 5.8: Normalised histograms to indicate Pest for both estimation techniques against
the Barker-11 code.
2 outperforms the best possible performance of technique 1 for SNR values exceeding
approximately−11 dB. When the segment size of technique 1 is chosen as L = 5, technique
2 outperforms technique 1 by up to 4 dB.
Similar to Fig. 5.9, the simulated Pce performances of the two estimation techniques
against the length-63 m-sequence are shown in Fig. 5.10. The theoretical performance
bound for technique 1 predicted in (5.27) is approached for L = N , and worse perfor-
mances are shown for both L < N and L > N as in Fig. 5.9. Furthermore, technique 2
exceeds the best possible performance of technique 1 by approximately 4 dB. By compar-
ing Figs. 5.9 and 5.10, it is clear that the estimation performance improves for a larger
value of N .
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Figure 5.9: Estimation performance of the two techniques against the Barker-11 code.
Figs. 5.9 and 5.10 also indicate that both techniques 1 and 2 will be able to correctly
estimate the sequence lengths (with Pce = 1) of DSSS transmissions at the SNR levels
given in terms of the maximum tolerable BER and channel requirements described in
Section 5.2.
5.6 Conclusion
Two novel techniques based on autocorrelation and PCA were presented to blindly es-
timate the sequence length N of an intercepted DSSS transmission hidden within noise.
Mathematical analyses and results of a simulation study for each technique were given.
The autocorrelation technique computes the mean-square correlation between segments
of the intercepted signal and takes the index value of the first peak as the sequence length.
The performance of this technique depends on the choice of the segment length L, with
best performance if L = N . Furthermore, the range of k over which the correlation peak
is searched must include k = N and the number of segments M must be sufficient to
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Figure 5.10: Estimation performance of the two techniques against the length-63 m-
sequence.
suppress the noise. This technique is similar to the correlation spike spacing estimation
algorithm suggested in [54], and was used to establish a reference performance in terms
of probability of correct estimation Pce over SNR.
The eigen-analysis technique computes the mean value λµ of the largest eigenvalue se-
quence of the intercepted signal for a range of square data matrix dimensions D. It was
shown in this paper that λµ is much larger when D equals the spreading sequence length
N . The sequence length can therefore be determined as the value of D at which λµ versus
D has a peak value. The eigen-analysis technique, adapted from the detection technique
of [16], was also shown to have superior estimation performance compared with the ref-
erence autocorrelation technique.
5.7 Future work
In this paper it was assumed that the signal of interest was detected first such that the
estimation algorithm was applied to a signal that is surely present within noise. However,
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it cannot always be ascertained that the signal of interest is present before attempting to
perform estimation. In certain applications, detection and estimation can be formulated
as a single problem which can provide improved results [136]. The estimation techniques
presented in this paper can be adapted to function as detection algorithms by using the
estimated parameters as detection test statistics. A confidence level that the sequence
length is estimated correctly can also be established by evaluating the consistency of the
estimated value.
Furthermore, only spreading codes with noise-like autocorrelation characteristics, includ-
ing Barker codes and m-sequences, were considered in this paper. How to blindly estimate
the sequence length of orthogonal codes, such as Walsh codes which have multiple sidelobe
correlation peaks, remains an open question.
5.8 Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor)
under contract no. KT521909. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers
for their valuable inputs.
127
CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
This chapter presents a summary and considers the major findings of the work presented
in this thesis. Conclusions drawn from studying the existing detection and estimation
techniques, developing new techniques and evaluating the simulated performance results
are included. The challenge and importance of the research are highlighted, and ethical
concerns are addressed. The work is also critically evaluated and possible areas for future
investigation are briefly explored.
6.1 Summary and major findings of publications
A short summary and major findings of the research work presented in the three publi-
cations (Chapters 3 to 5) are provided below.
6.1.1 Publication 1
The first publication presented analytic expressions that approximate the distribution
of the largest eigenvalue of white Wishart matrices, which can be used to predict the
performance of eigenvalue-based detection techniques in AWGN. It was shown that the
desired analytic expression follows from an approximation to the TW distribution in
terms of the Gamma distribution. The parameters of the analytic expression were found
by scaling and shifting the Gamma distribution, such that the difference between the
Gamma and TW distribution was minimised. The approximation offers largely simplified
computation and also provides statistics, including the mean value and support region,
of the largest eigenvalue distribution. The approximation is given in simple closed-form
equations that do not require numerical evaluation.
Publication 1 illustrated (through Monte-Carlo computer simulation and analysis of the
distributions) that the TW and associated distributions (which can be used to predict
the performance of eigenvalue-based techniques) can be accurately approximated using a
simplified Gamma distribution.
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6.1.2 Publication 2
The second publication presented a semi-blind DSSS detection technique based on eigen
analysis. The received signal is segmented and the samples packed in a square detection
matrix, which is cyclically shifted when a new sample is received. The largest eigenvalue
is calculated for each cyclic shift of the detection matrix. Test statistics based on the
resulting eigenvalue sequence (including the amplitude and frequency content) are then
used to make a decision (using binary hypothesis testing) as to whether the DSSS signal
is present or not. The eigenvalue-based test statistics show large differences under the H0
(signal absent) and H1 (signal present) hypotheses. The two hypotheses can thus easily
be distinguished, such that detection in low-SNR conditions is made possible.
Publication 2 illustrated that detection of DSSS signals is possible at low-SNR values,
if the spreading sequence length is known. Detection performance improvements of up
to 7 dB were shown to be achievable (using Monte-Carlo computer simulation) when
comparing the new algorithms with classic ED. However, achieving detection in lower
SNR scenarios comes at a price of increased computational complexity.
6.1.3 Publication 3
The third publication presented two techniques to blindly estimate the sequence length
of a cyclostationary sequence, such as a DSSS signal. The first technique splits the re-
ceived signal into segments and then calculates the mean-square correlation between the
segments, such that the first correlation peak is located at the index value corresponding
to the sequence length. The second technique uses the eigenvalue test statistic presented
in Publication 2 to estimate the sequence length. The mean of the eigenvalue sequence
is calculated over a range of the dimensions of the square detection matrix. The matrix
dimension that exhibits the maximum mean eigenvalue is then taken as the estimated
sequence length.
Publication 3 illustrated that the sequence length of a DSSS signal hidden within noise
can be estimated blindly. Blind estimation of the sequence length is important, as several
DSSS detection and estimation techniques are available in the literature, which assume
prior knowledge of the sequence length.
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6.1.4 Connections between three publications
The following two important connections exist between the three publications.
• The analytic approximation presented in Publication 1 is used in Publication 2 to
describe the distribution of the eigenvalue sequence under H0. The threshold level is
also calculated (for a given false alarm rate) using the right-tail of the approximated
distribution.
• The eigenvalue-based detection algorithm presented in Publication 2 is adapted and
presented in Publication 3 as a sequence-length estimation algorithm.
6.2 Challenge of DSSS detection
For the unintended receiver, DSSS signals are usually weak and indistinguishable from
noise. Advanced and processor-intensive algorithms are typically required to extract weak
signals from noise, especially when the signals to be detected are unknown. Real-time
blind signal detection is however required on tactical platforms, which have limited pro-
cessing capability [10]. These platforms can only accommodate relatively low-complexity
algorithms, such as ED which lack the performance to detect the typically weak DSSS
signal blindly.
It is however possible to record the signals intercepted by tactical units and pass them on
to strategic platforms for analysis on HPC facilities [11]. Processor-intensive algorithms
can then be used to perform detection and estimation, but this approach only allows
off-line processing. By developing algorithms with improved detection performances, and
then reducing their complexities through simplifications (which may in turn result in
a reduction in detection performance) may result in the realisation of low-complexity
detection techniques with sufficient performance to offer a real-time solution for certain
scenarios.
Development of high-complexity techniques should however continue, as future hardware
platforms will most likely be capable of executing increasingly complex algorithms in real
time. The aim of the newly developed detection and estimation techniques presented in
this thesis was therefore on improving theoretical performance, even though real-time
processing and analysis of signals (as they are being transmitted) may not be currently
possible using these new techniques.
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6.3 Importance of DSSS detection research
DSSS communication signals are designed to avoid detection by unintended receivers, and
are therefore used in covert communication with a potentially hostile nature. New and
improved detection and estimation techniques will benefit the communications intelligence
community by providing an enhanced capability to enact countermeasures against these
hidden transmissions. Exploiting or taking action against weak and unknown DSSS signals
may include direction finding, message interception and extraction, and communication
denial through jamming.
Improved weak signal detection techniques may also be applicable to the wider commu-
nications community, especially for receiver design and cognitive radio spectrum sensing
applications [14]. Incorporating some of the blind detection concepts into non-blind sys-
tems may result in improved detection performance, extended communication ranges, and
lower transmit powers.
6.4 Ethical issues surrounding the research topic
Ethical research issues concerning the work conducted and reported in this thesis are lim-
ited to indirect effects, as detailed below. Only theoretical research, including the analysis
and development of signal detection and estimation techniques, statistical modelling, and
computer simulation was conducted. However, when test and evaluation move beyond
theoretical research, there are a number of ethical research issues that may become rel-
evant, depending on how the research outputs are applied in hardware. These potential
issues are highlighted below.
6.4.1 Lawful and unlawful interception
The legal implications of interception of communication signals, and the possibility of
infringing on privacy rights are complex issues, with different laws and regulations appli-
cable in different countries and scenarios [137, 138]. In certain circumstances, authorised
law enforcement agencies may be allowed access to wireless communication transmissions
by network operators (which are often required by law to implement lawful intercept
strategies or systems in their networks), subject to interception regulations [139].
6.4.2 Communication denial
Although this thesis did not focus on jamming of communication signals [9], it is an im-
portant part of EW which depends on electronic support activities. A jamming device may
include a detection system to intelligently deny active communication transmissions. The
denial of licensed or authorised communication transmissions, and the sale or marketing
of jamming devices, are prohibited by law in many countries [140].
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6.4.3 Hardware test platforms
To practically evaluate detection and estimation techniques, it may be required to develop
or use an experimental communication system as configurable hardware test platform.
Such a platform would be required to transmit communication signals, which may cause
interference (or jamming) in the licensed RF spectrum if configured incorrectly. Strategies
to avoid such a scenario include transmitting in one of the unlicensed ISM bands [141],
or performing evaluation in an isolated location such as an anechoic chamber.
6.5 Future research
The gaps in the literature identified in Section 2.5 can be considered further by continu-
ing the development, evaluation and improvement of detection and estimation techniques.
Realising low-complexity, high-performance algorithms is the ideal, as computational com-
plexity and detection performance are usually traded off. Furthermore, future development
of fully-blind detection and estimation techniques is also important as signal parameters
are unknown in the non-cooperative context. Some areas of possible future research into
the detection and estimation of DSSS signals are subsequently highlighted.
6.5.1 Reduced-complexity detection techniques
The most promising weak signal detection technique considered in this thesis is the PCA-
based technique presented in Chapter 4. Detection based on nonlinear methods and chaos
theory have also been reported to show promising performance [83]. Methods to simplify
the underlying algorithms in these approaches should be developed to realise practical
detection techniques. Simplifying the calculation of eigenvalues (for PCA) can possibly
be achieved using the trace method [126] or the NN structure [93] discussed in Section
2.4.4.
6.5.2 Multi-channel receiver architectures
Most detection techniques considered in this thesis were designed for single-channel re-
ceiver systems. Methods to expand these techniques for application in multi-channel re-
ceivers should be investigated as improved performance can thus be expected. Using
multiple receiver nodes is also the philosophy behind cooperative spectrum sensing (see
Section 1.1.4 and the footnote on p. 7) as used in cognitive radio applications [14,72]. Some
aspects of this approach have already been applied to DSSS detection using a dual-channel
correlator structure [53], indicating a performance advantage.
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6.5.3 Joint detection and estimation approaches
Detection and estimation are closely related and interdependent in many applications. Es-
timation may be performed as part of detection and vice versa [5]. Performing detection
and estimation separately is not always optimal, and joint approaches may improve the
performance [136]. Furthermore, the consistency (or fluctuation) of an estimated param-
eter value may also serve as confidence measure that the parameter is estimated correctly
and that the signal of interest is indeed present.
An example of a joint approach include the detection of DSSS transmissions using the
sequence-length estimate from the correlation technique as test statistic [54]. Conversely,
the sequence length may be determined using the eigen-detection techniques as discussed
in Chapter 5. Such joint approaches should be developed and evaluated further.
6.5.4 Algorithms for different spreading codes
Different spreading codes have unique properties [18, 28], and detection and estimation
techniques will therefore perform differently on different spreading codes. For example,
Walsh codes and m-sequences have respectively large and small sidelobe correlation val-
ues [28, 142]. The correlation-based, sequence-length estimation technique presented in
Chapter 5 will only work on sequences with noise-like autocorrelation functions, such as
m-sequences, and not on Walsh codes. Determining which algorithm will work on which
type of spreading code is an area of possible future investigation. Developing techniques for
specific spreading sequences, such as sequence-length estimation for Walsh codes, should
also be considered.
6.5.5 Effect of parameter value uncertainty
The theoretical performance bound of a given detection technique can be determined by
assuming perfect knowledge of all the unknown parameters [5]. The practical detection
performance will typically be worse, since not all parameters can be estimated perfectly.
However, some detection algorithms such as the cognitive radio techniques [68] do not
require perfect knowledge of all parameter values. The effect of inaccurate parameter esti-
mates on detection performance should be investigated. The performance and complexity
of algorithms insensitive to parameter value uncertainty should also be evaluated and
compared with algorithms that depend more heavily on parameter value accuracy.
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6.6 Conclusion
A communication signal can be detected in noise by differentiating between the statistical
properties of the signal and the noise [5]. This thesis considered the blind detection of
DSSS communication signals, which were designed to resemble noise in order to avoid
detection. The detection of such covert signals therefore presents a significant challenge
to the intercept receiver, which can only be addressed by implementing sophisticated
detection algorithms [16].
Sophisticated algorithms typically have high computational complexities, and real-time
detection might not always be possible. Simpler techniques are favoured in practical ap-
plications, due to limited processing power [10]. This presents another challenge as in-
tercepted DSSS signals typically have very low SNRs, beyond the detection capability
of low-complexity algorithms. The ultimate aim is therefore to realise low-complexity,
high-performance detection methods, which can be implemented in field-deployable sys-
tems. It is however still worthwhile to investigate computationally complex algorithms,
as intercepted signals can be analysed off-line on HPC clusters [11].
Several detection and estimation algorithms, which are available in the literature, were
reviewed in this thesis. A number of new algorithms were also developed and published,
which are presented in Chapters 3 to 5. All these algorithms can broadly be categorised as
energy-based [49] and correlation-based [55,60,72] techniques. ED has low computational
requirements, but needs a relatively high SNR to perform detection. Correlation-based de-
tection methods require more processing power, but show improved detection potential in
low-SNR scenarios [16]. The two most promising detection methods are the PCA or eigen-
detection techniques [16, 68, 77], and the nonlinear techniques [80, 83]. These techniques
should be investigated further as suggested in Section 6.5.
Parameter estimation is also important and forms part of the detection process, as an
unknown intercepted signal should be classified in order to confirm that the intercepted
signal is in fact the signal of interest [15]. Furthermore, semi-blind detection and esti-
mation techniques depend on prior knowledge of certain signal parameters. For example,
the DSSS detection techniques presented in [16, 54] require knowledge of the spreading
sequence length in order to detect the presence of the signal. Likewise, the estimation
techniques presented in [77,86,90,93] require the sequence length in order to estimate the
actual chip sequence. If the spreading sequence can be estimated, the intercepted DSSS
transmission can be despread, and the transmitted information can be accessed. The esti-
mation techniques reviewed in this thesis focus on the extraction of the spreading sequence
(in addition to other RF signal parameters) from the intercepted signal. Techniques to
estimate the spreading sequence length are presented in Chapter 5 and published in [17].
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The detection of both military and non-military communication systems were considered
in this thesis, as DSSS signaling is widely used in both domains. Furthermore, the algo-
rithms presented in this thesis are applicable to the detection of any type of weak signal,
as long as it has a periodic pattern. It is this feature, the cyclostationary nature of com-
munication signals such as DSSS transmissions, which make them detectable even if the
signal parameters are not known a priori.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
SIMULATION OF WIDEBAND
SIGNALS IN AWGN
This appendix considers the simulation of spread spectrum signals in AWGN conditions
which was used in this thesis to perform Monte-Carlo analysis. Further details on the
simulation platform discussed in Section 4.2.2 are also provided.
A.1 Oversampling of signals
Figs. A.1 and A.2 show the temporal and spectral representations of a DSSS signal x(t)
spread with the Barker-11 code (10110111000) using 10 samples per chip. The AWGN
sequence w(t) ∼ N (0, 1) and the sum of the signal and noise (all sampled at the same
sampling frequency) are also shown. The signal and noise powers are Ps = Pn = 1 W ,
such that the SNR is 0 dB1. The top graph of Fig. A.1 shows ten spread bits (1001101010)
of the signal and the top graph of Fig. A.2 shows the associated power spectrum. Table
A.1 contains the parameter values used to plot the graphs in Figs. A.1 and A.2.
Although the SNR is 0 dB for Ps = Pn, Fig. A.2 indicates that a significant portion of
the noise lies outside the main lobe (or first null-to-null bandwidth) of the signal. The
SNR can therefore easily be increased by filtering out the high-frequency noise, although
filtering will introduce other effects (such as changes to the signal amplitude and phase,
and the introduction of correlation) and will complicate the computer simulation model.
Oversampling the digital signal therefore results in a simulation model with a relatively
narrow-band information signal in wideband noise. Without filtering, the SNR will there-
fore be unrealistically low in the simulation, and performance predictions will be overly
optimistic if the approach is not amended.
The reasons for sampling at a frequency greater than or equal to the Nyquist rate in-
clude avoiding aliasing to allow reconstruction of an analogue signal from its discrete-time
equivalent, increasing the spectral distance between the main and mirror spectral lobes
to ease filter requirements, and for visual display of signals. For information transmission
purposes, it is however possible to sample at frequencies lower than the Nyquist rate.
1This SNR measurement does not take sampling bandwidth into account.
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Table A.1: Parameter values used in Figs. A.1 and A.2.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Data rate fb 1 Mbps Bit period Tb 1 µs
Chip rate fchip 11 Mcps Chip period Tchip 90.91 ns
Sampling rate fs 110 MHz Sampling period Ts 9.091 ns
Chips per bit N 11 Samples per chip Nspc 10
Samples per bit N ×Nspc 110 Total bits NT (Fig. A.2) 100
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Figure A.1: Temporal representations of Barker-11 sequence and AWGN (Nspc = 10).
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Figure A.2: Spectral representations of Barker-11 sequence and AWGN (Nspc = 10).
A.2 Nyquist sampling and bandwidth
According to the Nyquist sampling theorem [61], the sampling rate fs must exceed the
highest frequency component in the continuous-time signal by at least a factor of two, to
allow reconstruction of the signal. Assuming the DSSS signal is bandlimited to fchip, the
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sampling rate should then be
fs ≥ 2fchip (A.1)
∴ fs
fchip
≥ 2 (A.2)
where the factor can be shown to be
fs
fchip
=
Tchip
Ts
= Nspc (A.3)
which is the number of samples used to represent a single chip of the spreading sequence.
At least two samples per chip are therefore required to satisfy the Nyquist sampling
requirement. However, one sample per chip is sufficient to carry the digital information,
as the Nyquist bandwidth [28] (in Hz) is half the chip rate (in chips per second) using
an antipodal DSSS sequence. The aim is not to reconstruct a continuous-time signal, and
therefore sampling at the chip rate fs = fchip or Nspc = 1 can be allowed. It is however
assumed that perfect symbol or chip synchronisation can be achieved in the receiver, such
that sampling occurs at the right instant to recover the digital information.
Figs. A.3 and A.4 show the temporal and spectral representations of the Barker-11 spread
signal x(t) using 1 sample per chip. Due to undersampling, the noise w(t) is limited to the
Nyquist bandwidth of the digital signal, and no noise filtering is therefore required. As no
correlation is introduced due to filtering, white noise scenarios can thus be simulated and
comparisons can easily be made with theoretical derivations based on AWGN assumptions
(which are readily available in several text books such as [5]) also discussed in Section
A.3. Furthermore, the simulation is simplified using Nspc = 1, as the minimum number of
samples is used, which limits computer memory usage and minimises simulation time.
It is clear that the noise power is higher in Fig. A.4 than in A.2, although the SNR is 0 dB
in both figures. The lower sampling frequency limits the noise power to the main spectral
lobe of the signal, and the SNR level is therefore more realistic (although the SNR is still
only a function of signal and noise powers and not of the sampling bandwidth).
Nothing will be gained by using more than 1 sample per chip in the Monte-Carlo com-
puter simulations, as was done in this thesis to evaluate the performance of detection
algorithms. In a practical receiver, it would however make sense to sample at a higher fre-
quency. Advantages include the simplification of symbol synchronisation and the reasons
mentioned in Section A.1.
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Figure A.3: Temporal representations of Barker-11 sequence and AWGN (Nspc = 1).
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Figure A.4: Spectral representations of Barker-11 sequence and AWGN (Nspc = 1).
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A.3 Bit error rate performance
The method used in this thesis to validate the DSSS simulation platform shown in Fig.
1.5 and also discussed in Sections 4.2.1 and 5.2 is considered here. By measuring the
BER in simulation and comparing it with theoretical derivations, the simulation model
and parameters (including the data and noise powers, and the noise distribution) can be
confirmed to be correct.
The error probability of BPSK in AWGN is well known as [26]
Pe = Q
(√
2 εb
N0
)
(A.4)
with Q(·) the right-tail probability of the standard normal distribution, εb the energy per
bit and N0 the single-sided noise PSD. The quantity εb/N0 is the SNR normalised with the
noise-equivalent bandwidth of a digital receiver [143], which provides a convenient metric
to compare the performances of different communication systems where the parameter
values of the communication systems are available.
In the non-cooperative context, using the SNR metric makes more sense as the intercept
receiver typically has no knowledge regarding the information signal (such as the band-
width, modulation type, bit energy, etc.). Equation (A.4) can be rewritten in terms of
SNR by noting that
Ps =
εb
Tb
(A.5)
∴ εb = PsTb. (A.6)
Furthermore, the single-sided PSD can be written as
N0 =
PN
fs/2
= 2PNTs (A.7)
as the single-sided simulation bandwidth is fs/2. The normalised SNR can therefore be
written by combining (A.6) and (A.7) as
εb
N0
=
PsTb
2PNTs
=
SNR×Nspc
2
(A.8)
such that (A.4) can be written as
Pe = Q
(√
SNR×Nspc
)
(A.9)
which was used to plot the graphs shown in Figs. 4.1 and 5.1.
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ESTIMATION OF
COMMUNICATION SIGNAL
PARAMETERS
The focus of this thesis is on the detection of DSSS signals. However, parameter estimation
is closely related and some detection approaches also rely on estimation principles. This
appendix briefly considers some concepts of parameter estimation theory [15,29].
B.1 Estimation theory
Parameter estimation is concerned with extracting the value of an unknown parameter
θ from a received signal. The estimated value or estimator θˆ is determined by applying
a function to the received signal (similar to performing detection). Estimation accuracy
can be defined in terms of the average estimation error or mean square error (MSE)
measure [15]
MSE
(
θˆ
)
= E
[(
θˆ − θ
)2]
(B.1)
= var
(
θˆ
)
+
[
E
(
θˆ
)
− θ
]2
(B.2)
with the first term the variance, and the second term the bias. If the parameter value is
correctly estimated on average, such that E(θˆ) = θ, the estimator is said to be unbiased.
The unbiased estimator with the minimum variance (which can theoretically be derived
using the Cramer-Rao lower bound [15]) is then the minimum-variance unbiased estimator.
Generally, the MSE cannot be used to realise an estimation formula, as (B.2) depends on θ
which is the actual parameter to be estimated (which is unknown). However, several other
methods and theorems have been developed which may be used to develop an estimation
strategy [15].
Parameter estimation can be performed mainly using two approaches, which depend on
assumptions made regarding the unknown parameter. The unknown parameter can be
assumed to be either a deterministic constant (classical estimation) or a realisation of a
random process, where a prior PDF is assigned to the parameter (Bayesian estimation).
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B.2 Joint detection and estimation
Signal detection and parameter estimation are traditionally performed separately and
independently in communication problems [129]. Detection is performed first to determine
whether the signal of interest is present within noise or not. When a decision is made that
the signal of interest is present, the parameter values may be estimated. Although this
approach may make sense in several applications, it cannot always be ascertained that
the signal of interest is surely present before attempting to perform estimation.
In certain applications detection and estimation can be formulated as a joint problem
resulting in improved performance [136]. Other applications require parameter values (or
their estimates) in order to perform detection (e.g. the estimator-correlator [5]). Referring
to the subject area as either “detection and estimation” or “estimation and detection” is
therefore equally valid in many applications.
The separation of signal detection and parameter estimation as distinct operations is
being replaced by simultaneous detection and estimation techniques, mainly due to the
rapidly changing environment in which modern communication systems operate. It is
therefore desirable to constantly update parameter estimates while performing detection
on the received signals [29]. If joint detection and estimation becomes a requirement
in cooperative communication system design, it will become even more important for
COMINT receivers.
B.3 Estimation of DSSS sequence length
Chapter 5 considered the estimation of the sequence length (an integer value) of spreading
sequences. The estimation accuracy was expressed in terms of the probability of correct
estimation Pce, which in this case is more appropriate than for example the MSE given in
(B.2). In many estimation problems, the closer the estimate is to the true parameter value,
the better the performance of the estimation technique. The variance around the true value
is therefore an indication of the accuracy of an estimator. However, for the application of
detecting DSSS signals as considered in Chapters 4 and 5, estimation performance is not a
function of how close the estimated value is to the true value. If the actual sequence length
is N , an estimated value of N−1 instead of N−2 does not improve the performance of the
DSSS detection algorithm, which depends on the sequence length estimation algorithm.
The detection algorithm presented in Chapter 4 requires the correct value N , and any
incorrect value will result in the algorithm not functioning (see also Figs. 5.5 and 5.6).
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PROBABILITY AND
LIKELIHOOD
The terms “probability” and “likelihood” are not synonyms in statistical inference [144].
Probability refers to the chance (or odds) of occurrence of an event given the parameters,
whereas likelihood refers to the chance of a parameter being or taking on a certain value
given the data or outcomes of an experiment. Correct phrases are therefore, for example
“probability of an event” and “likelihood of the parameter”.
C.1 Probability
Probability is defined in terms of the PDF p(y|θ) where y represents the data value (or
event) and θ the parameter(s). For example, the Gaussian PDF
p(y|µ, σ2) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
(y − µ)2
]
(C.1)
expresses the probability of a given data sample value being y, given that the mean and
variance have fixed values µ and σ2. The probability that y = 0 (with µ = 0 and σ2 = 1)
is therefore 1/
√
2pi.
Some example questions to further explain probability are given below.
• Given that the mean is zero and the variance one, what is the probability that the
outcome will be between 1.1 and 1.2?
• If a fair coin is flipped 100 times, what is the probability of it landing heads-up
every time?
• Given that hypothesisH0 is true, what is the probability that the received amplitude
is greater than 3?
Furthermore, it is also important to distinguish between probability and probability den-
sity (or PDF). From Kolmogorov’s axioms [110], a probability of an event must always lie
in the range [0, 1]. A probability density can however grow arbitrarily large, although the
integral of the PDF will be one (accounting for all events in the probability space). Thus,
(C.1) specifies a density, but the three bulleted examples above are real probabilities.
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C.2 Likelihood
Likelihood is determined from the data PDF when the data values are known. The func-
tion p(y|θ) is the PDF of the data y if the parameter value θ is known, and the same
function p(y|θ) is the likelihood function of the parameter θ if the data value y is known.
For example, if a statistical experiment (of which the outcome is known to be normally
distributed with unity variance) is undertaken and the sample value y = 0 is observed,
the likelihood function of the mean can be derived from (C.1) as
p(y = 0|µ, σ2 = 1) = 1√
2pi
exp
[
−µ
2
2
]
. (C.2)
For this example, the likelihood that µ = 0 is therefore 1/
√
2pi.
Some example questions to further explain likelihood are given below.
• A value of 1.3 has been obtained from the distribution, what is the likelihood of the
mean being zero?
• Given that a coin is flipped 100 times and it landed on heads every time, what is
the likelihood of the coin being fair?
• Given that the received amplitude is 3.5, what is the likelihood that hypothesis H0
is true?
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Q-FUNCTION
D.1 Standard normal distribution
The Q-function is the right-tail probability of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1),
which can be expressed as [7]
Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
−t
2
2
)
dt (D.1)
which can be evaluated numerically. However, since the Q-function is often used, it is well
tabulated and implemented in several statistical software libraries. The Q-function can
also be expressed in terms of the error function [7]
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
exp
(−t2) dt (D.2)
or the complementary error function [7]
erfc(x) = 1− erf(x) (D.3)
=
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
exp
(−t2) dt (D.4)
as
Q(x) =
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
x√
2
)
(D.5)
=
1
2
erfc
(
x√
2
)
. (D.6)
D.2 General normal distribution
The right-tail probability of the general normal distribution N (µ, σ2) can be written as
QN (µ,σ2)(x) =
1√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
x
exp
[
−(t− µ)
2
2σ2
]
dt (D.7)
which should be rewritten in terms of the Q-function given in (D.1) to make use of the
software libraries.
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By using the substitution
u =
t− µ
σ
(D.8)
∴ du
dt
=
1
σ
(D.9)
∴ dt = σ du (D.10)
in (D.7), the integration limits can be changed as follows
t = x → u = x− µ
σ
(D.11)
t =∞ → u =∞ (D.12)
such that (D.7) can be written as
QN (µ,σ2)(x) =
1√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
x
exp
[
−1
2
(
t− µ
σ
)2]
dt (D.13)
=
1√
2piσ2
∫ ∞
x−µ
σ
exp
[
−1
2
u2
]
σ du (D.14)
=
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x−µ
σ
exp
[
−u
2
2
]
du (D.15)
= Q
(
x− µ
σ
)
. (D.16)
Therefore, the right-tail probability of the RV X ∼ N (µ, σ2) can be expressed as
p(X > γ) = QN (µ,σ2)(γ) (D.17)
= p
(
X − µ
σ
>
γ − µ
σ
)
(D.18)
= Q
(
γ − µ
σ
)
. (D.19)
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APPENDIX E
DETECTION OF UNKNOWN
DETERMINISTIC SIGNALS
An unknown DSSS signal can be viewed as a random or noise-like signal, especially if the
interceptor has no knowledge of the pseudo-random spreading code. In this appendix it is
shown that optimal detection (derived using the LRT) of an AWGN signal hidden within
AWGN can be achieved by using the energy of the received signal as the test statistic.
E.1 Hypothesis problem
The hypothesis problem can be stated in terms of the received signal y[n] as
H0 : y[n] = w[n] (E.1)
H1 : y[n] = x[n] + w[n] (E.2)
with the sample index n = 1, 2, . . . , N . The background noise is w[n] ∼ N (0, σ2w), and the
signal of interest is x[n] ∼ N (0, σ2x). The only feature differentiating the two hypotheses
is clearly the variance or power content, which can be written as
H0 : σ2y = σ20 = σ2w (E.3)
H1 : σ2y = σ21 = σ2x + σ2w (E.4)
since the signal and noise are assumed to be independent.
E.2 Likelihood functions and likelihood ratio
Each of the joint likelihoods p(y;H0) and p(y;H1) can respectively be written as the
product of the individual likelihoods p(y[n];H0) and p(y[n];H1) as the received samples
(RVs) are i.i.d. [5]. The likelihood functions are therefore given by
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p(y;H0) = 1
[2piσ20]
N
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ20
N∑
n=1
y2[n]
}
(E.5)
p(y;H1) = 1
[2piσ21]
N
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ21
N∑
n=1
y2[n]
}
(E.6)
and the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) can then be expressed as
ln Λ(y) = ln
p(y;H1)
p(y;H0) (E.7)
= N ln
(
σ0
σ1
)
+
σ21 − σ20
2σ20σ
2
1
N∑
n=1
y2[n]. (E.8)
E.3 Test statistic
According to the NP theorem [5] a detection should be declared if the likelihood ratio
exceeds a threshold γ, which is determined from the set false alarm rate. Isolating the
data-dependent term from (E.8), the test statistic is obtained as
T (y) =
N∑
n=1
y2[n] (E.9)
which is the energy contained in the received signal y. A detection should be declared if
T (y) > γ′ (E.10)
with γ′ the new threshold value, absorbing all the non-data-dependent terms in (E.8),
which do not affect the decision region. The detection is therefore based on the energy
content of the signal, finding its origin in the multivariate Gaussian distribution.
E.4 Detection performance
In order to calculate the detection performance, the distribution of the test statistic under
both hypotheses needs to be determined. The sum of the squares of N independent stan-
dard normal RVs N (0, 1) is distributed according to the central Chi-squared distribution
with N degrees of freedom [5]. By normalising the variance of each received sample, the
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test statistic given in (E.9) can be written as
Tnorm(y) =
N∑
n=1
(
y[n]
σy
)2
(E.11)
=
1
σ2y
T (y) (E.12)
where Tnorm(y) has a central Chi-squared distribution with N degrees of freedom. It can
therefore be stated that
T (y)
σ2y
∼ X 2N . (E.13)
The detection performance can therefore be determined from the right-tail probability of
the central Chi-squared distribution. The false alarm rate is given as
PFA = p(T (y) > γ
′;H0) (E.14)
= p
(
T (y)
σ20
>
γ′
σ20
)
(E.15)
= QX 2N
(
γ′
σ20
)
(E.16)
from which the optimal threshold level can be calculated as
γ′ = σ20 Q
−1
X 2N
(PFA) . (E.17)
Similarly, the detection probability can be shown to be
PD = p(T (y) > γ
′;H1) (E.18)
= QX 2N
(
γ′
σ21
)
(E.19)
= QX 2N
(
σ20
σ21
Q−1X 2N
(PFA)
)
. (E.20)
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APPENDIX F
EIGENVALUE MATHEMATICS
This appendix contains further explanation of the eigenvalue decomposition of the SCM
of aligned and shifted data matrices, presented in Section 4.3.
F.1 Aligned data matrix
Assume the code sequence c = [c1, c2, c3] is used to spread the data sequence d = [d1, d2, d3]
and is intercepted and arranged to form the detection matrix (assuming no channel effects)
X = dTc =
 d1c1 d1c2 d1c3d2c1 d2c2 d2c3
d3c1 d3c2 d3c3
 . (F.1)
The SCM of X can be expressed as
R =
1
N
XTX = α1
 c1c1 c1c2 c1c3c2c1 c2c2 c2c3
c3c1 c3c2 c3c3
 (F.2)
with scale factor
α1 =
1
N
(
d21 + d
2
2 + d
2
3
)
(F.3)
and square matrix dimension N = 3.
F.1.1 Eigenvalue calculation
This section shows that aligned matrices of the form given in (F.2) has only one eigenvalue,
which is equal to the trace of the matrix. The matrix can be written in the form
A =
 k1c1 k1c2 k1c3k2c1 k2c2 k2c3
k3c1 k3c2 k3c3
 (F.4)
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which is a matrix with all rows (and columns) linearly dependent. Calculating the eigen-
values of A is equivalent to finding the roots of its characteristic polynomial, defined
as [123]
p(λ) = det (A− λI) . (F.5)
The first step in finding the roots is setting the determinant to zero:
p(λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
k1c1 − λ k1c2 k1c3
k2c1 k2c2 − λ k2c3
k3c1 k3c2 k3c3 − λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0. (F.6)
The values of λ can then be calculated from
p(λ) = p1(λ)− p2(λ) = 0 (F.7)
with
p1(λ) = (k1c1 − λ)(k2c2 − λ)(k3c3 − λ) + (k1c2)(k2c3)(k3c1) + (k2c1)(k3c2)(k1c3)
= −λ3 + [k1c1 + k2c2 + k3c3]λ2 − [k1c1k2c2 + k1c1k3c3 + k2c2k3c3]λ+ 3k1c1k2c2k3c3
(F.8)
and
p2(λ) = (k1c3)(k2c2 − λ)(k3c1) + (k1c2)(k2c1)(k3c3 − λ) + (k2c3)(k3c2)(k1c1 − λ)
= −[k1c1k2c2 + k1c1k3c3 + k2c2k3c3]λ+ 3k1c1k2c2k3c3.
(F.9)
By combining (F.7), (F.8) and (F.9), the characteristic polynomial can be written as
p(λ) = −λ3 + [k1c1 + k2c2 + k3c3]λ2 (F.10)
since the lower-order terms sum to zero. By setting (F.10) equal to zero, the only non-zero
eigenvalue of A can directly be found as
λ = k1c1 + k2c2 + k3c3 (F.11)
which is the trace (sum of diagonal elements) of A. From (F.10), it is clear that the other
two eigenvalues are zero.
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F.1.2 General form
In general, if a code sequence c = [c1, c2, c3, . . . , cN ] is used to spread the data sequence
d = [d1, d2, d3, . . . , dN ] and is intercepted and arranged to form the detection matrix
X = dTc =

d1c1 d1c2 d1c3 · · · d1cN
d2c1 d2c2 d2c3 · · · d2cN
d3c1 d3c2 d3c3 · · · d3cN
...
...
...
. . .
...
dNc1 dNc2 dNc3 · · · dNcN

(F.12)
the entry in the ith row and jth column (i, j ∈ [1, N ]) of the SCM of X can be shown to
be (following the same approach as in Section F.1)
Ri,j =
(
1
N
N∑
l=1
d2l
)
cicj. (F.13)
The eigenvalues of R can be found as follows. From linear algebra it is known that the
trace of a square matrix A equals the sum of its eigenvalues [75]
tr(A) =
N∑
i=1
Ai,i =
N∑
i=1
λi. (F.14)
Since R is aligned (and all the rows are linearly dependent) it follows that R will only
have one non-zero eigenvalue equal to the trace, which can be expressed using (F.13) and
(F.14) as
λ = tr(R) =
N∑
i=1
Ri,i (F.15)
=
(
1
N
N∑
l=1
d2l
)
N∑
i=1
c2i . (F.16)
F.2 Eigen analysis of non-aligned data matrix
This section will only consider the 3× 3 detection matrix for illustration purposes. If the
original detection matrix given in (F.1) is cyclically shifted by one chip to the left, the
following matrix is formed
X−1 =
 d1c2 d1c3 d2c1d2c2 d2c3 d3c1
d3c2 d3c3 d1c1
 (F.17)
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of which the SCM can be shown to be
R−1 =
 α1c2c2 α1c2c3 α2c1c2α1c2c3 α1c3c3 α2c1c3
α2c1c2 α2c1c3 α1c1c1
 (F.18)
with scale factors
α1 =
1
N
(
d21 + d
2
2 + d
2
3
)
(F.19)
α2 =
1
N
(d1d2 + d1d3 + d2d3) . (F.20)
By following the eigenvalue calculation method of Section F.1.1, the characteristic poly-
nomial of R−1 given in (F.18) can be shown to be
p(λ) = −λ3 + α1
(
c21 + c
2
2 + c
2
3
)
λ2 + c21
(
α22c
2
3 + α
2
2c2c3 − α21c23 − α21c22
)
λ. (F.21)
Since (F.21) has no constant term (like (F.10)), one root will be λ = 0. The other two
roots can be calculated by solving the quadratic equation
− λ2 + α1
(
c21 + c
2
2 + c
2
3
)
λ+ c21
(
α22c
2
3 + α
2
2c2c3 − α21c23 − α21c22
)
= 0. (F.22)
Since the sum of the two non-zero eigenvalues of R−1 equals the trace, and the trace
remains the same whether the detection matrix X is aligned or not (compare (F.2) and
(F.18)), the largest eigenvalue will be less when X is not aligned (assuming both eigen-
values are positive). In the aligned case, there is only one non-zero eigenvalue, whereas in
the non-aligned case there are two non-zero eigenvalues (see (F.22)).
By cyclically shifting the detection matrix given in (F.17) again by one chip to the left
(similar to shifting the original detection matrix given in (F.1) by one chip to the right),
the resulting SCM will still have two non-zero eigenvalues. By repeatedly performing
cyclic shifting on the detection matrix X, the largest eigenvalue of the SCM will reach its
maximum (equal to the matrix trace) every time X is aligned. The resulting eigenvalue
sequence will therefore be a periodic sequence, reaching its peak value once every N cyclic
shifts.
It can be assumed that all eigenvalues of R (for any number of cyclic shifts of X) are real
(R is symmetric) and non-negative (R is positive semi-definite) [5]. Since R is of the form
kXTX, it is symmetric (RT = R) since
[
kXTX
]T
= kXTX. Furthermore, R is positive
semi-definite since it can be shown that for any non-zero column vector z [114]
zTXTXz ≥ 0. (F.23)
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EIGENVALUE BOUNDS
This appendix contains further explanation of the eigenvalue bounds presented in Sections
4.3.4.1 and 5.4.3.1. The eigenvalues of the matrix H = NR = XTX presented here were
obtained using the Maxima numerical analysis software package [145]. The N ×N DSSS
data matrix X is given by
X = dTc =

d1c1 d1c2 d1c3 · · · d1cN
d2c1 d2c2 d2c3 · · · d2cN
d3c1 d3c2 d3c3 · · · d3cN
...
...
...
. . .
...
dNc1 dNc2 dNc3 · · · dNcN

(G.1)
with the spreading code c = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] and data sequence d = [d1, d2, . . . , dN ], each
having antipodal elements c, d ∈ ±1. The data matrix X is cyclically shifted continually
by moving all row elements to the left, with the first element in each row moving to the
last position of the row above. The upper left matrix element is removed, and the lower
right element is fed with a new spread bit dN+1c. The eigenvalues of H = X
TX is then
calculated for each cyclic shift of X.
Subsequently, the eigenvalues of H for N = 3 to 7 are considered for cyclic shifts of X from
one shift to N − 1 shifts. From N shifts the cycle repeats such that N shifts correspond
to no shift, N + 1 shifts to 1 shift, etc. The underlying pattern is then analysed to obtain
a general expression for the eigenvalues in order to find the limits of the largest two
eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 over the range of cyclic shifts of X considered.
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G.1 3 by 3 matrix
G.1.1 No shift or shifts of integer multiples of N
Using (F.16) the only non-zero eigenvalue of R can be calculated as
λ (R) =
(
1
N
N∑
l=1
d2l
)
N∑
i=1
c2i (G.2)
=
(
1
3
3∑
l=1
1
)
3∑
i=1
1 (G.3)
= 3. (G.4)
The corresponding eigenvalue of H = NR is therefore λ1 = 9. The eigenvalues obtained
using Maxima are: λ1 = 9 and λ2 = λ3 = 0.
G.1.2 One or two shifts
The eigenvalues of H for both one or two shifts of X are of the form
λ1 =
9 +
√
∆
2
(G.5)
λ2 =
9−√∆
2
(G.6)
λ3 = 0 (G.7)
with the discriminant
∆ = (16 d1 d2 d3 + 16 d2) d4 + 16 d1 d3 + 33 (G.8)
obtained through simplification using the fact that all data bits d = ±1 and all code chips
c = ±1. (The simplification follows by replacing all occurrences of ck and dk with k even
in ∆ with 1.) By considering all possible values and combinations of the data bits, the
discriminant is found to be within the range ∆ ∈ [17, 81].
G.2 4 by 4 matrix
G.2.1 No shift
Similar as in Section G.1.1, the eigenvalues of H obtained using Maxima for N = 4 are:
λ1 = 16 and λ2 = λ3 = λ4 = 0.
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G.2.2 One or three shifts
The non-zero eigenvalues of H are of the form
λ1 =
16 +
√
∆
2
(G.9)
λ2 =
16−√∆
2
(G.10)
with the discriminant
∆ = ((24 d2 d3 + 24 d1 d2) d4 + 24 d3) d5 + (24 d1 d2 d3 + 24 d2) d4 + 24 d1 d3 + 112 (G.11)
with range ∆ ∈ [64; 256] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.2.3 Two shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.9) and (G.10), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((32 d2 d3 + 32 d1 d2) d4 + 32 d3) d5 + (32 d1 d2 d3 + 32 d2) d4 + 32 d1 d3 + 64 (G.12)
with range ∆ ∈ [0; 256] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.3 5 by 5 matrix
G.3.1 No shift
Similar as in Section G.1.1, the largest eigenvalue of H obtained using Maxima for N = 5
is λ1 = 25, while the remaining four (λ2 to λ5) are zero.
G.3.2 One or four shifts
The non-zero eigenvalues of H are of the form
λ1 =
25 +
√
∆
2
(G.13)
λ2 =
25−√∆
2
(G.14)
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with the discriminant
∆ = ((32 d3 d4 + 32 d2 d3 + 32 d1 d2) d5 + 32 d4) d6 + ((32 d2 d3 + 32 d1 d2) d4 + 32 d3) d5
+ (32 d1 d2 d3 + 32 d2) d4 + 32 d1 d3 + 305 (G.15)
with range ∆ ∈ [241; 625] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.3.3 Two or three shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.13) and (G.14), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((48 d3 d4 + 48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d5 + 48 d4) d6 + ((48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d4 + 48 d3) d5
+ (48 d1 d2 d3 + 48 d2) d4 + 48 d1 d3 + 145
with range ∆ ∈ [49; 625] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.4 6 by 6 matrix
G.4.1 No shift
Similar as in Section G.1.1, the largest eigenvalue of H obtained using Maxima for N = 6
is λ1 = 36, while the remaining five (λ2 to λ6) are zero.
G.4.2 One or five shifts
The non-zero eigenvalues of H are of the form
λ1 =
36 +
√
∆
2
(G.16)
λ2 =
36−√∆
2
(G.17)
with the discriminant
∆ = ((40 d4 d5 + 40 d3 d4 + 40 d2 d3 + 40 d1 d2) d6 + 40 d5) d7
+ ((40 d3 d4 + 40 d2 d3 + 40 d1 d2) d5 + 40 d4) d6
+ ((40 d2 d3 + 40 d1 d2) d4 + 40 d3) d5
+ (40 d1 d2 d3 + 40 d2) d4 + 40 d1 d3 + 696
with range ∆ ∈ [576; 1296] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
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G.4.3 Two or four shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.16) and (G.17), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((64 d4 d5 + 64 d3 d4 + 64 d2 d3 + 64 d1 d2) d6 + 64 d5) d7
+ ((64 d3 d4 + 64 d2 d3 + 64 d1 d2) d5 + 64 d4) d6
+ ((64 d2 d3 + 64 d1 d2) d4 + 64 d3) d5
+ (64 d1 d2 d3 + 64 d2) d4 + 64 d1 d3 + 336
with range ∆ ∈ [144; 1296] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.4.4 Three shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.16) and (G.17), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((72 d4 d5 + 72 d3 d4 + 72 d2 d3 + 72 d1 d2) d6 + 72 d5) d7
+ ((72 d3 d4 + 72 d2 d3 + 72 d1 d2) d5 + 72 d4) d6
+ ((72 d2 d3 + 72 d1 d2) d4 + 72 d3) d5
+ (72 d1 d2 d3 + 72 d2) d4 + 72 d1 d3 + 216
with range ∆ ∈ [0; 1296] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.5 7 by 7 matrix
G.5.1 No shift
Similar as in Section G.1.1, the largest eigenvalue of H obtained using Maxima for N = 7
is λ1 = 49, while the remaining six (λ2 to λ7) are zero.
G.5.2 One or six shifts
The non-zero eigenvalues of H are of the form
λ1 =
49 +
√
∆
2
(G.18)
λ2 =
49−√∆
2
(G.19)
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with the discriminant
∆ = ((48 d5 d6 + 48 d4 d5 + 48 d3 d4 + 48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d7 + 48 d6) d8
+ ((48 d4 d5 + 48 d3 d4 + 48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d6 + 48 d5) d7
+ ((48 d3 d4 + 48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d5 + 48 d4) d6
+ ((48 d2 d3 + 48 d1 d2) d4 + 48 d3) d5
+ (48 d1 d2 d3 + 48 d2) d4 + 48 d1 d3 + 1393
with range ∆ ∈ [1249; 2401] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.5.3 Two or five shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.18) and (G.19), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((80 d5 d6 + 80 d4 d5 + 80 d3 d4 + 80 d2 d3 + 80 d1 d2) d7 + 80 d6) d8
+ ((80 d4 d5 + 80 d3 d4 + 80 d2 d3 + 80 d1 d2) d6 + 80 d5) d7
+ ((80 d3 d4 + 80 d2 d3 + 80 d1 d2) d5 + 80 d4) d6
+ ((80 d2 d3 + 80 d1 d2) d4 + 80 d3) d5
+ (80 d1 d2 d3 + 80 d2) d4 + 80 d1 d3 + 721
with range ∆ ∈ [481; 2401] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
G.5.4 Three or four shifts
The form of the non-zero eigenvalues of H is identical to (G.18) and (G.19), though the
discriminant is
∆ = ((96 d5 d6 + 96 d4 d5 + 96 d3 d4 + 96 d2 d3 + 96 d1 d2) d7 + 96 d6) d8
+ ((96 d4 d5 + 96 d3 d4 + 96 d2 d3 + 96 d1 d2) d6 + 96 d5) d7
+ ((96 d3 d4 + 96 d2 d3 + 96 d1 d2) d5 + 96 d4) d6
+ ((96 d2 d3 + 96 d1 d2) d4 + 96 d3) d5
+ (96 d1 d2 d3 + 96 d2) d4 + 96 d1 d3 + 385
with range ∆ ∈ [97; 2401] obtained as described in Section G.1.2.
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G.6 General form and bounds on λ1 and λ2
As illustrated in Sections G.1 to G.5 and discussed in Section 4.3.3, the matrix H and
consequently the SCM R has at most two non-zero eigenvalues, irrespective of the value
of N and how many cyclic shifts are applied to the data matrix X. From the expressions
derived in Sections G.1 to G.5, the general form of the largest two eigenvalues of H can
be expressed as
λ =
N2 ±√∆
2
(G.20)
which can be understood from the fact that the simplified characteristic polynomial of H
has a maximum order of two (see e.g. (F.21) and (F.22)). The roots of the characteris-
tic polynomial can therefore be calculated using the quadratic formula, which resembles
(G.20). The ranges for the discriminant value ∆ in (G.20), found in Sections G.1 to G.5,
are summarised in Table G.1. The different values for the minimum correspond to different
numbers of cyclic shifts applied to X.
Table G.1: Ranges of discriminant values.
N ∆min ∆max
3 17 81
4 min(0, 64) 256
5 min(49, 241) 625
6 min(0, 144, 576) 1296
7 min(97, 481, 1249) 2401
From Table G.1 it is clear that
∆ ∈

[
0; N4
]
(N even)
[
2N2 − 1; N4] (N odd)
(G.21)
from which the upper and lower limits of λ1 and λ2 can be calculated.
G.6.1 Upper and lower limits of λ1
The upper limit of the largest eigenvalue can be expressed using (G.20) and (G.21) as
λ1,max =
N2 +
√
∆max
2
=
N2 +
√
N4
2
= N2.
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The lower limit of the largest eigenvalue can be expressed using (G.20) and (G.21) as
λ1,min =
N2 +
√
∆min
2
=

N2
2
(N even)
N2 +
√
2N2 − 1
2
(N odd)
G.6.2 Upper and lower limits of λ2
The upper limit of the second largest eigenvalue can be expressed using (G.20) and (G.21)
as
λ2,max =
N2 −√∆min
2
=

N2
2
(N even)
N2 −√2N2 − 1
2
(N odd)
The lower limit of the second largest eigenvalue can be expressed using (G.20) and (G.21)
as
λ2,min =
N2 −√∆max
2
=
N2 −√N4
2
= 0.
G.6.3 Summary
Using the upper and lower limits given in Sections G.6.1 and G.6.2, the eigenvalue bounds
can be summarised as follows.
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λ1 ∈

[
N2
2
; N2
]
(N even)
[
N2 +
√
2N2 − 1
2
; N2
]
(N odd)
(G.22)
λ2 ∈

[
0;
N2
2
]
(N even)
[
0;
N2 −√2N2 − 1
2
]
(N odd)
(G.23)
G.6.4 Examples
Figs. G.1 and G.2 show example eigenvalue sequences of H = XTX when X (defined in
(G.1)) is cyclically shifted continuously. The spreading sequence used in Fig. G.1 is given
by
c = [1,−1, 1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1,−1,−1, 1, 1, 1, 1] (G.24)
with N = 15 to illustrate the case where N is odd. The spreading sequence used in Fig.
G.2 is given by
c = [1,−1, 1,−1,−1,−1,−1, 1,−1,−1,−1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] (G.25)
with N = 16 to illustrate the case where N is even. The cyclic shift parameter τ shown
in the two figures indicates the number of cyclic shifts applied to X. The upper and lower
bounds given in (G.22) and (G.23) are also shown on the graphs.
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Figure G.1: Eigenvalue sequences for odd sequence length.
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Figure G.2: Eigenvalue sequences for even sequence length.
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APPENDIX H
STATISTICAL DERIVATIONS
This appendix considers statistical derivations of importance mostly for Chapter 5.
H.1 Variance
The variance of a RV x can be expressed as [26]
σ2x = σ
2(x) = E
[
(x− E[x])2] (H.1)
= E
[
x2 − 2xE[x] + (E[x])2] (H.2)
= E
[
x2
]− 2E [xE[x]] + (E[x])2 (H.3)
= E
[
x2
]− 2E[x]E[x] + (E[x])2 (H.4)
= E
[
x2
]− (E[x])2 (H.5)
= E
[
x2
]− µ2x. (H.6)
The variance of cx, with c a constant value, can be expressed as
σ2(cx) = E
[
(cx)2
]− (E[cx])2 (H.7)
= c2E
[
x2
]− c2 (E[x])2 (H.8)
= c2σ2(x). (H.9)
H.2 Statistics of the product of two independent RVs
This section considers the statistics (mean µ and variance σ2) of the product of two inde-
pendent RVs. The product of two i.i.d. (normally distributed) RVs wnwn+k was considered
in Section 5.3.3.2 (see Equation (5.14)).
The expected value of Z = XY , with RVs X and Y independent, can be written as
E[Z] = E[XY ] = E[X]E[Y ] (H.10)
∴ µz = µxµy. (H.11)
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By combining (H.6) and (H.11), the variance of Z can be expressed as
σ2z = E[Z
2]− (E[Z])2 (H.12)
= E[X2Y 2]− (E[XY ])2 (H.13)
= E[X2]E[Y 2]− (E[X]E[Y ])2 (H.14)
= (σ2x + µ
2
x)(σ
2
y + µ
2
y)− (µ2xµ2y) (H.15)
= σ2xσ
2
y + σ
2
xµ
2
y + σ
2
yµ
2
x + µ
2
xµ
2
y − (µ2xµ2y) (H.16)
= σ2xσ
2
y + σ
2
xµ
2
y + σ
2
yµ
2
x. (H.17)
Equations (H.11) and (H.17) therefore provide the relationships between the means and
variances of the product Z and the two RVs X and Y .
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